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Keep it simple: a field experiment on information sharing among strangers
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Experimental Evidence on Semi-structured Bargaining with Private Information
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Altruism and the topology of transfer networks
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The evolution of built-up areas in Ghana since 1975
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Mobilizing P2P diffusion for new agricultural practices
experimental evidence from Bangladesh -
Learning management through matching
a field experiment using mechanism design -
Measuring relative poverty through peer rankings
evidence from côte d'ivoire -
Implicit and explicit commitment in credit and saving contracts
a field experiment -
Learning management through matching
a field experiment using mechanism design -
Risk Pooling and Precautionary Saving in Village Economies
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Agency, Gender, and Endowments Effects in the Efficiency and Equity of Team Allocation Decisions
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Material Incentives and Effort Choice
Evidence from an Online Experiment Across Countries -
Microequity and Mutuality
Experimental Evidence on Credit with Performance-Contingent Repayment -
Material incentives and effort choice
evidence from an online experiment across countries -
Learning management through matching
a field experiment using mechanism design -
Women's Empowerment and the Intrinsic Demand for Agency
Experimental Evidence from Nigeria -
Matching frictions and distorted beliefs
evidence from a job fair experiment -
Measuring Relative Poverty through Peer Rankings
Evidence from Côte D'Ivoire -
Microequity and mutuality
experimental evidence on credit with performance-contingent repayment -
The evolution of built-up areas in Ghana since 1975
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Microequity and mutuality
experimental evidence on credit with performance-contingent repayment -
Networks, communities, and markets in Sub-Saharan Africa
implications for firm growth and investment -
Inventories and risk in African manufacturing
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Labour use and productivity and technological change in African smallholder agriculture
a case study of Sudan -
Implicit and explicit commitment in credit and saving contracts
a field experiment