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  1. A machine learning approach to analyze and support anti-corruption policy
    Autor*in: Ash, Elliott; Galletta, Sergio; Giommoni, Tommaso
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Can machine learning support better governance? In the context of Brazilian municipalities, 2001-2012, we have access to detailed accounts of local budgets and audit data on the associated fiscal corruption. Using the budget variables as predictors,... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
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    Can machine learning support better governance? In the context of Brazilian municipalities, 2001-2012, we have access to detailed accounts of local budgets and audit data on the associated fiscal corruption. Using the budget variables as predictors, we train a tree-based gradient-boosted classifier to predict the presence of corruption in held-out test data. The trained model, when applied to new data, provides a prediction-based measure of corruption that can be used for new empirical analysis or to support policy responses. We validate the empirical usefulness of this measure by replicating and extending some previous empirical evidence on corruption issues in Brazil. We then explore how the predictions can be used to support policies toward corruption. Our policy simulations show that, relative to the status quo policy of random audits, a targeted policy guided by the machine predictions could detect almost twice as many corrupt municipalities for the same audit rate. Similar gains can be achieved for a politically neutral targeting policy that equalizes audit rates across political parties.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235385
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9015 (2021)
    Schlagworte: algorithmic decision-making; corruption policy; local public finance
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Abandon ship?
    party brands and politicians' responses to a political scandal
    Autor*in: Daniele, Gianmarco; Galletta, Sergio; Geys, Benny
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Institut d’Economia de Barcelona, Barcelona

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2018, 03
    Schlagworte: Accountability; corruption; party cues; brands; multi-level governance
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Decision-making institutions and voters' preferences for fiscal policies
    Autor*in: Galletta, Sergio
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  KOF, Zurich, Switzerland

    This paper examines the effect of local political decision-making institutions (i.e., direct democracy vs. representative democracy) on citizens' preferences toward public spending. Exogenous variation in institutions comes from a regression... mehr

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    This paper examines the effect of local political decision-making institutions (i.e., direct democracy vs. representative democracy) on citizens' preferences toward public spending. Exogenous variation in institutions comes from a regression discontinuity design, which exploits a discrete change in the probability that a municipality has representative democracy based on a legally stipulated population threshold in the Swiss canton (state) of Vaud. Fiscal policy preferences by municipality are measured by vote shares on Swiss national referendums and initiatives that, if approved, would have increased public spending. Relative to direct democracy, representative democracy reduces vote shares in favor of spending by around 5 percentage points. The effect is not due to sorting on other observables or to feedback from changes in local policies. These findings demonstrate the importance of preferences as a channel through which political decision-making institutions can affect public policies.

     
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    46
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/204783
    Schriftenreihe: KOF working papers ; no. 448 (December 2018)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Popularity shocks and political selection
    Autor*in: Cavalcanti, Francisco; Daniele, Gianmarco; Galletta, Sergio
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Institut d’Economia de Barcelona, Barcelona

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2018, 04
    Schlagworte: Political selection; corruption; competence; local election; political parties
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Highway to economic growth?
    competition in public works tenders in the Democratic Republic of Congo
    Autor*in: Galletta, Sergio; Jametti, Mario; Redonda, Agustin
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries in the World. The construction sector will play an essential part to bring the country on the path of economic growth, and competition within the sector is crucial to achieve this... mehr

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries in the World. The construction sector will play an essential part to bring the country on the path of economic growth, and competition within the sector is crucial to achieve this goal. In this paper we analyze the effect of competition in public works tenders in the DRC. Using a unique and newly assembled database on tenders we find that the number of participating bidders and the observed spread of submitted bids both significantly reduce contract prices, confirming our prior that competitive pressure can enhance the overall performance of the sector. -- construction ; competition ; tenders ; public works

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/69553
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 4048
    Schlagworte: Öffentlicher Bauauftrag; Ausschreibung; Wettbewerb; Bauwirtschaft; Effizienz; Kongo (Demokratische Republik)
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, graph. Darst.
  6. How to tame two Leviathans?
    revisiting the effect of direct democracy on local public expenditure
    Autor*in: Galletta, Sergio; Jametti, Mario
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    We explore how the vertical structure of direct democracy in a federal context affects expenditure decisions of sub-central governments. In so doing we revisit previous research on the effect of direct democratic institution on public policies.... mehr

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bibliothek
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    Online-Ressource
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63 (3982)
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    We explore how the vertical structure of direct democracy in a federal context affects expenditure decisions of sub-central governments. In so doing we revisit previous research on the effect of direct democratic institution on public policies. Particularly, the effect of upper-level (state) existence of direct democratic control on local expenditure. Empirically we exploit the fact that both states (cantons) and local governments (municipalities) enjoy a high autonomy in setting their degree of direct democracy. This allows us to take into account vertical differences between institutions, i.e. we can distinguish the effect of state direct democracy on local expenditures for municipalities with and without own direct democratic instruments. Considering 119 municipalities belonging to 22 Swiss cantons for the period 1993-2007 we highlight that municipalities without fiscal referenda belonging to cantons with fiscal referenda present higher expenditure, while the effect is much reduced and statistically significantly different for municipalities that also avail of referenda. -- direct democracy ; local public expenditure ; vertical interaction

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/66874
    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 3982
    Schlagworte: Kommunale Ausgaben; Demokratie; Finanzbeziehungen; Teilstaat; Schweiz
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 29 S., 5,04 MB), Kt.
  7. Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects
    evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy
    Autor*in: Galletta, Sergio
    Erschienen: January 2016
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, München

    In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives... mehr

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63 (5707)
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    In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives power to the central government to replace democratically elected municipal officials who are potentially connected with mafia with a commission of non-elected administrators. Fixed effects model estimates that focus on a sample of municipalities from three Italian regions (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia) for the period 1998 to 2013 show that the city council dismissal of a municipality fosters a reduction in public investments in neighboring municipalities. Additional empirical evidence suggests that this result could be explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers potentially reducing misconducts in neighboring municipalities.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/128412
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; no. 5707
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects
    evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy
    Autor*in: Galletta, Sergio
    Erschienen: [2016]
    Verlag:  Institut d’Economia de Barcelona, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2016, 1
    Schlagworte: Rechtsdurchsetzung; Anti-Korruption; Kommunalverwaltung; Gemeindefinanzen; Spillover-Effekt; Italien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen