Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Narrow Search
Search narrowed by
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 6 of 6.

  1. Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions
    Author: Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Pär; Philpott, Andrew B.
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Research Inst. of Industrial Economics, Stockholm

    Using the concept of market-distribution functions, we derive general optimality conditions for discriminatory divisible-good auctions, which are also applicable to Bertrand games and non-linear pricing. We introduce the concept of offer distribution... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 206 (814)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Using the concept of market-distribution functions, we derive general optimality conditions for discriminatory divisible-good auctions, which are also applicable to Bertrand games and non-linear pricing. We introduce the concept of offer distribution function to analyze randomized offer curves, and characterize mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for pay-as-bid auctions where demand is uncertain and costs are common knowledge; a setting for which pure-strategy supply function equilibria typically do not exist. We generalize previous results on mixtures over horizontal offers as in Bertrand-Edgeworth games, but more importantly we characterize novel mixtures over partly increasing supply functions. -- Pay-as-bid auction ; divisible good auction ; mixed strategy equilibria ; wholesale electricity markets

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/81442
    Series: IFN working paper ; 814
    Subjects: Auktion; Güter; Oligopol; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Elektrizitätswirtschaft
    Scope: Online-Ressource (72 S., 566,45 KB), graph. Darst.
  2. Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand
    Author: Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Pär
    Published: May 9, 2023
    Publisher:  Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

    We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 206
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/297256
    Series: IFN working paper ; no. 1460 (2023)
    Subjects: Multi-unit auction; single-unit demand; uniform pricing; pay-asbid; asymmetric information; publicity effect
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Simplex-like trajectories on quasi-polyhedral convex sets
    Author: Anderson, Edward J.; Goberna, Miguel A.; López, Marco A.
    Published: 1997

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 368 (97.011)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    ISBN: 1862743177
    Series: Array ; 97,011
    Subjects: Mathematische Optimierung; Theorie
    Scope: 24 S
  4. A direct search algorithm for optimization with noisy function evaluations
    Author: Anderson, Edward J.; Ferris, Michael C.
    Published: 1997

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 368 (97.010)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    ISBN: 1862743169
    Series: Array ; 97,010
    Subjects: Suchtheorie; Theorie
    Scope: 30 S
  5. Price instability in multi-unit auctions
    Author: Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Pär
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  Research Inst. of Industrial Economics, Stockholm

    We consider a procurement auction, where each supplier has private costs and submits a stepped supply function. We solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and show that the equilibrium has a price instability in the sense that a minor change in a... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 206 (1095)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider a procurement auction, where each supplier has private costs and submits a stepped supply function. We solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and show that the equilibrium has a price instability in the sense that a minor change in a supplier.s cost sometimes result in a major change in the market price. In wholesale electricity markets, we predict that the bid price of the most expensive production unit can change by 1-10% due to price instability. The price instability is reduced when suppliers have more steps in their supply functions for a given production technology. In the limit, as the number of steps increases and the cost uncertainty decreases, the Bayesian equilibrium converges to a pure-strategy NE without price instability, the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE).

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129646
    Series: IFN working paper ; 1095
    Scope: Online-Ressource (36 S.), graph. Darst.
  6. Price instability in multi-unit auctions
    Author: Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Pär
    Published: 03 December 2015
    Publisher:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 123 (2015,38)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Cambridge working papers in economics ; 1538
    EPRG working paper ; 1521
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten)