Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 7 von 7.

  1. Procuring survival
    Autor*in: Cappelletti, Matilde; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    Public spending (i.e., “G”) enables governments to fulfill their fiscal policies. This paper takes a micro perspective and quantifies the impact of procurement spending - a specific component of G - on firm survival. We find that firms that receive... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 15
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Public spending (i.e., “G”) enables governments to fulfill their fiscal policies. This paper takes a micro perspective and quantifies the impact of procurement spending - a specific component of G - on firm survival. We find that firms that receive public contracts survive longer, ceteris paribus, and that this effect accrues over time, reaching 20 percentage points after ten years. Our results are based on a novel dataset for Italy that combines balance sheet data on the universe of limited liability firms with administrative records on market entry and exit and quasi-universe of public contract data between 2008 and 2018. For construction auctions, we also rely on bid-level data to inform a regression discontinuity analysis. We find that the survival rate of winners relative to marginal losers is 70% higher after 36 months - or after two years and half of the median contract expiration. We explore several alternative channels that could rationalize our findings. We find that recipients do not become more productive, and their earnings become increasingly dependent on sales to public customers.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/247702
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 093 (11/2021)
    Schlagworte: firm survival; firm dynamics; government demand; public procurement; demandshocks; productivity; auctions; regression discontinuity design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Targeted bidders in government tenders
    Autor*in: Cappelletti, Matilde; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    A set-aside restricts participation in procurement contests to targeted firms. Despite being widely used, its effects on actual competition and contract outcomes are ambiguous. We pool a decade of US federal procurement data to shed light on this... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 15
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    A set-aside restricts participation in procurement contests to targeted firms. Despite being widely used, its effects on actual competition and contract outcomes are ambiguous. We pool a decade of US federal procurement data to shed light on this empirical question using a two-stage approach. To circumvent the lack of exogenous variation in our data, as a first step we draw on random forest techniques to calculate the likelihood of a tender being set aside. We then estimate the effect of restricted tenders on pre- and postaward outcomes using an inverse probability weighting regression adjustment. Set-asides prompt more firms to bid - that is, the increase in targeted bidders more than offsets the loss of untargeted. During the execution phase, set-aside contracts incur higher cost overruns and delays. The more restrictive the setaside, the stronger these effects. In a subset of our data we leverage an expected spike in set-aside spending and we find no evidence of better performance by winners over a ten-year period.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/261382
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 22, 030 (07/2022)
    Schlagworte: small businesses; set-aside; competition; procurement; public contracts; random forest; firm dynamics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Procuring survival
    Autor*in: Cappelletti, Matilde; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Rovigatti, Gabriele
    Erschienen: November 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We investigate the impact of public procurement spending on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large-scale dataset on firms-covering balance-sheet, income-statement, and administrative records-and match it with public... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We investigate the impact of public procurement spending on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large-scale dataset on firms-covering balance-sheet, income-statement, and administrative records-and match it with public contract data. Employing a regression discontinuity design for close-call procurement auctions, we find that winners are more likely to stay in the market than marginal losers after the award and that the boost in survival chances lasts longer than the contract duration. We document that this effect is associated with earnings substitution rather than increased business scale. Regardless of size, contracts that are long-lasting and awarded by decentralized buyers are more impactful for survival prospects. Survivors experience no productivity premium but rather an improvement in their credit position.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/271768
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10124 (2022)
    Schlagworte: firm survival; firm dynamics; public demand; public procurement; demand shocks; productivity; credit; auctions; regression discontinuity design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Procuring survival
    Autor*in: Cappelletti, Matilde; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Rovigatti, Gabriele
    Erschienen: 31 January 2024
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    We investigate the impact of public procurement on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large-scale dataset of firms—covering balance-sheet, income-statement, and administrative records—and match it with public contract... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    We investigate the impact of public procurement on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large-scale dataset of firms—covering balance-sheet, income-statement, and administrative records—and match it with public contract data. Employing a regression discontinuity design for close-call auctions, we find that winners are more likely to stay in the market than marginal losers after the award and that the boost in survival chances lasts longer than the contract duration. We document that this effect is associated with earnings substitution rather than increased business scale and that survivors experience no productivity premium. Securing contracts relaxes credit constraints and acts as a mechanism for survival.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18796
    Schlagworte: irm survival; firm dynamics; public demand; public procurement; de-mand shocks; productivity; credit; auctions; regression discontinuity design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Strategic management in public procurement
    the role of dynamic capabilities in equity and efficiency
    Autor*in: Cappelletti, Matilde; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Heaton, Sohvi; Siegel, Donald S.
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    A key issue in strategic management in the public sector is how government creates economic and social value through procurement. Unfortunately, most procurement studies are based on contract theories, which fail to incorporate the growing role of... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 15
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    A key issue in strategic management in the public sector is how government creates economic and social value through procurement. Unfortunately, most procurement studies are based on contract theories, which fail to incorporate the growing role of strategic management in performance. We fill this gap by analyzing longitudinal data on contracting to assess the equity and efficiency effects of a form of affirmative action used by governments: set-aside programs. Employing a machine learning-augmented propensity score weighting approach, we find that set-aside contracts are negatively associated with contract performance. These effects are attenuated by an agency’s dynamic capabilities and the extent to which the agency uses more competitive procedures. Our findings illustrate how the dynamic capabilities of a federal agency can simultaneously enhance equity and efficiency.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/277729
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 23, 035 (09/2023)
    Schlagworte: Dynamic capabilities; resource-based view; public procurement; machine learning; random forest
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Procuring survival
    Autor*in: Cappelletti, Matilde; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Rovigatti, Gabriele
    Erschienen: 31 January 2024
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    We investigate the impact of public procurement on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large-scale dataset of firms—covering balance-sheet, income-statement, and administrative records—and match it with public contract... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We investigate the impact of public procurement on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large-scale dataset of firms—covering balance-sheet, income-statement, and administrative records—and match it with public contract data. Employing a regression discontinuity design for close-call auctions, we find that winners are more likely to stay in the market than marginal losers after the award and that the boost in survival chances lasts longer than the contract duration. We document that this effect is associated with earnings substitution rather than increased business scale and that survivors experience no productivity premium. Securing contracts relaxes credit constraints and acts as a mechanism for survival.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18796
    Schlagworte: irm survival; firm dynamics; public demand; public procurement; de-mand shocks; productivity; credit; auctions; regression discontinuity design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Procuring survival
    Autor*in: Cappelletti, Matilde; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Rovigatti, Gabriele
    Erschienen: [2024]
    Verlag:  Banca d'Italia Eurosistema, [Rom]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 450
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Temi di discussione / Banca d'Italia ; number 1439 (February 2024)
    Schlagworte: firm survival; firm dynamics; public demand; public procurement; demandshocks; productivity; credit; auctions; regression discontinuity design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen