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  1. Altering wait time information to reduce A&E overcrowding
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.; Mustafee, Navonil
    Erschienen: December 2020
    Verlag:  University of Exeter, [Exeter]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 226
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Economics Department discussion papers series ; paper number 20, XX
    Schlagworte: health decisions; waiting times; ambiguity aversion
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Die Zählung sollte lauten: 2020, 03
  2. Operationalizing reverse Bayesianism
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kelsey, David; Teitelbaum, Joshua C.
    Erschienen: November 2020
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    Karni and Viero (2013) propose a model of belief revision under growing awareness reverse Bayesianism which posits that as a person becomes aware of new acts, consequences, or act-consequence links, she revises her beliefs over an expanded state... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 175
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Karni and Viero (2013) propose a model of belief revision under growing awareness reverse Bayesianism which posits that as a person becomes aware of new acts, consequences, or act-consequence links, she revises her beliefs over an expanded state space in a way that preserves the relative likelihoods of events in the original state space. A key limitation of the model is that reverse Bayesianism alone does not fully determine the revised probability distribution. We provide an assumption act independence that imposes additional restrictions on reverse Bayesian belief revision. We show that under act independence, knowledge of the probabilities of new events in the expanded state space is sufficient to fully determine the revised probability distribution in each case of growing awareness. We thereby operationalize the reverse Bayesian model for applications. To illustrate how act independence operationalizes reverse Bayesianism, we consider the law and economics problem of optimal safety regulation.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248290
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Draft: May 14, 2020
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2020, 18
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten)
  3. Increasing employment through the partialrelease of information
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.; Lindsay, Luke
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  University of Exeter, Department of Economics, [Exeter]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 226
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Economics Department discussion papers series ; paper number 20, 01
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Incentives and performance of agents in a microfinance bank
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Dalwai, Sumedh; Kumar, Pradeep
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  University of Exeter, Department of Economics, [Exeter]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 226
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Economics Department discussion papers series ; paper number 20, 02
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Reverse Bayesianism and act independence
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kelsey, David; Teitelbaum, Joshua C.
    Erschienen: February 2022
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    Karni and Vierø (2013) propose a model of belief revision under growing awareness- reverse Bayesianism- which posits that as a person becomes aware of new acts, conse- quences, or act-consequence links, she revises her beliefs over an expanded state... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 175
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Karni and Vierø (2013) propose a model of belief revision under growing awareness- reverse Bayesianism- which posits that as a person becomes aware of new acts, conse- quences, or act-consequence links, she revises her beliefs over an expanded state space in a way that preserves the relative likelihoods of events in the original state space. A key feature of the model is that reverse Bayesianism does not fully determine the revised probability distribution. We provide an assumption- act independence- that imposes additional restrictions on reverse Bayesian belief revision. We show that with act independence knowledge of the probabilities of the new act events in the expanded state space is suffi cient to fully determine the revised probability distribution in each case of growing awareness. We also explore what additional knowledge is required for reverse Bayesianism to pin down the revised probabilities without act independence.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/261244
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2022, 06
    Schlagworte: act independence; reverse Bayesianism; unawareness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten)
  6. Tort liability and unawareness
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kelsey, David; Teitelbaum, Joshua C.
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  University of Exeter, Department of Economics, Exeter

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 226 (2018,01)
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Economics Department discussion papers series ; paper number 18, 01
    Schlagworte: negligence; strict liability; tort law; unawareness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten)
  7. Contracting in the shadow of law
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; MacLeod, William Bentley
    Erschienen: 2008
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

    "Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations on the basis of verifiable events. As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies that... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (13960)
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    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
    Signatur:
    http://www.nber.org/papers/w13960.pdf
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    "Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations on the basis of verifiable events. As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies that are enforced by a court of law. This paper shows that standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an optimal solution to this problem. It is shown that a central feature of construction contracts is the inclusion of governance covenants that shape the scope of authority, and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties. Our model also provides a unified framework for the study of the legal remedies of mistake, impossibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the case of Hadley vs. Baxendale"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; 13960
    Schlagworte: Vertragstheorie; Rechtsordnung; Haftung; Risiko; Rechtsschutz; Architekten; USA
    Umfang: 38 S.
  8. Discrimination via exclusion
    an experiment on group identity and club goods
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Fonseca, Miguel A.
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  Univ. of Exeter Business School, Exeter

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 226 (2013,2)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Economics Department discussion paper series ; 13/02
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (25 S.)
  9. Optimal allocation without transfer payments
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Univ. of Exeter, School of Business and Economics, Exeter

    Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known differences is not a viable option. In this paper, we nd an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent. While the designer cannot charge agents, he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them. We nd conditions for which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share (or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible) is optimal. In other cases, those that send the highest signal should receive the goods; however, we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior. Finally, we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers in economics / University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics ; 10/04
    Schlagworte: Öffentliche Güter; Allokationseffizienz; Unvollkommene Information; Signalling
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (36 S.), graph. Darst.
  10. The benefits of costly voting
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.; Myles, Gareth D.
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Univ. of Exeter, School of Business and Economics, Exeter

    We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome will be determined by voters with higher valuations. We show that in such a case welfare may be enhanced. Such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and a high enough expected value.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers in economics / University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics ; 10/05
    Schlagworte: Wahlverhalten; Nutzen; Bewertung; Kosten
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (20 S.), graph. Darst.
  11. Vote or shout
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Univ. of Exeter, School of Business and Economics, Exeter

    We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most votes wins.... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most votes wins. With shouting, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. For other cases, the superior mechanism depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values. -- Voting ; Lobbying ; Order Statistics

     
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers in economics / University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics ; 10/06
    Schlagworte: Wahlverhalten; Signalling; Kosten; Interessenpolitik
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (11 S.)
  12. An experiment on the causes of bank run contagions
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Fonseca, Miguel A.; Kaplan, Todd R.
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Univ. of Exeter Business School, Exeter

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 226 (2012,6)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Economics Department discussion paper series ; 12/06
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 32 S.)
  13. The effect of social fragmentation on public good provision
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Fonseca, Miguel A.
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Univ. of Exeter Business School, Exeter

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 226 (2012,7)
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Economics Department discussion paper series ; 12/07
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 44 S.), graph. Darst.
  14. Essays on contracting in the construction industry
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet
    Erschienen: 2002

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    B 356207
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Druck
    Schlagworte: Bauwirtschaft; Vertrag; Vertragsrecht; Effizienz; Gerechtigkeit; Risiko; Verhandlungen; Theorie
    Umfang: VI, 132 S.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich. - Enth. 3 Beitr

    Zugl.: Los Angeles, Calif., Univ. of Southern California, Diss., 2002
  15. An experimental investigation of entry cost effects in sealed bid dollar auctions
    Autor*in: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Ghosh, Sudeep
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Univ. of Exeter, School of Business and Economics, Exeter

    In numerous auction settings potential bidders incur costs to enter the auction. Such costs may potentially influence bidder’s behavior subsequently. In this paper we experimentally study the effect of entry costs on bidding and entry behavior,... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In numerous auction settings potential bidders incur costs to enter the auction. Such costs may potentially influence bidder’s behavior subsequently. In this paper we experimentally study the effect of entry costs on bidding and entry behavior, through a complete information common value auction. We run first and second price auctions both with and without entry costs. We find that with entry costs, players on average bid lower in first price auctions, while in second price auctions the average bids are higher, compared to bids in the corresponding no entry fee auctions. -- Common Value Auctions ; Entry Costs ; Experiments

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers in economics / University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics ; 10/07
    Schlagworte: Auktion; Markteintritt; Kosten; Verhaltensökonomik
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (11 S.), graph. Darst.