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  1. Merger in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  CES, Munich ; Ifo

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QC 000
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: CESifo working papers ; No. 241
    Subjects: Fusion; Monopolistische Konkurrenz; Administrierter Preis; Preisüberwachung; Staatliche Preispolitik; Auktionstheorie; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusion; (stw)Monopolistischer Wettbewerb; (stw)Preisregulierung; (stw)Auktionstheorie; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 15 S., 21 cm
  2. On the profitability of collusion in location games
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Knoblauch, Vicky; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,23
    Subjects: Räumliche Konkurrenz; Standorttheorie; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; Koalitionstheorie; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Räumlicher Wettbewerb; (stw)Standorttheorie; (stw)Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; (stw)Koalition; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Hotelling-Modell; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: 9 S., 21 cm
  3. Merger in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of... more

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    Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CESifo working paper series ; 241
    Subjects: Fusion; Monopolistischer Wettbewerb; Preisregulierung; Auktionstheorie; Theorie
    Scope: 15 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 14 - 15

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/241.pdf verfügbar
  4. Merger in Contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin

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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    RVK Categories: QC 000
    Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes ; Ausgabe 3, 2000
    Subjects: Fusion; Monopolistische Konkurrenz; Administrierter Preis; Preisüberwachung; Staatliche Preispolitik; Auktionstheorie; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusion; (stw)Monopolistischer Wettbewerb; (stw)Preisregulierung; (stw)Auktionstheorie; (stw)Theorie; contests; merger; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  5. On the profitability of collusion in location games
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Knoblauch, Vicky; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    On the basis of a real high stakes insurance experiment with small probabilities of losses, we demonstrate that concern is a more important driver of WTP for insurance than subjective probability estimates when there is ambiguity surrounding the... more

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    On the basis of a real high stakes insurance experiment with small probabilities of losses, we demonstrate that concern is a more important driver of WTP for insurance than subjective probability estimates when there is ambiguity surrounding the estimate. Concern is still important when probabilities are exactly given. It also helps explaining the low probability insurance puzzle well known from the literature, where a part of individuals pays too much and a part nothing for coverage, a result we are able to replicate. In our experiment, belonging to either the group of threshold persons or to those that pay far too much, is not related to probability judgments but to the degree an individual is concerned in our decision situation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62198
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,23
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 9 S., 81,65 KB)
  6. The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross
    on clustering in the four-player hotelling game
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J.
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    This article investigates whether decision makers intuitively optimize close to the normative prediction in entrepreneurial decision situations where their time must be allocated between a wage job and a newly formed venture. We offer an analytical... more

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    This article investigates whether decision makers intuitively optimize close to the normative prediction in entrepreneurial decision situations where their time must be allocated between a wage job and a newly formed venture. We offer an analytical model based on maximizing expected utility, and derive an optimal time allocation strategy for decreasing, constant and increasing returns from time invested in the venture. The model's predictions are tested in a simple questionnaire experiment where respondents have to detect corner solutions, that is, they should allocate to the venture either the maximum or the minimum possible time. Respondents are found to allocate time relatively close to the normative predictions, although with systematic deviations that are consistent with well-known decision anomalies. Risk propensity is found to have an impact on the decisions, but it should not according to the model. Respondents appear to use an anchoring and adjustment procedure and are influenced by the so-called affect heuristic, which may explain why those who do not mathematically optimize have their decision partially driven by their risk propensity. Implications of our findings for entrepreneurs and institutions dealing with entrepreneurs are discussed. -- Decision Making ; Intuitive Optimizing ; Micro Economics Model ; Time Allocation Strategy ; Entrepreneurship ; Questionnaire Experiment

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62175
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,24
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 21 S., 261,59 KB), graph. Darst.
  7. Profitable horizontal mergers
    a market structure-oriented view
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We propose a model in which mergers exert a more pronounced effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear.... more

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    We propose a model in which mergers exert a more pronounced effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The results help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings on mergers. -- efficient hedging ; quantile hedging ; jump-diffusion ; martingale measure.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62261
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,27
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 10 S., 147,89 KB)
  8. Strategic delegation in experimental markets
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the... more

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    In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction when asymmetric contracts are given. -- experimental economics ; strategic delegation ; managerial incentives

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62234
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,39
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 18 S., 254,53 KB), graph. Darst.
  9. Absent–minded drivers in the lab
    testing Gilboa’s model
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent-mindedness of... more

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    This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent-mindedness of subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to test Gilboa's (1997) agent-based approach to games with imperfect recall. We implement his model of the absent-minded driver problem in an experiment and find, if subjects are repeatedly randomly rematched, strong support for the equilibrium prediction which coincides with Piccione and Rubinstein's (1997) ex ante solution of the driver's problem. -- experiments ; imperfect recall ; the absent-minded driver's paradox

     
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    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/62206
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,45
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 13 S., 355,35 KB), graph. Darst.
  10. Why firms should care for customers
    Author: Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Adopting the indirect evolutionary approach, we show that it might be beneficial for firms on a heterogeneous market not only to care for their profits but also for their respective customers' welfare. -- evolutionary stability ; customer orientation... more

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    Adopting the indirect evolutionary approach, we show that it might be beneficial for firms on a heterogeneous market not only to care for their profits but also for their respective customers' welfare. -- evolutionary stability ; customer orientation ; heterogenous market ; duopoly

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62241
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,102
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 7 S., 178,92 KB), graph. Darst.
  11. Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
    Author: Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk... more

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    On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these results evolutionary processes are formulated according to which sellers can switch to market research or refrain from it depending on the difference in profits of informed and uninformed sellers. We derive the evolutionarily stable number of informed sellers and discuss how it is influenced by market parameters. -- evolution ; oligopoly ; market research ; private information

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62264
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,113
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 16 S., 247,77 KB), graph. Darst.
  12. Merger in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of... more

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    Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants. -- contests ; merger

     
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    hdl: 10419/62185
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,3
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 15 S., 89 KB)
  13. Divisionalization in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest. -- contests ; Divisionalization ; delegation more

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    To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest. -- contests ; Divisionalization ; delegation

     
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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/62193
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,9
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 6 S., 55,47 KB)
  14. Strategic delegation in experimental markets
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the... more

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    In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction when asymmetric contracts are given.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/75634
    Series: CESifo Working Paper ; 290
    Scope: Online-Ressource (18 S.)
  15. Merger in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest st ructure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number... more

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    Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest st ructure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/75673
    Series: CESifo Working Paper ; 241
    Scope: Online-Ressource (15 S.)
  16. Why firms should care for customers
    Author: Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1190 (2000.102)
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,102
    Subjects: Beziehungsmarketing; Evolutionsökonomik; Duopol; Theorie
    Scope: 7 S, graph. Darst, 21 cm
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  17. Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
    Author: Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1190 (2000.113)
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    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,113
    Subjects: Oligopol; Marktforschung; Informationsverhalten; Asymmetrische Information; Risikoaversion; Evolutionsökonomik; Theorie
    Scope: 16 S, graph. Darst, 21 cm
    Notes:
  18. The East End, the West End, and King's Cross
    on clustering in the four-player hotelling game
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J.
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Dep. of Economics, Queen Mary and Westfield College, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1150 (409)
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    Series: Paper / Department of Economics, Queen Mary and Westfield College ; 409
    Subjects: Räumlicher Wettbewerb; Standorttheorie; Städtische Standorttheorie; Experiment; Theorie; Wiederholte Spiele
    Scope: 21 S, graph. Darst
  19. On the profitability of collusion in location games
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Knoblauch, Vicky; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1190 (2000.23)
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,23
    Subjects: Räumlicher Wettbewerb; Standorttheorie; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; Koalition; Spieltheorie; Theorie; Hotelling-Modell
    Scope: 9 S
    Notes:
  20. The East End, the West End, and Kings Cross
    on clustering in the four-player hotelling games
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J.
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (2000.24)
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    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,24
    Subjects: Räumlicher Wettbewerb; Standorttheorie; Städtische Standorttheorie; Experiment; Theorie; Hotelling-Modell; Wiederholte Spiele
    Scope: 21 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:
  21. Profitable horizontal mergers: a market structure-oriented view
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (2000.27)
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    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,27
    Subjects: Fusion; Horizontale Integration; Dezentrale Organisation; Duopol; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Theorie
    Scope: 10 S
    Notes:
  22. Strategic delegation in experimental markets
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (2000.39)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,39
    Subjects: Leistungsanreiz; Vertrag; Führungskräfte; Leistungsanreiz; Duopol; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 18 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:
  23. Strategic delegation in experimental markets
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Uni., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    In this experiment, the authors analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duooly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Signature:
    bc 1391-290
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Signature:
    1 : Z 104.53 -290-
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 624 (290)
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    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
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    S32-290 a
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    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
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    S32-290 b
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    In this experiment, the authors analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duooly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction when asymmetric contracts are given.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CESifo working paper series ; 290
    Subjects: Leistungsanreiz; Vertrag; Führungskräfte; Leistungsanreiz; Duopol; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 18 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 13 - 14

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/290.pdf verfügbar
  24. Divisionalization in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (2000.9)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,9
    Subjects: Theorie der Unternehmung; Organisationsstruktur; Auktionstheorie; Spieltheorie; Oligopol; Theorie
    Scope: 6 S
    Notes:
  25. Merger in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (2000.3)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2000,3
    Subjects: Fusion; Monopolistischer Wettbewerb; Preisregulierung; Auktionstheorie; Theorie
    Scope: 15 S
    Notes: