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Displaying results 1 to 8 of 8.

  1. Persistence and snap decision making
    inefficient decisions by a reputation-concerned expert
    Author: Tajika, Tomoya
    Published: July 2017
    Publisher:  Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 62 (661)
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10086/28690
    Series: Array ; no. 661
    Subjects: Reputation; herding; persistency of the initial opinion; snap decision
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Organizational concealment
    an incentive of reducing the responsibility
    Author: Tajika, Tomoya
    Published: November 2017
    Publisher:  Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 62 (667)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10086/28973
    Series: Array ; no. 667
    Subjects: Concealment; overlapping generations; promotion; reducing the responsibility
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Collective mistakes
    intuition aggregation for a trick question under strategic voting
    Author: Tajika, Tomoya
    Published: July 2018
    Publisher:  Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 62 (674)
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10086/29383
    Series: Array ; no. 674
    Subjects: Information aggregation; inefficiency; counterintuitive question; strategic voting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten)
  4. Evolution of information projection bias through costly communication in overlapping generations organizations
    Author: Daido, Kohei; Tajika, Tomoya
    Published: October 2023
    Publisher:  School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 815
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / [School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University] ; no. 261
    Subjects: Information Projection Bias; Costly Communication; Overlapping Generations; Performance-based Promotion; Diversity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. At the crossroad of research
    the impact of projection bias on the decision to explore or exploit ideas
    Author: Daido, Kohei; Tajika, Tomoya
    Published: December 2023
    Publisher:  School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 815
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / [School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University] ; no. 263
    Subjects: Projection bias; Over/underconfidence; Selectiveness; Explore or exploit ideas; Filedrawer problem
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Non-manipulability of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects
    Author: Tajika, Tomoya; Kazumura, Tomoya
    Published: May 2016
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linear preferences with a submodular valuation function. It is known thatWalrasian... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 198 (972)
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    We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linear preferences with a submodular valuation function. It is known thatWalrasian mechanisms are manipulable. We investigate the incentive property of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects. Given a set of agents and a preference profile, an agent i asymptotically dominates an agent j if at sufficiently many objects, i's incremental valuation is higher than j's incremental valuation. We show that for each economy, if there is no agent asymptotically dominating the other agents, and if there are sufficiently many objects, any Walrasian mechanism is non-manipulable at the economy. We also consider replica economies, and show that for each economy, if it is replicated sufficiently many times, the minimum price Walrasian mechanisms are non-manipulable at the replica economy.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/148200
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 972
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten)
  7. Information projection and timing decisions
    a rationale for second thoughts
    Author: Daido, Kohei; Tajika, Tomoya
    Published: August 2022
    Publisher:  School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 815
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / [School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University] ; no. 238
    Subjects: Delay; Information projection bias; Preemption games; Second thoughts; Social learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Hidden cost of sanctions in a dynamic principal-agent model
    reactance to controls and restoration of freedom
    Author: Daido, Kohei; Tajika, Tomoya
    Published: December 2021
    Publisher:  School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 815
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / [School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University] ; no. 233
    Subjects: Dynamic principal-agent model; Hidden cost of controls; Psychological reactance; Ratchet effects; Sanction
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen