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  1. Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow cost of public funds
    Autor*in: Capuano, Carlo; De Feo, Giuseppe
    Erschienen: 2008
    Verlag:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Signatur:
    RN 2490(2008,19)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 159 (2008.19)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: CORE discussion paper ; 2008,19
    Schlagworte: Oligopol; Gemischte Wirtschaftsordnung; Privatisierung; Öffentlicher Sektor; Effizienzmarkthypothese; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Steuerwirkung; Theorie
    Umfang: 27 S., graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Literaturverz. S. 24 - 27

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  2. On public ineffciencies in a mixed duopoly
    Autor*in: Capuano, Carlo; De Feo, Giuseppe
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Univ. of Strathclyde, Dep. of Economics, Glasgow

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Keine Speicherung
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Strathclyde discussion papers in economics ; 09,16
    Schlagworte: Öffentliches Unternehmen; Oligopol; Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel; Steuerpolitik; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Public subsidies and cooperation in research and development
    evidence from the lab
    Autor*in: Acconcia, Antonio; Beraldo, Sergio; Capuano, Carlo; Stimolo, Marco
    Erschienen: January 2022
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers and the intensity of competition. Consistently with the theory, we find that the probability of cooperation increases in the level of spillovers and decreases in that of market competition. We then replicate the experimental markets by providing subsidies to subjects who cooperate. Subsidies relevantly increase the probability of cooperation in focus markets, causing, however, a sensible reduction of R&D investments. Overall, our evidence suggests that, depending on the characteristics of the market, the use of public subsidies might be redundant, for firms would anyway joined their R&D efforts; or counterproductive, inducing firms to significantly reduce R&D investments compared to the non-cooperative scenario.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249973
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2022, 02
    Schlagworte: Cooperation in R&D; Public Subsidies; Knowledge Spillovers; Market Competition
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Public subsidies and cooperation in research and development
    evidence from the lab
    Autor*in: Acconcia, Antonio; Beraldo, Sergio; Capuano, Carlo; Stimolo, Marco
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  EERI, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute, Brussels, Belgium

    We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 545
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers and the intensity of competition. Consistently with the theory, we find that the probability of cooperation increases in the level of spillovers and decreases in that of market competition. We then replicate the experimental markets by providing subsidies to subjects who cooperate. Subsidies relevantly increase the probability of cooperation in focus markets, causing, however, a sensible reduction of R&D investments. Overall, our evidence suggests that, depending on the characteristics of the market, the use of public subsidies might be redundant, for firms would anyway joined their R&D efforts; or counterproductive, inducing firms to significantly reduce R&D investments compared to the non-cooperative scenario.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/273048
    Schriftenreihe: EERI research paper series ; no 2022, 04
    Schlagworte: Cooperation in R&D; Public subsidies; knowledge spillovers; market competition
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Demand growth, entry and collusion sustainability
    Autor*in: Capuano, Carlo
    Erschienen: 2002

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 723 (2002.62)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2002,62
    Schlagworte: Kartell; Markteintritt; Fusionskontrolle; Gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage; Theorie; EU-Staaten
    Umfang: 41 S
    Bemerkung(en):
  6. Measuring organized crime
    statistical indicators and economics aspects
    Autor*in: Capuano, Carlo; Giacalone, Massimiliano
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  EERI, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute, Brussels, Belgium

    One of the most negative factors that characterize Italian economy and society is the pervasive and oppressive presence of organized crime, affecting many aspects of the daily live and every sector of business. The data unfortunately show how this... mehr

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 545 (2018,11)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    One of the most negative factors that characterize Italian economy and society is the pervasive and oppressive presence of organized crime, affecting many aspects of the daily live and every sector of business. The data unfortunately show how this phenomenon is increasingly growing and involves more and more aspects of our society (Albanese & Marinelli, 2013). In recent years there have been peaceful demonstrations but also concrete acts by the police that has made numerous arrests and thwarted many robberies. (Calderoni, 2014). However, the work done in recent years is not sufficient to definitively delete organized crime (OC), even more difficult and targeted intervention by the institutions is needed in order to definitively resolve this question. (Fedeli et al., 2017; Visco of the Bank of Italy, 2014). This work introduces new indexes that measure and compare organized crime in different territories. We apply then to Italian provinces and we obtain a ranking at national level.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/213544
    Schriftenreihe: EERI research paper series ; no 2018, 11
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Patent protection and threat of litigation in oligopoly
    Autor*in: Capuano, Carlo; Grassi, Iacopo
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  EERI, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute, Brussels, Belgium

    In recent years, the increasing awarding of patents has captured the attention of scholars operating in different fields. Economic literature has studied the causes of this proliferation; we propose an entry game focusing on one of the consequences,... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 545 (2018,3)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In recent years, the increasing awarding of patents has captured the attention of scholars operating in different fields. Economic literature has studied the causes of this proliferation; we propose an entry game focusing on one of the consequences, showing how an incumbent may create a patent portfolio in order to control market entry and to collude. The incumbent fixes the level of patent protection and the threat of denunciation reduces the entrant’s expected profits; moreover, if the entrant deviates from collusion, the incumbent can strengthen punishment suing the competitor for patent infringement, reducing her incentive to deviate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should pay attention to the level of patent protection implemented by the incumbent and note whether the holder of a patent reacts to entry by either suing or not suing the competitor. In the model, we use completely general functional forms in analyzing the is- sues, and this allows us to obtain general results not depending on the assumptions about the kind of oligopolistic competition.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/179418
    Schriftenreihe: EERI research paper series ; no 2018, 03
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Patent protection and threat of litigation in oligopoly
    Autor*in: Capuano, Carlo; Grassi, Iacopo
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    In recent years, the increasing awarding of patents has captured the attention of scholars operating in different fields. The economic literature has studied the causes of this proliferation; we propose an entry game focusing on one of the... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In recent years, the increasing awarding of patents has captured the attention of scholars operating in different fields. The economic literature has studied the causes of this proliferation; we propose an entry game focusing on one of the consequences, showing how an incumbent may create a patent portfolio in order to control market entry and to collude. The incumbent fixes the level of patent protection and the threat of denunciation reduces the entrant's expected profits; moreover, if the entrant deviates from collusion, the incumbent can strengthen punishment suing the competitor for patent infringement, reducing her incentive to deviate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should pay attention to the level of patent protection implemented by the incumbent and note whether the holder of a patent reacts to entry by either suing or not suing the competitor. In the model, we use completely general functional forms in analyzing the issues, and this allows us to obtain general results not depending on the assumptions about the kind of oligopolistic competition.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/175243
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Demand growth, entry and collusion sustainability
    Autor*in: Capuano, Carlo
    Erschienen: September 2002
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano

    The purpose of this paper is to represent in which way a stable and no negligible growth in demand can affect the level of sustainability of collusion. For the European Commission this assumption is seen as a factor that disincentives collusion and... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125 (2002,62)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The purpose of this paper is to represent in which way a stable and no negligible growth in demand can affect the level of sustainability of collusion. For the European Commission this assumption is seen as a factor that disincentives collusion and pushes to a competitive behavior. This fact maybe is not so obvious and I have shown that what is important is the final effect on entry in the market. In fact, expected oligopolistic profits are as the Faith Morgana that attracts competitors and disappears when they have come in. Entry is profitable if it is finite, i.e. one or very few entrants, and if prices above marginal cost are still successfully sustainable.Our result is that demand growth path is not a sufficient condition to neglect the risk of collective dominance, and in order to support our analysis we consider first some trigger strategy equilibria where deviation punishment is implemented by Nash Reversion for ever. After that, we consider Abreu's simple penal code (1986) and we have derived a non stationary optimal penal code that in our structural changing framework implement collusion before and after entry as a subgames perfect equilibrium. The final conclusion is that demand growth, ceteris paribus, is negative correlated with the critical discount factor necessary to substaines collusion.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/119670
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2002, 62
    Schlagworte: Kartell; Markteintritt; Fusionskontrolle; Gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage; Theorie; EU-Staaten
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten)