Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 25 of 45.

  1. Credit scoring and incentives for loan officers in a principle agent model
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Signature:
    2 : V Kz 260 -30-
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1055 (30)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
    Signature:
    99-3895
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; No. 30
    Subjects: Kreditgeschäft; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Kreditwürdigkeit; Signalling; Theorie
    Scope: 26 Bl
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 24 - 26
  2. Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation
    the welfare increasing effect of liability insurance
    Author: Ewert, Ralf; Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Signature:
    2 : V Kz 260 -28-
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1055 (28)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
    Signature:
    99-3894
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; No. 28
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Risiko; Unvollkommene Information; Haftpflichtversicherung; Theorie
    Scope: 15 Bl
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 14 - 15
  3. The manager and the auditor in a double moral hazard setting
    efficiency through contingent Feess and insurance contracts
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin
    Published: 1998

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1055 (24)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 24
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Moral Hazard; Leistungsanreiz; Haftpflichtversicherung; Theorie
    Scope: 15 Bl
  4. Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naive offenders
    Author: Buechel, Berno; Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantially from the true level. To account for this insight, we extend the standard economic model of law enforcement (Becker, 1968) by considering two types... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (7106)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantially from the true level. To account for this insight, we extend the standard economic model of law enforcement (Becker, 1968) by considering two types of offenders, sophisticates and naïves. The former are always fully informed about the enforcement effort, the latter become informed only when the effort is revealed by the authority; otherwise, naïves rely on their perceptions. We characterize the optimal enforcement effort and the decision whether to hide or reveal it. The welfare-maximizing authority chooses either a relatively high effort which is then revealed, or it chooses a relatively low effort which remains hidden. The latter policy becomes more favorable, the larger the share of naïves in the population and the higher their level of perceived effort. We then analyze three empirically important extensions, thereby allowing for lower efficacy of the enforcement effort due to avoidance activities, endogenous fines, and heterogeneity with respect to naïves'perceptions.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/181306
    Series: Array ; no. 7105
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Lying and reciprocity
    Author: Dato, Simon; Feess, Eberhard; Nieken, Petra
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Recent literature has shown that lying behavior in the laboratory can well be explained by a combination of lying costs and reputation concerns. We extend the literature on lying behavior to strategic interactions. As reciprocal behavior is important... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (7368)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Recent literature has shown that lying behavior in the laboratory can well be explained by a combination of lying costs and reputation concerns. We extend the literature on lying behavior to strategic interactions. As reciprocal behavior is important in many interactions, we study a theoretical model on reciprocity where a player's altruism depends on her perception of the other player's altruism towards herself. We analyze a sequential two-player contest and vary the second mover's information on the first movers lying behavior. This allows us to derive predictions on the second mover's behavior which we test empirically in a large scale online experiment and in the laboratory. In both experiments, the second mover's lying propensity does not depend on whether the first mover has (possibly) lied or not. This robust behavioral pattern provides strong evidence that reciprocity does not play a role for lying behavior in our setting.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/191393
    Series: Array ; no. 7368 (November 2018)
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Transfer fee regulations in European football
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QV 000 ; QV 000
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; No. 423
    Subjects: Fußball; Arbeitsvertrag; Dienstvertrag; Berufssport; Kontrakttheorie; Verhandlungstheorie; Abfindung; Sportler; Sportlerin; Leistungsmotivation; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fußball; (stw)Arbeitsvertrag; (stw)Profisport; (stw)Vertragstheorie; (stw)Verhandlungstheorie; (stw)Abfindung; (stw)Sportler; (stw)Leistungsmotivation; (stw)Theorie; (stw)EU-Staaten; (stw)Abfindung; Ablösesumme; Ablösesumme; Online-Publikation; Arbeitspapier; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 25 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
  7. Credit scoring and incentives for loan officers in a principal agent model
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Working paper series / Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : [...], Finance & accounting ; No. 30
    Subjects: Kreditgeschäft; LEN-Modell; Kreditwürdigkeit; Signaling; Theorie; Anreiz; Kreditwürdigkeitsprüfung; Finanzmakler; Sachbearbeiter
    Other subjects: (stw)Kreditgeschäft; (stw)Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; (stw)Kreditwürdigkeit; (stw)Signalling; (stw)Theorie; delegated expertise; loan officers; loan origination; limited liability; informed principal; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 25 Bl., graph. Darst., 30 cm
  8. Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation
    the welfare increasing effect of liability insurance
    Author: Ewert, Ralf; Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Working paper series / Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : [...], Finance & accounting ; No 28
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Risiko; Unvollkommene Information; Haftpflichtversicherung; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Wirtschaftsprüfung; (stw)Haftung; (stw)Risiko; (stw)Unvollkommene Information; (stw)Haftpflichtversicherung; (stw)Theorie; auditor liability; risk allocation; liability insurance; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 15 Bl., 30 cm
  9. The manager and the auditor in a double moral hazard setting
    efficiency through contingent fees and insurance contracts
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin
    Published: 1998
    Publisher:  Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Working paper series / Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : [...], Finance & accounting ; No. 24
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Moral Hazard; Anreizsystem; Haftpflichtversicherung; Theorie; Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Moral Hazard; Anreizsystem; Haftpflichtversicherung
    Other subjects: (stw)Wirtschaftsprüfung; (stw)Haftung; (stw)Moral Hazard; (stw)Leistungsanreiz; (stw)Haftpflichtversicherung; (stw)Theorie; auditor liability; duble moral hazard; team production problem; partnerships; insurance; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 15 Bl., 30 cm
  10. CERCLA, lender liability and the secured creditor exemption
    an argument against negligence rules
    Author: Feess, Eberhard
    Published: 1997
    Publisher:  Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Frankfurter volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; Arbeitspapier Nr. 84
    Subjects: Umwelthaftung; Verursacherprinzip; Gläubiger; Risikomanagement; Moral Hazard; Wirtschaftsprüfung; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Umwelthaftung; (stw)Gläubiger; (stw)Risikomanagement; (stw)Moral Hazard; (stw)Wirtschaftsprüfung; (stw)Theorie; (stw)USA; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch
    Scope: 21 Bl., 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 15 - 17
  11. Settlement and litigation under the private securities litigation reform act of 1995
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Blaurock, Christine
    Published: 1997
    Publisher:  Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Frankfurter volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; Arbeitspapier Nr. 83
    Subjects: Wertpapierrecht; Haftung; Wirtschaftsprüfung; Zivilprozess; Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit; Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts
    Other subjects: (stw)Wertpapierrecht; (stw)Haftung; (stw)Wirtschaftsprüfung; (stw)Zivilprozess; (stw)Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit; (stw)Rechtsökonomik; (stw)USA; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch
    Scope: 34 Bl., 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 32 - 34
  12. Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Schumacher, Christoph R.
    Published: 2005

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1079 (05.10)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper / Massey University, College of Business, Department of Commerce ; 05,10
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Theorie; Beschränkte Haftung
    Scope: 6 S
    Notes:
  13. Transfer fee regulations in European football
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1194 (423)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
    Signature:
    98/464 B-423
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QV 000
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; No. 423
    Subjects: Fußball; Arbeitsvertrag; Profisport; Vertragstheorie; Verhandlungstheorie; Abfindung; Sportler; Leistungsmotivation; Theorie; EU-Staaten; Abfindung
    Scope: 25 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
  14. When should prinipals asquire verifiable information?
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael; Walzl, Markus
    Published: 2004

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 434 (04.047)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Research memorandum / METEOR ; 04,047
    Subjects: Asymmetrische Information; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
    Scope: 26 S
  15. Unfair contests
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Walzl, Markus
    Published: 2004

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 434 (04.048)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Research memorandum / METEOR ; 04,048
    Subjects: Auktion; Asymmetrische Information; Rent-Seeking; Spieltheorie
    Scope: 30 S, graph. Darst
  16. An analysis of corporate leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus
    Published: 2004

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 434 (04.037)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Research memorandum / METEOR ; 04/037
    Subjects: Kartellrecht; Asymmetrische Information; EU-Staaten; USA; Rechtsdurchsetzung
    Scope: 24 S
  17. The manager and the auditor in a double moral hazard setting
    efficiency through contingent fees and insurance contracts
    Author: Feess, Eberhard
    Published: 1998
    Publisher:  Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Signature:
    2 : V Kz 260 -24-
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    K99-1422
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1055 (24)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
    Signature:
    wrc 10.06:i/f71-24
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
    Signature:
    99-3939
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 24
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Moral Hazard; Leistungsanreiz; Haftpflichtversicherung; Theorie
    Scope: 15 Bl., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 14 - 15
  18. Emissionsbesteuerung bei grenzüberschreitender Umweltbelastung
    Author: Feess, Eberhard
    Published: 1990

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Clausthal
    Signature:
    CL 13 : IfW13 10 W 8
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Signature:
    RA 9518(10)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    1990 K 2671
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    C 170735
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Saarländische Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
    Signature:
    MT 8526
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Arbeitspapiere des Instituts für Ökologie und Unternehmensführung e. V. ; 10
    Subjects: Umweltabgabe; Wohlfahrtsökonomik; Theorie
    Scope: 32 S.
  19. Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation
    the welfare increasing effect of liability insurance
    Author: Ewert, Ralf; Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Signature:
    2 : V Kz 260 -28-
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1055 (28)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
    Signature:
    wrc 10.06:i/f71-28
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
    Signature:
    99-3894
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 28
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Risiko; Unvollkommene Information; Haftpflichtversicherung; Theorie
    Scope: 15 Bl.
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 14 - 15
  20. Credit scoring and incentives for loan officers in a principal agent model
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael
    Published: 1999
    Publisher:  Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Frankfurt am Main

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Signature:
    2 : V Kz 260 -30-
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1055 (30)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
    Signature:
    wrc 10.06:i/f71-30
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
    Signature:
    99-3895
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 30
    Subjects: Kreditgeschäft; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Kreditwürdigkeit; Signalling; Theorie
    Scope: 26 Bl.
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. Bl. 24 - 26
  21. The manager and the auditor in a double moral hazard setting : efficiency through contingent fees and insurance contracts
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin
    Published: 1998
    Publisher:  Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg, Frankfurt am Main

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 24
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Moral Hazard; Anreizsystem; Haftpflichtversicherung; Theorie; Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Moral Hazard; Anreizsystem; Haftpflichtversicherung
    Other subjects: (stw)Wirtschaftsprüfung; (stw)Haftung; (stw)Moral Hazard; (stw)Leistungsanreiz; (stw)Haftpflichtversicherung; (stw)Theorie; auditor liability; duble moral hazard; team production problem; partnerships; insurance; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  22. Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation : the welfare increasing effect of liability insurance
    Author: Ewert, Ralf; Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg, Frankfurt am Main

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 28
    Subjects: Wirtschaftsprüfung; Haftung; Risiko; Unvollkommene Information; Haftpflichtversicherung; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Wirtschaftsprüfung; (stw)Haftung; (stw)Risiko; (stw)Unvollkommene Information; (stw)Haftpflichtversicherung; (stw)Theorie; auditor liability; risk allocation; liability insurance; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  23. Basel II and the value of bank differentiation
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Hege, Ulrich
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Paris, Paris [u.a.]

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 39 (879)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    ISBN: 2854188799
    Series: Les cahiers de recherche / Groupe HEC ; 879
    Subjects: Basler Akkord; Basler Akkord; Bank; Wettbewerb; Moral Hazard; Bewertung
    Scope: 39 S.
  24. When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance
    choking under pressure as a screening device
    Author: Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Frankfurt, M.

    Empirical and experimental papers find that high-powered incentives may reduce performance rather than improve it; a phenomenon referred to as "choking under pressure". We show that competition for high ability workers nevertheless leads firms to... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 114 (135)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Empirical and experimental papers find that high-powered incentives may reduce performance rather than improve it; a phenomenon referred to as "choking under pressure". We show that competition for high ability workers nevertheless leads firms to offer high bonus payments, thereby deliberately accepting pressure-induced performance reductions. Bonus payments allow for a separating equilibrium in which only high ability workers choose high-powered incentive contracts. Low ability workers receive fixed payments and produce their maximum output which, however, is still below the reduced output of high ability workers. Bonus payments lead to a social loss which is increasing in the degree of competition. Our paper helps to explain why steep incentive schemes are persistent in highly-competitive industries such as investment banking, and why the observed performance sensitivity of CEO compensation is largely heterogeneous. -- Performance-related pay ; screening ; choking under pressure ; competition

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/30169
    Series: Working paper series / Frankfurt School of Finance & Management ; 135
    Subjects: Leistungsentgelt; Leistungsanreiz; Führungskräfte; Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte; Leistungsbeurteilung; Leistungsmotivation; Investmentbank; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 33 S.), graph. Darst.
  25. Contracts as rent-seeking devices
    evidence from German soccer
    Author: Feess, Eberhard; Gerfin, Michael; Mühlheußer, Gerd
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  Univ., Fac. of Economics and Social Sciences, Dep. of Economics, Bern

    Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent-seeking devices vis-à-vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue so far. To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we... more

    Location:
    Bibliothek der Hochschule Hannover
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 182 (2010,15)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent-seeking devices vis-à-vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue so far. To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we develop a theoretical and empirical framework in the context of European professional soccer where (incumbent) teams and players sign binding contracts which are, however, frequently renegotiated when other teams (entrants) want to hire the player. Because they weaken entrants in renegotiations, long-term contracts are useful rent-seeking devices for the contracting parties. However, they also lead to allocative distortions in the form of deterring efficient transfers. Since incumbent teams tend to benefit more from long-term contracts in renegotiations than players do, these must be compensated ex ante by higher wages when agreeing to a long-term contract. Using data from the German "Bundesliga", our model predictions are broadly confirmed. -- Strategic contracting ; rent-seeking ; empirical contract theory ; long-term contracts ; breach of contract

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/76757
    Series: Discussion papers / Universität Bern, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics ; 10,15
    Subjects: Arbeitsvertrag; Vertragstheorie; Rent-Seeking; Fußball; Profisport; Sportler; Tarifverhandlungen; Deutschland
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 36 S., 266 KB), graph. Darst.