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Displaying results 176 to 200 of 359.

  1. Bargaining outside the lab
    a newspaper experiment of a three-person ultimatum game
    Author: Güth, Werner; Schmidt, Carsten; Sutter, Matthias
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Inst. for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena

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    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
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    2006 SB 134
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1433 (2006.04)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Papers on strategic interaction ; 2006,04
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Experiment; Zeitung; Mediennutzung; Deutschland; Datenerhebung
    Scope: 38 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:
  2. Downsizing the labor force by low and high profit firms
    an experimental analysis
    Author: Güth, Werner; Paul, Christian
    Published: 2008
    Publisher:  Univ. [u.a.], Jena

    One may hope to capture the behavioral and emotional effects of downsizing the laborforce in rather abstract settings as an ultimatum game (see Fischer et al. (2008)), or try to explore downsizing in its more natural principalagent scenario with a... more

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    One may hope to capture the behavioral and emotional effects of downsizing the laborforce in rather abstract settings as an ultimatum game (see Fischer et al. (2008)), or try to explore downsizing in its more natural principalagent scenario with a labor market background. We pursue the latter approach and test experimentally wether downsizing occurs whenever (game) theoretically predicted and whether effort reactions qquestion its profitability. Our main findings are that downsizing seems to happen less often than predicted and that its frequency does not depend on whether, theoretically, its gains are rather large or small. Interestingly, we also find strong evidence that piece-rate offers are used in a suboptimal way. -- Downsizing ; experimental economics ; principal-agent model ; labor ; economics

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/31719
    Series: Jena economic research papers ; 2008,087
    Subjects: Personalabbau; Arbeitsproduktivität; Arbeitsbeziehungen; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource, (42 S.), graph. Darst., Kt.
  3. Studying deception without deceiving participants
    an experiment of deception experiments
    Author: Alberti, Federica; Güth, Werner
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Univ. [u.a.], Jena

    Banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who can gain by deceiving those in the role of participants. We compare treatments with and without possible deception by... more

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    Banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who can gain by deceiving those in the role of participants. We compare treatments with and without possible deception by experimenter-participants to test whether deception affects behaviour of participant-participants in a dictator experiment and whether participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception. We find no difference in behaviour of participant-participants between the treatments whereas most participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception. -- Experimental economic methods ; Deception ; Experiments

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/70148
    Series: Jena economic research papers ; 2012,024
    Subjects: Experimentelle Ökonomik; Betrug; Experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 19 S., 483 KB), graph. Darst.
  4. How ultimatum offers emerge
    a study in bounded rationality
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the "Master Module" as well as its... more

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    The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the "Master Module" as well as its submodules "New Problem Solver", "Adaptation Procedure", and "Learning" have to be specified for the task at hand. This illustrates the applicability of the general framework of boundedly rational decision emergence.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/62221
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,29
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S., 3,22 MB), graph. Darst.
  5. Privately contributing to public goods over time
    an experimental study
    Author: Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it... more

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    Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly endowed participants encounter repeatedly the weakest link-, the usual average contribution- and the best shot-technology of public good provision in a within subject-design. Some striking findings are that the weakest link-technology fares much better than the other two technologies in terms of welfare, and that the willingness to voluntarily contribute is greatly affected by the (increasing or decreasing) clock mechanism. -- Public goods ; Voluntary contributions ; Efficient provision ; Clock mechanism

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/65343
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2002,18
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 38 S., 200,22 KB), graph. Darst.
  6. I want you!
    an experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power
    Author: Brandts, Jordi; Güth, Werner; Stiehler, Andreas
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but... more

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    We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/65313
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2002,51
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 21 S., 68,76 KB)
  7. Retributive responses
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses... more

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    Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor may inflict harmful consequences without intending and intend harmful consequences without inflicting them. Our experimental results indicate that retributive responses are more strongly influenced by observed consequences than by ascribed intentions. However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by concerns that are non-retributive altogether in that they focus on end state distributions independently of who brought them about.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/62692
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,11
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 29 S., 171,47 KB), graph. Darst.
  8. From full to bounded rationality
    the limits of unlimited rationality
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Deriving advice that can in fact be utilized by boundedly rational decision makers is a central function of modeling choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that theories of... more

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    Deriving advice that can in fact be utilized by boundedly rational decision makers is a central function of modeling choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior of boundedly rational individuals. In view of such a causal role of theories we discuss how advice of a theory of boundedly rational behavior can become known, be followed among boundedly rational individuals and still be good advice.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/62773
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,12
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 27 S., 136,19 KB)
  9. Heuristics as decision rules
    Part I: the single consumer
    Author: Güth, Werner; Neuefeind, Wilhelm
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Many consumption prices are highly volatile. It would certainly overburden our cognitive system to fully adjust to all these changes. Households therefore often rely on simple heuristics when deciding what to consume, e.g. in the form of a constant... more

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    Many consumption prices are highly volatile. It would certainly overburden our cognitive system to fully adjust to all these changes. Households therefore often rely on simple heuristics when deciding what to consume, e.g. in the form of a constant budget share for a specific consumption commodity, like a vacation, or of a constant consumption amount for lowcost commodities as food items. Using utility functions we can measure the welfare loss, caused by such heuristics, and to what extent this can be reduced by adaptation. In the present Part I the analysis is mainly restricted to a single consumer with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. General utility functions will also be considered. Part II will study exchange economies.

     
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    Language: English
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    hdl: 10419/62762
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,13
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 22 S., 150,73 KB), graph. Darst.
  10. Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions
    an experimental study
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative... more

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    We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second–price auctions. -- Experiments ; Sealed Bid Auctions ; Asymmetric Bidders ; Private-Independent Values

     
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    Language: English
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    hdl: 10419/62694
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,15
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 356,87 KB), graph. Darst.
  11. The parasite game
    exploiting the abundance of nature in face of competition
    Author: Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    A situation in which the regularity in nature can be utilized while competition is to be avoided is modelled by the Parasite game. In this game regular behaviour could enhance guessing nature but strategic randomization is required to avoid being... more

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    A situation in which the regularity in nature can be utilized while competition is to be avoided is modelled by the Parasite game. In this game regular behaviour could enhance guessing nature but strategic randomization is required to avoid being outguessed. In an experiment, 60 pairs of participants (partner design) played many rounds of the Parasite game. The treatments differed in nature's probabilities and whether or not these probabilities were announced in advance or could only be experienced over time. Before playing, the working memory (WM) of participants was measured. Data analyses test the correspondence of participants behavior to game-theoretic benchmarks and the effect of participants' WM on their behavior.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62706
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,34
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 18 S., 207,43 KB), graph. Darst.
  12. Predating predators
    an experimental study
    Author: Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Predating predators requires at least three specimen to which we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well-fed but must also avoid being hunted... more

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    Predating predators requires at least three specimen to which we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well-fed but must also avoid being hunted by player 3. One major motivation is to test three benchmark solutions (uniformly perfect, impulse balance and payoff balance equilibrium) in such a complex strategic setting. In the experiment three participants play repeatedly the game (partner design) which allows to test whether certain types of behavior are just initial inclinations or stable patterns which survive learning and experience.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62686
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,35
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 176,30 KB), graph. Darst.
  13. Fairness in the mail and opportunism in the internet
    a newspaper experiment on ultimatum bargaining
    Author: Güth, Werner; Schmidt, Carsten; Sutter, Matthias
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    On May 11, 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector-mode: Each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM 1.000-pie but also which of the... more

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    On May 11, 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector-mode: Each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM 1.000-pie but also which of the nine possible offers of DM 100, 200, ..., 900 (s)he would accept or reject. In addition, participants were asked to predict the most frequent type of behavior. Three randomly selected proposerresponder pairs were rewarded according to the rules of ultimatum bargaining and three randomly chosen participants of those who predicted the most frequent type of behavior received a prize of DM 500. Decisions could be submitted by mail, fax, or via the internet. Behavior is described, statistically analyzed, and compared to usual laboratory ultimatum bargaining results. -- fairness ; ultimatum bargaining ; newspaper (or internet) experiment ; distribution conflicts

     
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    Language: English
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    hdl: 10419/62747
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,42
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 687,16 KB), graph. Darst.
  14. Experimental "beauty contests" with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior... more

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    We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. -- beauty contest experiments ; individual behavior

     
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    hdl: 10419/62714
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,45
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 181,84 KB), graph. Darst.
  15. Robust learning experiments
    evidence for learning and deliberation
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the... more

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    Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected by anticipation of rule changes. Adaptation to past success (the shadow of the past) is revealed when playing the same game repeatedly. The experiments of bidding behavior, reputation formation, endogenous timing in negotiations, and alternating offer bargaining allow to draw a few general conclusions.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62161
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,82
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 467,64 KB), graph. Darst.
  16. On the evolution of power indices in collective bargaining
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining... more

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    Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two (two-dimensional) power constellations is better and thereby derive the power structure endogenously. By distinguishing various measures of (evolutionary or reproductive) success we can identify the forces shaping the relative power indices of trade unions.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62200
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,109
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 15 S., 303,12 KB), graph. Darst.
  17. Experimental game theory
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Whereas orthodox game theory relies on the unrealistic assumption of (commonly known) perfect rationality, participants in game playing experiments are at best boundedly rational. This makes it necessary to supplement orthodox game theory by a... more

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    Whereas orthodox game theory relies on the unrealistic assumption of (commonly known) perfect rationality, participants in game playing experiments are at best boundedly rational. This makes it necessary to supplement orthodox game theory by a behavioral theory of game playing. We first point out that this applies also to (one person-) decision theory. After reviewing the influential experiments based on repeated games and the ultimatum game the typical reactions to the striking experimental results are categorized. Further sections are devoted to alternating offer bargaining and characteristic function experiments. -- common knowledge ; repeated play ; ultimatum game ; adaptation dynamics ; strategic bargaining ; characteristic function experiments ; random price mechanism

     
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    hdl: 10419/62159
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,111
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 84,31 KB), graph. Darst.
  18. Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
    Author: Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk... more

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    On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these results evolutionary processes are formulated according to which sellers can switch to market research or refrain from it depending on the difference in profits of informed and uninformed sellers. We derive the evolutionarily stable number of informed sellers and discuss how it is influenced by market parameters. -- evolution ; oligopoly ; market research ; private information

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62264
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,113
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 16 S., 247,77 KB), graph. Darst.
  19. Fairness versus efficiency
    an experimental study of (mutual) gift giving
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another potential concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and public good... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another potential concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and public good provision games. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving at the cost of reducing their own monetary payoff. In the one-sided treatment this is only possible for one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutual gift giving. In both cases decisions can be conditioned on whether there is or there is not an efficiency gain by gift giving. The overall conclusion from our results is that striving for efficiency is constrained by equity concerns that are less stringent in mutual exchanges than in onesided gift-relationships.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/62774
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,6
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 16 S., 191,53 KB), graph. Darst.
  20. Langzeiteffekte der "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior"
    zur Anwendung der Spieltheorie in den (Sozial-)wissenschaften
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62733
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,8
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 257,61 MB), graph. Darst.
  21. Alternating offer bargaining experiments with varying institutional details
    Author: Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Marchand, Nadège
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once... more

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    The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one what defines a cycle of altogether 16 successive plays. Participants play three such cycles. There are no major experience effects but strong and reliable effects of anticipated rule changes. The latter, however, are not due to strategic considerations but rather to the social norms of fairness and efficiency.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62678
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,9
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 278,46 KB), graph. Darst.
  22. Strategic delegation in price competition
    Author: Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, Tübingen

    We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Universitätsbibliothek der Eberhard Karls Universität
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    Fachbibliothek Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Bibliothek
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    We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents in competition. We show that price delegation can increase or decrease the firms' surplus depending on the heterogeneity of the market and the number of agents employed by the firms. -- Strategic delegation ; Agency theory ; Revenue sharing

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62123
    Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 43
    Subjects: Preiswettbewerb; Preismanagement; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Einnahmen; Theorie; Delegation
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  23. Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Keser, Claudia
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has... more

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    We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture. However, we observe a significant amount of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, when compared with decentralized bargaining, has no significant effect on the payoffs of the players in the joint venture but reduces the payoff of the third player. -- Bargaining ; Joint Venture ; Merger ; Experiments ; Equilibrium Selection

     
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    Language: English
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    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61717
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,90
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 83,81 KB), graph. Darst.
  24. Please, marry me!
    an experimental study of risking a joint venture
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Tjotta, Sigve
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. First the female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. First the female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of the two forms of joint venture. Whereas a full engagement relies on more specialization, but makes her more exploitable by the male partner, a low engagement is less productive, but also fairer. More specifically, the random profit of a joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in case of a full engagement whereas demands are determined simultaneously in case of a low engagement. Partners interact anonymously. In the repetition the two partners in a matching group of four participants are exchanged. Our treatment variables are her and his outside option value representing gender specific investments in human capital.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61707
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,92
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 26 S., 3,19 MB)
  25. Dynamic decision structure and risk taking
    Author: Eichberger, Jürgen; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    This paper investigates the behaviour in repeated decision situations. The experimental study shows that subjects show low or no risk-aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in every stage of the decision problem.... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    This paper investigates the behaviour in repeated decision situations. The experimental study shows that subjects show low or no risk-aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in every stage of the decision problem. There is evidence that risk attitudes depend on whether they are measured by comparing the certainty equivalent and the expected value of a lottery or by preferences over mean-preserving spreads. -- Dynamic decisions ; risk taking behaviour ; decision-making experiments

     
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    hdl: 10419/61759
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,95
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 192,28 KB)