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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Fast or slow?
    competing on publication frequency
    Author: Chen, Lin; Roels, Guillaume
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  INSEAD, [Fontainebleau]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2021, 74
    Subjects: Publishing; Batching; Information Goods; Competition; Vertical Differentiation; Digitalization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Competition Laws, Governance, and Firm Value
    Author: Levine, Ross; Chen, Lin; Xie, Wensi
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Do antitrust laws influence corporate valuations? We evaluate the relationship between firm value and laws limiting firms from engaging in anticompetitive agreements, abusing dominant positions, and conducting M&As that restrict competition. Using... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Do antitrust laws influence corporate valuations? We evaluate the relationship between firm value and laws limiting firms from engaging in anticompetitive agreements, abusing dominant positions, and conducting M&As that restrict competition. Using firm-level data from 99 countries over the 1990-2010 period, we discover that valuations rise after countries strengthen competition laws. The effects are larger among firms with more severe pre-existing agency problems: firms in countries with weaker investor protection laws, with weaker firm-specific governance provisions, and with greater opacity. The results suggest that antitrust laws that intensify competition exert a positive influence on valuations by reducing agency problems

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w28908
    Subjects: Wettbewerbsrecht; Unternehmenswert; Welt
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  3. Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring
    Author: Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, Michael S.
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent directors' perceptions of the likelihood of receiving a regulatory penalty affect their monitoring. Our results suggest that they are more likely to vote against management after observing how another director in their board network received a regulatory penalty related to negligence. This effect is long-lasting and stronger if the observing and penalized directors share the same professional background or gender and if the observing director is at a firm that is more likely to be penalized. These results provide direct evidence suggesting that the possibility of receiving penalties is an important factor motivating directors

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w28974
    Subjects: Führungskräfte; Corporate Governance; Leistungsmotivation; Board of Directors; Vorstand; China
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  4. The Legal Origins of Financial Development
    Evidence from the Shanghai Concessions
    Author: Levine, Ross; Chen, Lin; Ma, Chicheng; Xu, Yuchen
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We assemble new data on the British and French concessions in Shanghai between 1845 and 1936 to assess the legal origins view of financial development. During this period, two regime changes altered the degree to which the British common and French... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We assemble new data on the British and French concessions in Shanghai between 1845 and 1936 to assess the legal origins view of financial development. During this period, two regime changes altered the degree to which the British common and French civil law traditions held jurisdiction over the respective concessions: the 1869 formation of the Mixed Courts strengthened Western legal jurisdiction, while the 1926 rendition agreement returned those courts to Chinese control. By examining the changing application of different legal traditions to adjacent neighborhoods within the same city, we address identification challenges associated with cross-country studies. Consistent with the legal origins view, the financial development advantage in the British concession widened after the formation of the Courts and shrank after their rendition

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w28794
    Subjects: Rechtsordnung; Frankreich; Britisch; Wirkungsanalyse; Entwicklung; Geschichte; Shanghai; China
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  5. Risk perceptions, board networks, and directors' monitoring
    Author: Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, Michael S.
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  The Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics, [Columbus, Ohio]

    What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are concerned about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Rechte
    Inter-library loan:
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    What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are concerned about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent directors’ perceptions of the likelihood of receiving a regulatory penalty affect their monitoring. Our results suggest that they are more likely to vote against management after observing how another director in their board network received a regulatory penalty related to negligence. This effect is long-lasting and stronger if the observing and penalized directors share the same professional background or gender and if the observing director is at a firm that is more likely to be penalized. These results provide direct evidence suggesting that the possibility of receiving penalties is an important factor motivating directors

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Working papers series / Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics ; WP 2021, 11
    Fisher College of Business working paper series ; WP 2021-03, 11
    Subjects: Director monitoring; regulatory penalties; board networks; board voting
    Other subjects: Array
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen