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  1. Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Keser, Claudia
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin, Germany

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät : [...], Economics series ; 146
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Gemeinschaftsunternehmen; Experiment; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Verhandlungstheorie; (stw)Joint Venture; (stw)Experiment; (stw)Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; (stw)Theorie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 17 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
  2. Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Keser, Claudia
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,90
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Gemeinschaftsunternehmen; Experiment; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Verhandlungstheorie; (stw)Joint Venture; (stw)Experiment; (stw)Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; (stw)Theorie; Bargaining; Joint Venture; Merger; Experiments; Equilibrium Selection; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 20 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
  3. Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Keser, Claudia
    Published: 1999

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1155 (99.85)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Sonderforschungsbereich Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und Ökonomische Modellierung ; 99,85
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Joint Venture; Experiment; Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; Theorie
    Scope: 17 Bl
  4. Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Keser, Claudia
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Gemeinschaftsunternehmen; Experiment; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Verhandlungstheorie; (stw)Joint Venture; (stw)Experiment; (stw)Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; (stw)Theorie; Bargaining; Joint Venture; Merger; Experiments; Equilibrium Selection; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource
    Notes:

    In: Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Band 1999, Ausgabe 90, 1999
  5. Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Keser, Claudia
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    DS 20 (1999,90)
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    We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture. However, we observe a significant amount of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, when compared with decentralized bargaining, has no significant effect on the payoffs of the players in the joint venture but reduces the payoff of the third player. -- Bargaining ; Joint Venture ; Merger ; Experiments ; Equilibrium Selection

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61717
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,90
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 83,81 KB), graph. Darst.
  6. Please, marry me!
    an experimental study of risking a joint venture
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Tjotta, Sigve
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. First the female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of... more

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    DS 20 (1999,92)
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    Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. First the female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of the two forms of joint venture. Whereas a full engagement relies on more specialization, but makes her more exploitable by the male partner, a low engagement is less productive, but also fairer. More specifically, the random profit of a joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in case of a full engagement whereas demands are determined simultaneously in case of a low engagement. Partners interact anonymously. In the repetition the two partners in a matching group of four participants are exchanged. Our treatment variables are her and his outside option value representing gender specific investments in human capital.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61707
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,92
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 26 S., 3,19 MB)
  7. Dynamic decision structure and risk taking
    Author: Eichberger, Jürgen; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    This paper investigates the behaviour in repeated decision situations. The experimental study shows that subjects show low or no risk-aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in every stage of the decision problem.... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    This paper investigates the behaviour in repeated decision situations. The experimental study shows that subjects show low or no risk-aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in every stage of the decision problem. There is evidence that risk attitudes depend on whether they are measured by comparing the certainty equivalent and the expected value of a lottery or by preferences over mean-preserving spreads. -- Dynamic decisions ; risk taking behaviour ; decision-making experiments

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61759
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,95
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 192,28 KB)
  8. An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information
    Author: Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Engelmann, Dirk
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    DS 20 (1999,97)
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    In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a human participant who may decide opportunistically. To allow for reputation formation, this game is played repeatedly. Learning can be analysed since participants play successively several repeated games with changed partners. In our computerized experiment, participants can explicitly rely on mixed strategies which allows testing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reputation equilibria also at an individual level.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61770
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,97
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S., 2,57 MB), graph. Darst.
  9. How competition in investing, hiring, and selling affects (un)employment
    an analysis of equilibrium scenario
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Ramser, Hans Jürgen
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Most models of labor markets and (un)employment neglect how competition among firms or sectors of the economy affects their hiring of workers and working times. Our approach pays special attention to such effects by proposing a complex stage game... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    DS 20 (1999,102)
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    Most models of labor markets and (un)employment neglect how competition among firms or sectors of the economy affects their hiring of workers and working times. Our approach pays special attention to such effects by proposing a complex stage game where firms invest in capital equipment before hiring workers. Working times are adjusted to demand which is implied by price competition. A special advantage of such a framework is that one can distinguish two kinds of employment effects, namely the numbers of workers as well as their working times, and that one can locate which firm or sector suffers from unemployment. Instead of solving the model in full generality we offer several equilibrium scenarios showing that certain economic phenomena are consistent with subgame perfect equilibrium behavior.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61697
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,102
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 22 S., 2,48 MB)
  10. An experimental analysis of equal punishment games
    Author: Ahlert, Marlies; Crüger, Arwed; Güth, Werner
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    In equal punishment games first the proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative... more

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    In equal punishment games first the proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was bounded from above depending on the proposal and the (for proposer and responder) same show up-fee, our only treatment variable. Although inequality aversion (Bolton and Oekenfels, 1999, and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) predicts zero-punishments, we observe positive punishments which, however, became smaller in the repetition. Initial fairness is often substituted in the repetition by extreme greed. Whereas greed is sticky, fairness is more characteristic for initial inclinations and not a stable behavioral pattern.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61710
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,73
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 18 S., 1,90 MB), graph. Darst.
  11. Evolutionary norm enforcement
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of... more

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    Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of "truly" trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/61708
    Series: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 1999,84
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 17 S., 89,95 KB), graph. Darst.
  12. Consistency and equilibrium selection
    how to avoid the impasse?
    Author: Güth, Werner
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (1999.11)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Edition: Rev. version
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,11
    Subjects: Kooperatives Spiel; Theorie
    Scope: 16 S, graph. Darst, 21 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 14 - 16
  13. Please, marry me!
    An experimental study of risking a joint venture
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Tjotta, Sigve
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (1999.92)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,92
    Subjects: Familienökonomik; Verhandlungstheorie; Frauen; Männer; Bildungsinvestition; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 26 S
    Notes:
  14. Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Keser, Claudia
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (1999.90)
    Inter-library loan:
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,90
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Joint Venture; Experiment; Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; Theorie
    Scope: 2012 S
    Notes:
  15. How competition in investing, hiring, and selling affect (un)employment
    ana nalysis of equilibrium scenarios
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Ramser, Hans Jürgen
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (1999.102)
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,102
    Subjects: Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit; Duopol; Investitionsentscheidung; Arbeitsnachfrage; Arbeitszeit; Wettbewerb; Spieltheorie; Erwerbstätigkeit; Theorie
    Scope: 21 S
    Notes:
  16. An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information
    Author: Anderhub, Vital; Engelmann, Dirk; Güth, Werner
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (1999.97)
    Inter-library loan:
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,97
    Subjects: Reputation; Unvollkommene Information; Theorie; Wiederholte Spiele
    Scope: 24 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:
  17. An experimental analysis of equal punishment games
    Author: Ahlert, Marlies; Crüger, Arwed; Güth, Werner
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (1999.73)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,73
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 28 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:
  18. Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Keser, Claudia
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 751 (146)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 146
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Joint Venture; Experiment; Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes; Theorie
    Scope: 17, XII S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 16 - 17
  19. Evolutionary norm enforcement
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (1999.84)
    Inter-library loan:
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    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,84
    Subjects: Vertragstheorie; Rechtsökonomik; Reputation; Theorie; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Scope: 17 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:
  20. Evolutionary norm enforcement
    Author: Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 751 (145)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 145
    Subjects: Vertragstheorie; Rechtsökonomik; Vertrauen; Theorie; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Scope: 17, XII S, graph. Darst
  21. An experimental analysis of equal punishment games
    Author: Ahlert, Marlies; Crüger, Arwed; Güth, Werner
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 751 (144)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 144
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 18, XI S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 14 - 16
  22. How competition in investing, hiring and selling affects (un)employment
    an analysis of equilibrium scenarios
    Author: Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Ramser, Hans Jürgen
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 751 (149)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 149
    Subjects: Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit; Duopol; Investitionsentscheidung; Arbeitsnachfrage; Arbeitszeit; Wettbewerb; Spieltheorie; Erwerbstätigkeit; Theorie
    Scope: 21, XII S
  23. Dynamic decision structure and risk taking
    Author: Eichberger, Jürgen; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1190 (1999.95)
    Inter-library loan:
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,95
    Subjects: Entscheidung; Intertemporale Allokation; Risikopräferenz; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: 30 S
    Notes: