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Displaying results 51 to 59 of 59.

  1. Optimal destabilization of cartels
    Author: Auer, Ludwig von; Tu Anh Pham
    Published: February 2, 2020
    Publisher:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    A model-based derivation of an effective antitrust policy requires an economic framework that includes three actors: a cartel, a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. In existing models of cartel behavior, at... more

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    A model-based derivation of an effective antitrust policy requires an economic framework that includes three actors: a cartel, a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. In existing models of cartel behavior, at least one of these actors is always missing. By contrast, the present paper's oligopoly model includes all three actors. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. Taking into account that the antitrust policy instruments (effort, fine, and leniency program) are not costless for society, an optimal policy is derived.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/224521
    Series: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 48
    Subjects: antitrust; stability; Cournot fringe; oligopoly; leniency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten)
  2. The farsighted stability of global trade policy arrangements
    Author: Berens, Stefan; Chochua, Lasha; Willmann, Gerald
    Published: July 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the stability of trade policy arrangements under two regulatory scenarios, with/without PTAs. Unlike previous papers, we consider an extensive set of trade policy constellations and allow for unlimited farsightedness of negotiating parties.... more

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    We study the stability of trade policy arrangements under two regulatory scenarios, with/without PTAs. Unlike previous papers, we consider an extensive set of trade policy constellations and allow for unlimited farsightedness of negotiating parties. We find global free trade (GFT) to be uniquely stable under symmetry, with/without PTAs. When two countries are smaller (larger) than the third, availability of PTAs decreases (increases) the stability of GFT. Away from symmetry, GFT is not attainable, and without PTAs the non-cooperative MFN regime is the only stable outcome. The effect of (dis-)allowing PTAs thus depends on the size asymmetry of countries.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/245394
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9213 (2021)
    Subjects: trade policy arrangements; stability; unlimited farsightedness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Is generosity time-inconsistent?
    present bias across individual and social context
    Author: Kölle, Felix; Wenner, Lukas
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We investigate dynamically inconsistent time preferences across contexts with and without interpersonal trade-offs. In a longitudinal experiment participants make a series of intertemporal allocation decisions of real-effort tasks between themselves... more

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    We investigate dynamically inconsistent time preferences across contexts with and without interpersonal trade-offs. In a longitudinal experiment participants make a series of intertemporal allocation decisions of real-effort tasks between themselves and another person. Our results reveal that agents are present-biased when making choices that only affect themselves but not when choosing for others. Despite this asymmetry, we find no evidence for time-inconsistent generosity, i.e., when choices involve trade-offs between own and other’s consumption. Structural estimations reveal no individual-level correlation of present bias across contexts. Discounting in social situations thus seems to be conceptually different from discounting in individual situations.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/237322
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 077
    Subjects: Present bias; altruism; stability; real effort; dictator game; intertemporal choice
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 92 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Cloturing deliberation
    Author: Anesi, Vincent; Safronov, Mikhail
    Published: February, 2021
    Publisher:  University of Luxemborg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    hdl: 10993/46112
    Series: Array ; 2021, 03
    Subjects: Cloture; deliberation; obstruction; pivots; political failure; stability; voting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten)
  5. Using high-dimensional corporate governance variables to predict firm performance
    Author: Nicholas, Benes; Ben, Garton; Daisuke, Myakawa; Junichi, Yamanoi
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  RIETI, [Tokyo, Japan]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: RIETI discussion paper series ; 24-E, 030 (February 2024)
    Subjects: corporate governance; total shareholder return; LASSO; stability; quantitative impacts; prediction; investment strategy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Beyond truth-telling
    a replication study on school choice
    Author: Andersson, Tommy; Kessel, Dany; Lager, Nils; Olme, Elisabet; Reese, Simon
    Published: January 2024
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Lund

    4207 In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even... more

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    4207 In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth-telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 52 of the 58 investigated data sets (P-value threshold 0.05).

     
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    Series: Working paper / Department of Economics, Lund University ; 2024, 1
    Subjects: school choice; deferred acceptance algorithm; truth-telling; stability; replication study
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 13 Seiten)
  7. The elephant in the other room
    Author: Veneziani, Roberto; Skillman, Gilbert L.
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London

    Fabio Petri's Microeconomics for the Critical Mind (2021) is an impressive tour de force in the field of microeconomic theory. It manifests the author's command of cutting edge analytical tools, concepts, and theoretical approaches both in the... more

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    Fabio Petri's Microeconomics for the Critical Mind (2021) is an impressive tour de force in the field of microeconomic theory. It manifests the author's command of cutting edge analytical tools, concepts, and theoretical approaches both in the mainstream and in the heterodox literature. The book aims to show that the neo-Ricardian approach, as augmented by the Keynesian/Kaleckian account of demand-constrained equilibrium, is a viable -- indeed, superior -- alternative to mainstream theory. While the book is effective in identifying current shortcomings of mainstream equilibrium and welfare analysis (many of which were first identified in the mainstream literature), it does not provide a rigorous demonstration that these or related difficulties are clearly avoided by the surplus approach, or that the latter is completely consistent with phenomena such as persistent unemployment. This is primarily a consequence of Petri's central distinction between "core" and "out-of-core" analysis, which offers no unified or clearly articulated basis for deriving or characterizing general equilibrium outcomes. In lieu of such foundations, Petri discusses a portfolio of analytically unconnected formal and informal narratives, some of which rely on the very theoretical constructs that he criticizes the mainstream for employing.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/284323
    Edition: This draft: 12 September 2023
    Series: Working paper / School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London ; no. 973 (February 2024)
    Subjects: economic theory; general equilibrium; stability; normative economics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten)
  8. Climate change and banking sector (in)stability in Kenya
    a vulnerability assessment
    Author: Kimundi, Gillian; Wambui, Reuben
    Published: May 2023
    Publisher:  Kenya Bankers Association, Nairobi

    This paper offers a climate change vulnerability assessment of the Kenyan banking sector by examining the time-varying linkages of climate risk drivers, economic sectors that get impacted by a disorderly low-carbon transition (climate policy relevant... more

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    This paper offers a climate change vulnerability assessment of the Kenyan banking sector by examining the time-varying linkages of climate risk drivers, economic sectors that get impacted by a disorderly low-carbon transition (climate policy relevant sectors (CPRSs)), and banking sector stability. We use temperature and precipitation climate data, identify 5 CPRSs and their quarterly outputs, construct a banking sector stability index, and examine the time-varying linkages of these variables. Effectively, we assess the response of banking sector stability to sectoral output shocks arising from physical and transition risks. Three important findings emerge: First, the agriculture sector is the sole channel of physical climate risk transmission. Second, manufacturing and utilities sectors are becoming increasingly critical/significant channels for transmitting transition risks. Third, during the COVID-19 era, all CPRSs have become increasingly linked to banking sector stability, effectively exacerbating the transmission of climate risks to the banking sector.

     
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    hdl: 10419/271527
    Series: KBA Centre for Research on Financial Markets and Policy working paper series ; WPS, 23, 03 = 66
    Subjects: climate change; climate risk drivers; climate policy relevant sectors (CPRS); banking sector; stability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. How important are IEAs for mitigation if countries are of the homo moralis type?
    Author: Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger
    Published: March 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material payoff obtained on the hypothesis that all... more

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    We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material payoff obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined probability. They are assumed to act morally w.r.t. both membership and emissions. We investigate the interaction and impact of that moral behavior on coalition formation and material payoff. The membership morality tends to increase while the emissions morality tends to decrease the coalition size, but the outcome is not smoothly determined by these opposite forces.

     
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    hdl: 10419/296129
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11040 (2024)
    Subjects: IEA; stability; homo moralis; emissions morality; membership morality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen