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Displaying results 1 to 21 of 21.

  1. Belief-dependent preferences and reputation
    experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena; Nagel, Rosemarie
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  IGIER, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: April, 2018
    Series: Working paper series / IGIER ; n. 622
    Subjects: Repeated psychological game; reputation; guilt; almost complete information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Embezzlement and guilt aversion
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Villeval, Marie-Claire
    Published: November 2018
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries... more

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    Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries' behavior. This is striking as embezzlement affects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/193250
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 11956
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Incomplete information models of guilt aversion in the trust game
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena
    Published: [2015]
    Publisher:  IGIER, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: January, 2015
    Series: Working paper series / IGIER ; n. 480
    Subjects: Psychological games; Trust Game; guilt; incomplete information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in a trust game
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Nagel, Rosemarie
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  IGIER, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: December, 2017
    Series: Working paper series / IGIER ; n. 506
    Subjects: Experiments; trust game; guilt; reciprocity; complete and incomplete information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. An experimental test of the under-annuitization puzzle with smooth ambiguity and charitable giving
    Author: Albis, Hippolyte d’; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Thibault, Emmanuel
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, Paris

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 331
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2019, 22
    Subjects: Self-insurance; annuity; uncertain survival probabilities; smooth ambiguityaversion; charity; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Guilt aversion in (new) games
    does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Villeval, Marie-Claire
    Published: February 2023
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 4
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    We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former is the traditional vulnerability which arises when a player's material payoff depends on another player's action (e.g., recipient's payoff in a Dictator game). The latter arises when a player's initial endowment is entrusted to another player (e.g., trustor's endowment in a Trust game). Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of a co-player who is payoff-vulnerable and/or endowment-vulnerable, or not vulnerable at all, and the decision rights of the vulnerable player. We find that trustees' guilt aversion is insensitive to the dimension of the co-player's vulnerability and to the decision rights of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent vulnerability of the co-player whose beliefs are disappointed. It is triggered by the willingness to respond to the co-player's beliefs on his strategy, regardless of whether this strategy concerns this player or a third player's vulnerability, that is, indirect vulnerability.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/272587
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15960
    Subjects: guilt aversion; vulnerability; psychological game theory; Dictator game; Trust game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Testing value vs waiting value
    a more general approach to environmental decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Montesano, Aldo
    Published: 2006

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1258 (2006.1)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 2006,1
    Scope: 34 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:
  8. The price for information about probabilities and its relation with capacities
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Montesano, Aldo
    Published: 2010

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Les cahiers du LERNA ; 10.16 = 322
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 21 S.), graph. Darst.
  9. Relative performance of liability rules
    experimental evidence
    Author: Angelova, Vera; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hiriart, Yolande
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Univ. [u.a.], Jena

    We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm's investment is... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm's investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric information call for public intervention to define rules aimed at increasing prevention. We determine the investment in safety under No Liability, Strict Liability and Negligence, and compare it to the first best. Additionally, we investigate how the (dis)ability of the firm to fully cover potential damages affects the firm's behavior. An experiment tests the theoretical predictions. In line with theory, Strict Liability and Negligence are equally effective; both perform better than No Liability; investment in safety is not sensitive to the ability of the firm to compensate potential victims. In contrast with theory, prevention rates absent liability are much higher and liability is much less effective than predicted. -- Risk Regulation ; Liability Rules ; Incentives Insolvency ; Experiment

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/56898
    Series: Jena economic research papers ; 2012,012
    Subjects: Umwelthaftung; Umweltschutz; Sicherheit; Investition; Anreiz; Experiment; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 40 S., 584 KB), graph. Darst.
  10. Double auction equilibrium and efficiency in a classroom experimental search market
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Centorrino, Samuele; Moscati, Ivan
    Published: 2010

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Les cahiers du LERNA ; 11.03 = 337
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 31 S.)
  11. Relative performance of liability rules
    experimental evidence
    Author: Angelova, Vera; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hiriart, Yolande
    Published: 2012

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Les cahiers du LERNA ; 12.05 = 362
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 40 S.), graph. Darst.
  12. Voting as a lottery
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Corazzini, Luca; Passarelli, Francesco
    Published: 2010

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Les cahiers du LERNA ; 09.27 = 303
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 35 S.), graph. Darst.
  13. Testing value vs waiting value in environmental decisions under uncertainty
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Montesano, Aldo
    Published: 2010

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Les cahiers du LERNA ; 10.01 = 307
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 35 S.), graph. Darst.
  14. Over-the-counter markets vs double auctions
    a comparative experimental study
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Centorrino, Samuele; Moscati, Ivan
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Stony Brook Univ., Dep. of Economics, Stony Brook, NY

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Stony Brook University, Economics Department ; 14,06
    Subjects: Market experiments; Over-the-counter market; Double auction; Private vs public information; Efficiency
    Scope: Online-Ressource (27 S.), graph. Darst.
  15. Relative performance of liability rules
    experimental evidence
    Author: Angelova, Vera; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hiriart, Yolande
    Published: 2016
    Publisher:  SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin

    We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm's investment is... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 86 (2016,28)
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    We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm's investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric information call for public intervention to define rules aimed at increasing prevention. We determine the investment in safety under No Liability, Strict Liability and Negligence, and compare it to the first best. Additionally, we investigate how the (dis)ability of the firm to fully cover potential damages affects the firm's behavior. An experiment tests the theoretical predictions. In line with theory, Strict Liability and Negligence are equally effective; both perform better than No Liability; investment in safety is not sensitive to the ability of the firm to compensate potential victims. In contrast with theory, prevention rates absent liability are much higher and liability is much less effective than predicted.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/148864
    Series: SFB 649 discussion paper ; 2016-028
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Eliciting ambiguity aversion in unknown and in compound lotteries
    a KMM experimental approach
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Gollier, Christian; Montesano, Aldo; Pace, Noemi
    Published: [2012]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice Italy

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics ; 2012, no. 23
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. An experimental test of the under-annuitization puzzle with smooth ambiguity and charitable giving
    Author: Albis, Hippolyte d’; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Thibault, Emmanuel
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 330
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no TSE-932 (June 2018)
    Subjects: Self-insurance; annuity; uncertain survival probabilities; smooth ambiguity aversion; charity; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Zero-intelligence vs. human agents
    an experimental analysis of the efficiency of double auctions and over-the-counter markets of varying sizes
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Centorrino, Samuele; Manzoni, Elena
    Published: March, 2020
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 527
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Departmental working papers / Stony Brook University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economics ; 20, 04
    Subjects: Market Design; Classroom Experiment; Agent-based Modelling; Game-theoretic Modelling
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Public goods, role models and "sucker aversion"
    the audience matters
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Dessí, Roberta; Moisan, Frederic; Robertson, Donald
    Published: 31 October 2017
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (12413)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; DP 12413
    Subjects: Öffentliche Güter; Spieltheorie; Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Gruppe; Generationengerechtigkeit; Experiment; Studierende
    Scope: 40 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  20. Zero-intelligence vs. human agents
    an experimental analysis of the efficiency of double auctions and over-the-counter markets of varying sizes
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Centorrino, Samuele; Manzoni, Elena
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Università die Verona, Department of Economics, [Verona]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 668
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Department of Economics, University of Verona ; WP number 5 (March 2020)
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten)
  21. Public goods and future audiences
    acting as role models?
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Dessí, Roberta; Moisan, Frédéric; Robertson, Donald
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 330
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 860 (17)
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen