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  1. Norderfriedrichskoog! Tax Havens, Tax Competition and the Introduction of a Minimum Tax Rate
    Autor*in: Boning, William C.; Klimsa, Drahomir; Slemrod, Joel; Ullmann, Robert
    Erschienen: May 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    German municipalities levy local business taxes by choosing a tax rate to apply to local business income, where the tax base is defined uniformly at the national level. Before the federal government's imposition of a minimum tax rate in 2004, some... mehr

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    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
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    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    German municipalities levy local business taxes by choosing a tax rate to apply to local business income, where the tax base is defined uniformly at the national level. Before the federal government's imposition of a minimum tax rate in 2004, some municipalities such as the tiny North Sea town of Norderfriedrichskoog chose to act as tax havens by setting a zero tax rate. We combine administrative microdata from firm tax returns with municipality-level information to study the choice to become a tax haven; the (reported and real) income tax havens attracted from other municipalities before and after the introduction of the minimum tax rate; and how the introduction of the minimum tax rate affected tax competition between municipalities. We find that income was shifted to tax haven municipalities both before and after the introduction of the minimum tax rate. The mandated increase in tax havens' tax rates did not lead to rate increases (or decreases) among municipalities in general, or among tax haven municipalities' geographical neighbors. Our results suggest that tax havens largely did not affect the business tax rates set by non-havens

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w31225
    Schlagworte: Gewerbesteuer; Steuertarif; Steueroase; Steuerwettbewerb; Steuerpolitik; Wirkungsanalyse; Deutschland; Business Taxes and Subsidies; Tax Evasion and Avoidance; State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  2. Heard it through the grapevine
    direct and network effects of a tax enforcement field experiment
    Autor*in: Boning, William C.; Guyton, John; Hodge, Ronald H.; Slemrod, Joel; Troiano, Ugo
    Erschienen: February 2018
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (24305)
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    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 24305
    Schlagworte: Steuervermeidung; Feldforschung; Netzwerkökonomik; USA
    Umfang: 39 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  3. A Welfare Analysis of Tax Audits Across the Income Distribution
    Autor*in: Boning, William C.; Hendren, Nathaniel; Sprung-Keyser, Ben; Stuart, Ellen
    Erschienen: June 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We estimate the returns to IRS audits of taxpayers across the income distribution. We find an additional $1 spent auditing taxpayers above the 90th income percentile yields more than $12 in revenue, while audits of below-median income taxpayers yield... mehr

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    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Resolving-System (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We estimate the returns to IRS audits of taxpayers across the income distribution. We find an additional $1 spent auditing taxpayers above the 90th income percentile yields more than $12 in revenue, while audits of below-median income taxpayers yield $5. We draw upon comprehensive internal accounting information and audit-level enforcement logs to quantify the average costs and revenues associated with each audit. We begin by estimating the average initial return to all audits of US taxpayers filing in 2010-2014. On average, $1 in audit spending raises $2.17 in initial revenue. Audits of high-income taxpayers are more costly, but the additional revenue raised more than offsets the costs. Audits of the 99-99.9th percentile have a 3.2:1 return; audits of the top 0.1% return 6.3:1. We then exploit the 40% audit reduction between tax years 2010 and 2014 to examine the returns to marginal audits. We find they exceed the returns to average audits. Revenues remain relatively unchanged but marginal costs fall below average costs due to economies of scale. Next, we use randomly selected audits to examine the impact of an initial audit on future revenue. This specific deterrence effect produces at least three times more revenue than the initial audit. Deterrence effects are relatively consistent across the income distribution. This results in the 12:1 return above the 90th percentile. We conclude by estimating the welfare consequences of audits using the MVPF framework and comparing audits to other revenue raising policies. We find that audits raise revenue at lower welfare cost

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w31376
    Schlagworte: Steuerfahndung; Steuerstrafrecht; Besteuerungsverfahren; Einkommensverteilung; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; USA; General
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers