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  1. The optimal capital structure of an economy
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Heidelberg

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    1 : Z 104.52:359
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    WP 8-359
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    W 235 (359)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; 359
    Subjects: Kapitalstruktur; Allokationseffizienz; Finanzintermediation; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Bank; Wettbewerb; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; Basler Akkord; Theorie
    Scope: 26 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 25 - 26

  2. Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Dt. Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    Freie Universität Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Philologische Bibliothek, FU Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    ISBN: 393374766X
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QK 900
    Series: Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum <Frankfurt, Main>: Discussion paper ; 2001,2
    Subjects: Abstimmung; Beschlussfassung; Publizitätspflicht; Notenbank
    Scope: 30 S., graph. Darst.
  3. Voting transparency and conflicting interests in Central Bank Councils
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Dt. Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    Freie Universität Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Philologische Bibliothek, FU Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    ISBN: 3933747678
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QK 900
    Series: Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum <Frankfurt, Main>: Discussion paper ; 2001,3
    Subjects: Transparenz; Abstimmung; Beschlussfassung; Publizitätspflicht; Notenbank
    Scope: 19 S.
  4. The optimal capital structure of an economy
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Heidelberg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Edition: Version: August 2001
    Series: Discussion paper series / Department of Economics ; No. 359
    Subjects: Kapitalstruktur; Pareto-Optimum; Finanzintermediation; LEN-Modell; Bank; Wettbewerb; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; Eigenkapitalgrundsätze; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Kapitalstruktur; (stw)Allokationseffizienz; (stw)Finanzintermediation; (stw)Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; (stw)Bank; (stw)Wettbewerb; (stw)Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; (stw)Basler Akkord; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 26 S., 21 cm
  5. Default probabilities and default correlations
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Heidelberg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Edition: Version: November 2001
    Series: Discussion paper series / Department of Economics ; No. 366
    Subjects: Kreditrisiko; Portfolio Selection; Optionspreistheorie; Theorie; Varianzanalyse; Korrelation
    Other subjects: (stw)Kreditrisiko; (stw)Portfolio-Management; (stw)Optionspreistheorie; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Varianzanalyse; (stw)Korrelation; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 50 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
  6. Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  CES, Munich ; Ifo

  7. Awareness of general equilibrium effects and unemployment
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    DDC Categories: 300; 330
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; No. 394
    Subjects: Arbeitsmarkttheorie; Verhandlungstheorie; Arbeitslosigkeit; Hysterese; Theorie; Gleichgewichtsmodell
    Other subjects: (stw)Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit; (stw)Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; (stw)Arbeitsmarkttheorie; (stw)Arbeitslosigkeit; (stw)Hysterese; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Gleichgewichtsmodell; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 28 S., 21 cm
  8. Learning of general equilibrium effects and the unemployment trap
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 300; 330
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; No. 254
    Subjects: Arbeitsmarkttheorie; Verhandlungstheorie; Lernkurve; Theorie; Gleichgewichtsmodell
    Other subjects: (stw)Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit; (stw)Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; (stw)Arbeitsmarkttheorie; (stw)Lernprozess; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Gleichgewichtsmodell; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 27 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
  9. Product market reforms and unemployment in Europe
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; No. 255
    Subjects: Marktmacht; Deregulierung; Wettbewerb; Beschäftigungswirkung; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; Arbeitsmobilität; Arbeitslosigkeit; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Marktmacht; (stw)Deregulierung; (stw)Wettbewerb; (stw)Beschäftigungseffekt; (stw)Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; (stw)Arbeitsmobilität; (stw)Arbeitslosigkeit; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 34 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 31 - 34

  10. The dynamics of deposit insurance and consumption trap
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Heidelberg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion paper series / Department of Economics ; No. 343
    Subjects: Bankenkrise; Sparen; Wirtschaftskrise; Mehrgenerationenmodell; Finanzintermediation; Einlagensicherung; Bankpolitik; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Bankenkrise; (stw)Sparen; (stw)Wirtschaftskrise; (stw)Overlapping Generations; (stw)Finanzintermediation; (stw)Einlagensicherung; (stw)Bankenregulierung; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 33 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 31 - 33

  11. Child labor and the education of a society
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

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  12. The dynamics of deposit insurance and the consumption trap
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  CES, Munich ; Ifo

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: CESifo working papers ; No. 509
    Subjects: Bankenkrise; Sparen; Wirtschaftskrise; Mehrgenerationenmodell; Finanzintermediation; Einlagensicherung; Bankpolitik; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Bankenkrise; (stw)Sparen; (stw)Wirtschaftskrise; (stw)Overlapping Generations; (stw)Finanzintermediation; (stw)Einlagensicherung; (stw)Bankenregulierung; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 30 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
    Notes:

    Literturverz. S. 28 - 30. - Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com oder www.CESifo.de verfügbar

  13. A product market theory of training and turnover in firms
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 300; 330
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; No. 327
    Subjects: Betriebliche Bildungsarbeit; Bildungsinvestition; Wettbewerb; Oligopol; Gehalt; Lohn; Arbeitsmobilität; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Betriebliches Bildungsmanagement; (stw)Bildungsinvestition; (stw)Wettbewerb; (stw)Oligopol; (stw)Lohn; (stw)Arbeitsmobilität; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 30 S., 21 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 28 - 30

  14. Reelection threshold contracts in politics
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  CES, Munich ; Ifo

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: CESifo working papers ; No. 622
    Subjects: Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Spieltheorie; Kontrakttheorie; Anreizsystem; Europawahl; Wahl; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Vertragstheorie; (stw)Leistungsanreiz; (stw)Wahl; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: 29 S., 21 cm
    Notes:

    Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com oder www.CESifo.de verfügbar

  15. Default probabilities and default correlations
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Dt. Bank Research, Frankfurt am Main

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Research notes in economics & statistics ; [20]01,5 : Economics : Quantitative analysis
    Subjects: Kreditrisiko; Portfolio Selection; Optionspreistheorie; Theorie; Varianzanalyse; Korrelation
    Other subjects: (stw)Kreditrisiko; (stw)Portfolio-Management; (stw)Optionspreistheorie; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Varianzanalyse; (stw)Korrelation; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 44 S., graph. Darst., 30 cm
  16. Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Dt. Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    Freie Universität Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek, Jacob-und-Wilhelm-Grimm-Zentrum
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Philologische Bibliothek, FU Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    ISBN: 393374766X
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QK 900
    Series: Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum <Frankfurt, Main>: Discussion paper ; 2001,2
    Subjects: Notenbank; Abstimmung; Beschlussfassung; Publizitätspflicht
    Scope: 30 S., graph. Darst.
  17. Voting transparency and conflicting interests in Central Bank Councils
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Dt. Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    Freie Universität Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Philologische Bibliothek, FU Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    ISBN: 3933747678
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QK 900
    Series: Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum <Frankfurt, Main>: Discussion paper ; 2001,3
    Subjects: Transparenz; Abstimmung; Publizitätspflicht; Notenbank; Beschlussfassung
    Scope: 19 S.
  18. Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon... more

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    When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians' time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CESifo working paper series ; 406
    Subjects: Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Asymmetrische Information; Glaubwürdigkeit; Leistungsanreiz; Wahlverhalten; Spieltheorie; Theorie; Politische Entscheidung; Commitment
    Scope: 20 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 19 - 20

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/406.pdf verfügbar

  19. Awareness of general equilibrium effects and unemployment
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    We examine wage-bargaining in a two-sector economy when employers and labor unions in each sector are not always aware of all general equilibrium feedback effects. We show analytically that if agents only consider labor demand effects, low real wages... more

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    We examine wage-bargaining in a two-sector economy when employers and labor unions in each sector are not always aware of all general equilibrium feedback effects. We show analytically that if agents only consider labor demand effects, low real wages and low unemployment result. With an intermediate view, i.e. when partial equilibrium effects within a sector are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment result. If all general equilibrium effects are considered at once, low real wages and low unemployment again result. The assumption that unions and employers' federations are not able to incorporate all feedback effects from other sectors may explain the persistence of high unemployment in Europe.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 394
    Subjects: Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit; Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; Arbeitsmarkttheorie; Arbeitslosigkeit; Hysterese; Theorie; Gleichgewichtsmodell
    Scope: 28 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 25 - 26

  20. Default probabilities and default correlations
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Heidelberg

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    1 : Z 104.52:366
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; 366
    Subjects: Kreditrisiko; Portfolio-Management; Optionspreistheorie; Theorie; Varianzanalyse; Korrelation
    Scope: 50 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 49 - 50

  21. Reelection threshold contracts in politics
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Center for Economic Studies, Ifo-Inst., Munich

    When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must... more

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    When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: Working paper series / CESifo ; Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 622
    Subjects: Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Spieltheorie; Vertragstheorie; Leistungsanreiz; Wahl; Theorie
    Scope: 29 S.
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 25 - 26

    Internetausg.: ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/622.pdf

  22. Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon... more

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    When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians' time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QC 000
    Series: Working paper series / CESifo ; 406
    Subjects: Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Asymmetrische Information; Glaubwürdigkeit; Leistungsanreiz; Wahlverhalten; Spieltheorie; Theorie; Politische Entscheidung; Commitment
    Scope: 20 S.
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 19 - 20

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/406.pdf verfügbar

  23. The dynamics of deposit insurance and the consumption trap
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Heidelberg

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Edition: Version February 2001
    Series: Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; 343
    Subjects: Bankenkrise; Sparen; Wirtschaftskrise; Overlapping Generations; Finanzintermediation; Einlagensicherung; Bankenregulierung; Theorie
    Scope: 33 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 31 - 33

  24. The optimal capital structure of an economy
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Heidelberg

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; 359
    Subjects: Kapitalstruktur; Allokationseffizienz; Finanzintermediation; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Bank; Wettbewerb; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; Basler Akkord; Theorie
    Scope: 26 S., graph. Darst.
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    Literaturverz. S. 25 - 26

  25. Beware of workaholics
    houshold preferences and individual equilibrium utility
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Heidelberg

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; 345
    Subjects: Haushaltsökonomik; Arbeitsangebot; Externer Effekt; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Theorie; Soziale Folgen
    Scope: 22 S., graph. Darst.
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    Literaturverz. S. 22