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  1. Good intentions pave the way to ... the local moneylender
    Autor*in: Arnold, Lutz; Booker, Benedikt
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Friedrich-Alexander-Univ., Erlangen [u.a.]

    Microborrowers may take usurious loans to repay a loan taken from a microfinance institution because of having neglected the time inconsistency of optimal plans or having discounted future payoffs too strongly from the ex-post perspective.... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 400 (126)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Microborrowers may take usurious loans to repay a loan taken from a microfinance institution because of having neglected the time inconsistency of optimal plans or having discounted future payoffs too strongly from the ex-post perspective. Microfinance programs should strive at preventing such consequences of bounded rationality. -- microfinance ; hyperbolic discounting

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/73430
    Schriftenreihe: BGPE discussion paper ; 126
    Schlagworte: Mikrofinanzierung; Wucher; Investition; Begrenzte Rationalität; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (8 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Refinancing MFIs with market power
    theory and evidence
    Autor*in: Arnold, Lutz; Booker, Benedikt; Dorfleitner, Gregor; Röhe, Michaela
    Erschienen: January 2016
    Verlag:  BGPE, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics, [Erlangen-Nuremberg]

    This paper presents a model of the complete microcredit financing chain investor -> MIV -> MFI -> micro-borrower, in which social-minded MIVs provide funds only to those MFIs which do not exploit their bargaining power towards micro-borrowers. The... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 400 (162)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper presents a model of the complete microcredit financing chain investor -> MIV -> MFI -> micro-borrower, in which social-minded MIVs provide funds only to those MFIs which do not exploit their bargaining power towards micro-borrowers. The MFIs with the highest bargaining power do not use MIV capital, since eschewing their market power is most costly for them. Consistent with this prediction of the theoretical model, we find empirically that the net interest margin, as a measure of MFI market power, negatively affects the likelihood of using MIV finance. This lends support to the view that social criteria play an effective role in MIVs' investment policies, thereby also impacting MFIs' lending behavior.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/156199
    Schriftenreihe: BGPE discussion paper ; no. 162
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten), Illustrationen