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  1. Homo Moralis and regular altruists - preference evolution for when they disagree
    Autor*in: Akdeniz, Aslihan; Graser, Christopher; Veelen, Matthijs van
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Alger and Weibull (2013) present a model for the evolution of preferences under incomplete information and assortative matching. Their main result is that Homo Moralis - who maximizes a convex combination of her narrow self-interest and "the right... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 432
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    Alger and Weibull (2013) present a model for the evolution of preferences under incomplete information and assortative matching. Their main result is that Homo Moralis - who maximizes a convex combination of her narrow self-interest and "the right thing to do" - is evolutionarily stable, if it assigns a weight on the right thing to do that is equal to the assortment parameter. We give a counterexample against their central result, and a way to repair it. We also show that the result ceases to hold if we allow for mixed equilibria or coordination on asymmetric equilibria. Allowing for mixed equilibria, we show that if there is a stable preference, it will be behaviorally equivalent to a regular altruist that puts a positive weight on the payoff of the other that is equal to the assortment parameter. We also consider the cross-species empirical evidence.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/229682
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2020, 062
    Schlagworte: Homo Moralis; altruism; preference evolution
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Homo Moralis and regular altruists II
    Autor*in: Akdeniz, Aslihan; Graser, Christopher; Veelen, Matthijs van
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Alger and Weibull (2013) ask the question whether a combination of assortative matching and incomplete information leads to the evolution of moral or altruistic preferences. Their central result states that Homo Hamiltonenis - a type that has moral... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 432
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Alger and Weibull (2013) ask the question whether a combination of assortative matching and incomplete information leads to the evolution of moral or altruistic preferences. Their central result states that Homo Hamiltonenis - a type that has moral preferences with a morality parameter equal to the level of assortment - is evolutionarily stable, while preferences that lead to different behaviour are unstable. Together with their claim that altruistic and moral preferences differ sharply, this suggests that moral preferences tend to beat altruistic ones in evolutionary competition. We show that this is not true. First of all, we show that there is a loophole in the definition of evolutionary stability, allowing for Homo Hamiltonensis to satisfy the definition when the set of equilibria is empty, and their equilibrium behaviour is not determined. If we try to close this loophole, by allowing for mixing, or by allowing for asymmetric equilibria, we find that there are two options. With the first approach, the differences in behaviour between Homo Hamiltonensis and regular altruists can be substantial, but as soon as the difference appears, Homo Hamiltonensis can be invaded, and regular altruists win in direct competition. With the second way of allowing for mixing, or coordination on asymmetric equilibria, Homo Hamiltonensis cannot be invaded, but then the difference in behaviour all but disappears, as all equilibria between Homo Hamiltonensis are also equilibria between regular altruists.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/273836
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2023, 025
    Schlagworte: Altruism; morality; evolution; assortment; incomplete information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Repeated games with partner choice
    Autor*in: Graser, Christopher; Fujiwara, Takako; García, Julián; Veelen, Matthijs van
    Erschienen: [2024]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Repetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games is to assume that there is an exogenous probability with which every interaction is repeated. If it is sufficiently likely that interactions... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 432
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Repetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games is to assume that there is an exogenous probability with which every interaction is repeated. If it is sufficiently likely that interactions are repeated, then reciprocity and cooperation can evolve together in repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Who individuals interact with can however also be under their control, or at least to some degree. If we change the standard model so that it allows for individuals to terminate the interaction with their current partner, and find someone else to play their prisoner's dilemmas with, then this limits the effectiveness of disciplining each other within the partnership, as one can always leave to escape punishment. The option to leave can however also be used to get away from someone who is not cooperating, which also has a disciplining effect. We find that the net effect of introducing the option to leave on cooperation is positive; with the option to leave, the average amount of cooperation that evolves in simulations is substantially higher than without. One of the reasons for this increase in cooperation is that partner choice creates endogenous phenotypic assortment. The model thereby produces a good match with many forms of human cooperation in repeated settings, where we end up interacting, not only with random others that we cannot separate from, once matched, or with others that are genetically related to us, but also with partners that we choose to stay with, and that end up being similarly dependable not to defect on us as we are not to defect on them.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2024, 038
    Schlagworte: Wiederholte Spiele; Theorie
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Preventative cancer treatments through optimizing tissue structure
    Autor*in: Graser, Christopher
    Erschienen: February 22, 2020
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    The likelihood of cancer emergence is highly dependent on the underlying tissue structure. This article gives evolutionary explanations for why natural selection fails to select for tissue structures that would minimize the likelihood of cancer. In a... mehr

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    The likelihood of cancer emergence is highly dependent on the underlying tissue structure. This article gives evolutionary explanations for why natural selection fails to select for tissue structures that would minimize the likelihood of cancer. In a second step, a mathematical framework is proposed, within which the risk of cancer emergence can be expressed and calculated dependent on a given tissue structure. This can be used to identify optimal structures and strategies for improvement. Lastly, the article explores both, ways to identify target areas for such intervention, as well as avenues towards developing treatment options.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/220049
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2020, 012
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Repeated prisoner's dilemmas with errors
    how much subgameperfection, how much forgiveness, and how much cooperation?
    Autor*in: Graser, Christopher; Veelen, Matthijs van
    Erschienen: [2024]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma with implementation errors, and look at the resulting population dynamics, both analytically and with simulations. We show that with implementation errors, pure equilibrium strategies represented by finite... mehr

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    DS 432
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    We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma with implementation errors, and look at the resulting population dynamics, both analytically and with simulations. We show that with implementation errors, pure equilibrium strategies represented by finite state automata exhibit a structure that we call self-mirroring. Because selection easily spreads thinly on subgames that are reached after (multiple) errors, we find that in the simulations, strategies are often not best responding in all subgames. We also explore how forgiveness and cooperation respond to changes in the error rate and the continuation probability. Close to an error rate of 0, both show a hump-shaped pattern. We also explore how forgiveness and cooperation change with the error rate in models with a limited strategy set, and we have results for forgiveness at high error rates and/or low continuation probabilities.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2024, 022
    Schlagworte: Gefangenendilemma; Spieltheorie; Simulation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 102 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Mechanisms for the evolution of prosociality
    Autor*in: Graser, Christopher
    Erschienen: [2024]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, [Amsterdam]

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    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 11245.1/9281db2c-6241-4ce8-a9b7-689d407f597f
    Schriftenreihe: Tinbergen Institute research series ; 845
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 177 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Dissertation, , Universiteit van Amsterdam$f2024