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Displaying results 1 to 25 of 33.

  1. Retributive responses
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin, Germany

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät : [...], Economics series ; 174
    Subjects: Verhaltensökonomie; Gerechtigkeit; Spieltheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Verhaltensökonomik; (stw)Gerechtigkeit; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Experiment; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 29 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
  2. Evolutionary norm enforcement
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Univ., FEMM, Magdeburg

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    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper series / Otto von Guericke Univ., FEMM, Faculty of Economics and Management ; 2000,24
    Subjects: Vertragstheorie; Rechtsökonomik; Vertrauen; Theorie; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Scope: 20 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Richtiger Name des 1. Verf.: Werner Güth

    Literaturverz. S. 19 - 20
  3. How ultimatum offers emerge
    a study in bounded rationality
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the "Master Module" as well as its... more

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    The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the "Master Module" as well as its submodules "New Problem Solver", "Adaptation Procedure", and "Learning" have to be specified for the task at hand. This illustrates the applicability of the general framework of boundedly rational decision emergence.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62221
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,29
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S., 3,22 MB), graph. Darst.
  4. Robust learning experiments
    evidence for learning and deliberation
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the... more

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    Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected by anticipation of rule changes. Adaptation to past success (the shadow of the past) is revealed when playing the same game repeatedly. The experiments of bidding behavior, reputation formation, endogenous timing in negotiations, and alternating offer bargaining allow to draw a few general conclusions.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62161
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,82
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 467,64 KB), graph. Darst.
  5. On the evolution of power indices in collective bargaining
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining... more

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    Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two (two-dimensional) power constellations is better and thereby derive the power structure endogenously. By distinguishing various measures of (evolutionary or reproductive) success we can identify the forces shaping the relative power indices of trade unions.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/62200
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,109
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 15 S., 303,12 KB), graph. Darst.
  6. Experimental game theory
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Whereas orthodox game theory relies on the unrealistic assumption of (commonly known) perfect rationality, participants in game playing experiments are at best boundedly rational. This makes it necessary to supplement orthodox game theory by a... more

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    Whereas orthodox game theory relies on the unrealistic assumption of (commonly known) perfect rationality, participants in game playing experiments are at best boundedly rational. This makes it necessary to supplement orthodox game theory by a behavioral theory of game playing. We first point out that this applies also to (one person-) decision theory. After reviewing the influential experiments based on repeated games and the ultimatum game the typical reactions to the striking experimental results are categorized. Further sections are devoted to alternating offer bargaining and characteristic function experiments. -- common knowledge ; repeated play ; ultimatum game ; adaptation dynamics ; strategic bargaining ; characteristic function experiments ; random price mechanism

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62159
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,111
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 84,31 KB), graph. Darst.
  7. Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
    Author: Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk... more

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    On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these results evolutionary processes are formulated according to which sellers can switch to market research or refrain from it depending on the difference in profits of informed and uninformed sellers. We derive the evolutionarily stable number of informed sellers and discuss how it is influenced by market parameters. -- evolution ; oligopoly ; market research ; private information

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62264
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,113
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 16 S., 247,77 KB), graph. Darst.
  8. Fairness versus efficiency
    an experimental study of (mutual) gift giving
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another potential concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and public good... more

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    Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another potential concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and public good provision games. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving at the cost of reducing their own monetary payoff. In the one-sided treatment this is only possible for one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutual gift giving. In both cases decisions can be conditioned on whether there is or there is not an efficiency gain by gift giving. The overall conclusion from our results is that striving for efficiency is constrained by equity concerns that are less stringent in mutual exchanges than in onesided gift-relationships.

     
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    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62774
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,6
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 16 S., 191,53 KB), graph. Darst.
  9. On saving and investing
    an experimental study of intertemporal decision making in a complex stochastic environment
    Author: Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Knust, Florian
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    The experimental situation presents a complex stochastic intertemporal allocation problem. First, two initial chance moves select one of three possible termination probabilities which then determines whether "life" lasts 3,4,5, or 6 periods. Compared... more

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    The experimental situation presents a complex stochastic intertemporal allocation problem. First, two initial chance moves select one of three possible termination probabilities which then determines whether "life" lasts 3,4,5, or 6 periods. Compared to Anderhub et al. (1997) participants are allowed to invest into a risky, but profitable asset. We investigate whether the willingness to invest can help to explain saving behavior, i.e. experimentally observed intertemporal decision making.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/62260
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,2
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 2,80 MB), graph. Darst.
  10. Evolutionary norm enforcement
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of... more

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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Universitätsbibliothek Osnabrück
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    Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of truly trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/75663
    Series: CESifo Working Paper ; 331
    Scope: Online-Ressource (17 S.)
  11. Boundedly rational decision emergence
    a general perspective and some selective illustrations
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a Master Module which keeps an inventory of previously successful and unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called... more

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    A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a Master Module which keeps an inventory of previously successful and unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called forth which either allow one to adjust behavior (by Learning Module and Adaptation Procedure) or to generate new decision routines (by applying New Problem Solver). Our admittedly bold attempt is loosely related to some stylized experimental results.

     
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    hdl: 10419/75597
    Series: CESifo Working Paper ; 330
    Scope: Online-Ressource (31 S.)
  12. Preemption in capacity and price determination
    a study of endogenous timing of decisions for homogeneous markets
    Author: Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine sales... more

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    Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine sales capacities before prices. Sellers must serve customers, but at higher costs when demand exceeds capacitiy. Our model allows for preemption in capacity as well as in price determination. Since preemption means to decide before the random choice of cost parameters reflecting the stochastic nature of (excess) capacity costs, preemptive commitments are no obviously better timing dispositions.

     
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    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/75486
    Series: CESifo Working Paper ; 309
    Scope: Online-Ressource (27 S.)
  13. Why do people veto?
    an experimental analysis of the valuation and the consequences of varying degrees of veto power
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kóvaczs, Judit
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    By vetoing one questions mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996) we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for... more

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    By vetoing one questions mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996) we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power. Afterwards the corresponding bargaining rule is implemented. The experimental data reveal that proposers are afraid of more veto power but that responders only care for commanding veto power at all, not for its strength.

     
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    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/75670
    Series: CESifo Working Paper ; 308
    Scope: Online-Ressource (24 S.)
  14. How ultimatum offers emerge
    a study in bounded rationality
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Edition: Rev
    Series: Array ; 155
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Entscheidungstheorie; Begrenzte Rationalität; Theorie
    Scope: 24, XIII S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 17 - 20
  15. Why do people veto?
    An experimental analysis of the valuation and the consequences of varying degrees of veto power
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kovács, Judit
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Media type: Book
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    Series: Array ; 157
    Subjects: Veto; Verhandlungstheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 24 S, graph. Darst
  16. Please, marry me!
    An experimental study of risking a joint venture
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Tjøtta, Sigve
    Published: 2000

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Working papers in economics / Department of Economics, University of Bergen ; 00,5
    Subjects: Familienökonomik; Verhandlungstheorie; Frauen; Männer; Bildungsinvestition; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 25 S
  17. On the evolution of power indices in collective bargaining
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin, Germany

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 171
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; Verhandlungstheorie; Macht; Gewerkschaft; Theorie; Shapley-Wert; Abstimmungsspiel
    Scope: 15 S, graph. Darst, 21 cm
  18. Fairness versus efficiency
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin, Germany

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 172
    Subjects: Verhaltensökonomik; Gerechtigkeit; Effizienz; Spieltheorie; Fundraising; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 16 S, graph. Darst, 21 cm
  19. Experimental game theory
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1190 (2000.111)
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,111
    Subjects: Spieltheorie; Experiment; Verhandlungstheorie; Theorie
    Scope: 14 S, 21 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 9 - 14
  20. On the evolution of power indices in collective bargaining
    Author: Güth, Werner; Berninghaus, Siegfried
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1190 (2000.109)
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    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,109
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; Verhandlungstheorie; Macht; Gewerkschaft; Theorie; Shapley-Wert; Abstimmungsspiel
    Scope: 15 S, graph. Darst, 21 cm
    Notes:
  21. Experimental game theory
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Media type: Book
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    Series: Array ; 169
    Subjects: Spieltheorie; Experiment; Verhandlungstheorie; Theorie
    Scope: 14 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 9 -14
  22. Procurement experiments
    how to choose quality when its costs are not known
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 173
    Subjects: Öffentlicher Auftrag; Auktionstheorie; Produktqualität; Verhandlungstheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 25, VI S, graph. Darst
  23. Retributive responses
    Author: Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät : Economics series ; 174
    Subjects: Verhaltensökonomik; Gerechtigkeit; Spieltheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 29 S, graph. Darst
  24. Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
    Author: Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1190 (2000.113)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,113
    Subjects: Oligopol; Marktforschung; Informationsverhalten; Asymmetrische Information; Risikoaversion; Evolutionsökonomik; Theorie
    Scope: 16 S, graph. Darst, 21 cm
    Notes:
  25. How ultimatum offers emerge
    a study in bounded rationality
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (2000.29)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,29
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Entscheidungstheorie; Begrenzte Rationalität; Theorie
    Scope: 24 S, graph. Darst
    Notes: