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Displaying results 51 to 75 of 98.

  1. Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights
    Author: Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne; Schmidt, Klaus M.
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Media type: Book
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    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 5369
    Subjects: Eigentumsrechtstheorie; Allokation; Joint Venture; Experiment; Moral Hazard; Gerechtigkeit; reciprocity
    Scope: 30 S, graph. Darst.
  2. Monitoring and pay
    an experiment of employee under endogenous supervision
    Author: Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; 5962
    Subjects: Effizienzlohn; Leistungsbeurteilung; Leistungsanreiz; Leistungsmotivation; Experiment; Theorie; reciprocity; Efficiency wage theory; Incentives in industry; Supervision of employees
    Scope: 35 S., graph. Darst.
  3. Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation?
    on the evolutionary foundations of human altruism
    Author: Fehr, Ernst; Henrich, Joseph
    Published: February 2003
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in... more

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    In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity.

     
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    hdl: 10419/76253
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; no. 859
    Subjects: Altruismus; Bioökonomik; Verhaltensökonomik; Spieltheorie; Gerechtigkeit; Theorie; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)
  4. Contracts and Inequity aversion
    Author: Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim
    Published: November 2002
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    Using the concept of Inequity Aversion we derive in a Moral Hazard setting several results which differ from conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal contracts.... more

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    Using the concept of Inequity Aversion we derive in a Moral Hazard setting several results which differ from conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal contracts. Second, there is a strong tendency towards linear sharing rules, giving a simple and plausible rationale for the prevalence of these schemes in the real world. Third, the Sufficient Statistics result no longer holds as optimal contracts may be ”too” complete. Along with these key insights we derive a couple of further results.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/76361
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; no. 809
    Subjects: Vertragstheorie; Moral Hazard; Verhandlungstheorie; Gerechtigkeit; Theorie; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Do the reciprocal trust less?
    Published: Aug. 2007
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    We study the intrapersonal relationship between trust and reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. Reciprocal subjects trust significantly more than selfish ones. This finding raises questions about theories of social preferences which predict that... more

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    We study the intrapersonal relationship between trust and reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. Reciprocal subjects trust significantly more than selfish ones. This finding raises questions about theories of social preferences which predict that "fairer" players should trust less.

     
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    hdl: 10419/34578
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 3010
    Subjects: Vertrauen; Gerechtigkeit; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Soziales Verhalten; Experiment; reciprocity
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 8 S., Text, graph. Darst.
  6. Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game
    Author: Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs
    Published: 2008
    Publisher:  Bibliothek der Universität Konstanz, Konstanz

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    Series: Research paper series / Thurgau Institute of Economics and Department of Economics at the University of Konstanz ; 34
    Subjects: Altruismus; Reputation; Verhaltensökonomik; Spieltheorie; Experiment; Theorie; reciprocity
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  7. When do punishment institutions work?
    Author: Aquino, Patrick; Gazzale, Robert S.; Jacobson, Sarah
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  Williams College Economics Dep., Williamstown, Mass.

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    Series: Williams College Economics Department working paper series ; 2015,15
    Subjects: punishment; cooperation; gift exchange; reciprocity
    Scope: Online-Ressource (29 S.), graph. Darst.
  8. Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions
    evidence from the field
    Author: Kirchler, Michael; Palan, Stefan
    Published: May 10, 2016
    Publisher:  Karl-Franzens-University Graz, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, [Graz]

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    Series: Working paper / Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Karl-Franzens-University Graz ; 2016, 01
    Subjects: gift exchange; reciprocity; natural field experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Selfish learning is more important than fair-minded conditional cooperation in public goods games
    Author: Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N.; Guérin, Claire
    Published: 22nd November 2021
    Publisher:  Université de Lausanne, Faculté des hautes études commerciales (HEC), Département d'économie, Lausanne

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    Series: Cahier de recherches économiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie ; 21, 17
    Subjects: altruism; behavioral economics; confusion; reciprocity; social preferences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes
    Author: Friedrichsen, Jana; Momsen, Katharina; Piasenti, Stefano
    Published: February 26, 2021
    Publisher:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    In sequential interactions, both the first mover's intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the second mover's action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for... more

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    In sequential interactions, both the first mover's intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the second mover's action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the second mover when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment to investigate how intentions and outcome affect second mover actions and whether second movers use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly. We find that second movers react both to the intention of the first mover and to the achieved outcome when they are fully informed about both, but the effect is stronger for intentions than outcomes. When intentions are not revealed by default, second movers select into information based on their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.

     
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    hdl: 10419/242403
    Series: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 108
    Subjects: information avoidance; dictator game; public good game; moral wiggleroom; intentions; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Pandemics and psychological game theory
    Author: Dufwenberg, Martin; Reed, Kathryn L.
    Published: December 20, 2021
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ

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    Series: Economics working papers / Eller College of Management ; 21, 08
    Subjects: pandemics; emotions; reciprocity; image; health; psychological game theory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. EU trade policy reform
    towards reciprocal concessions with developing countries
    Author: Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik; Volmer, Maximilian
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover, [Hannover]

    The European Union (EU) supports developing countries with a unilateral trade preference scheme. The scheme underwent a major reform in 2014, in which many countries lost access to reduced tariff rates. We analyse how this radical step that removed... more

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    The European Union (EU) supports developing countries with a unilateral trade preference scheme. The scheme underwent a major reform in 2014, in which many countries lost access to reduced tariff rates. We analyse how this radical step that removed preferences from 103 countries by 2018 fits into the EU's strategy to promote bilateral agreements and how it affected imports from the removed beneficiaries. Using the gravity model of trade with high-dimensional fixed effects, we show that the removal results in a significant decline in exports of affected developing countries. Some countries formed a bilateral free trade agreement with the EU, in which case the negative effect of removal of unilateral trade preferences is compensated but we do not find significant and consistent additional benefits. Thus, the threat of removal can be seen as a lever for beneficiaries that are about to become ineligible to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the EU.

     
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    hdl: 10419/268220
    Series: Hannover economic papers (HEP) / Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover ; Nummer: 697 (Mar 2022)
    Subjects: trade preferences; reciprocity; GSP; FTA; gravity model
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. May the forcing be with you
    experimental evidence on mandatory contributions to public goods
    Author: Battiston, Pietro; Chollete, Lorán; Harrison, Sharon G.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  [Università die Parma, Dipartimento di scienze economiche e aziendali], [Parma, Italia]

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    Edition: This version: May 7, 2022
    Series: [Working paper / $hUniversità di Parma, Dipartimento di scienze economiche e aziendali] ; 2022, EP 01
    Subjects: unintended consequences; public good game; laboratory experiment; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Super-additive cooperation
    Author: Efferson, Charles; Bernhard, Helen; Fischbacher, Urs; Fehr, Ernst
    Published: December 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions. Intergroup competitions provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism... more

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    Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions. Intergroup competitions provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism reliably supports the evolution of cooperation when actions vary continuously. Ambiguous reciprocity, a strategy generally ruled out in models of reciprocal altruism, completely undermines cooperation under repeated interactions, which challenges repeated interactions as a stand-alone explanation for cooperation in both repeated and one-shot settings. Intergroup competitions do not reliably support cooperation because groups tend to be similar under relevant conditions. Moreover, even if groups vary, cooperative groups may lose competitions for several reasons. Although repeated interactions and group competitions do not support cooperation by themselves, combining them often triggers powerful synergies because group competitions can stabilise cooperative strategies against the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a one-shot behavioural experiment in Papua New Guinea fit exactly this pattern. They thus indicate neither an evolutionary history of repeated interactions without group competition nor a history of group competition without repeated interactions. Our results are only consistent with social motives that evolved under the joint influence of both mechanisms together.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/271777
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10133 (2022)
    Subjects: evolution of cooperation; reciprocity; intergroup competition; social dilemma
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. A mechanism of proportional contributions for public good games
    Author: Rafat Beigpoor Shahrivar; Duesterhoeft, Ilka; Rogna, Marco; Vogt, Carla
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Essen, Germany

    Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher... more

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    Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of stable coalitions. The introduction of other–regarding preferences, in the form of Fehr and Schmidt utility functions, enlarges cooperation, but still at suboptimal levels. The present paper considers a further possibility, namely the introduction of a mechanism through which the contributions of players to the public good are proportional to the average contribution of the other players abiding to the mechanism: proportional contributions. The mechanism is therefore rooted into reciprocity. By applying it to a standard abatement game parameterized on the RICE model, we show that the mechanism is in fact able to increase cooperation both under standard and under F&S preferences. Stability of the grand coalition is never reached, but potential internally stable grand coalitions are achieved under F&S preferences. The attainment of higher cooperation comes at the expense of the level of global abatement that is lower when proportional contributions are in place. Im vorliegenden Papier wird ein reziprozitätsbasierter Beitragsmechanismus in ein Koalitionsspiel zur Bereitstellung eines globalen öffentlichen Gutes – z.B. Klimaschutz - eingeführt. Spieler tragen – wenn sie einer Koalition beitreten – proportional zum durchschnittlichen Beitrag bei. Das Modell wird anhand des RICE-Modells kalibriert. Es zeigt sich, dass der vorgeschlagene Mechanismus tatsächlich die Partizipation an Klimakoalitionen steigern kann, sowohl unter Annahme von Standard-, als auch von Fehr-Schmidt Präferenzen. Jedoch wird unter dem Mechanismus weniger des öffentlichen Gutes bereitgestellt.

     
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    ISBN: 9783969731567
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    hdl: 10419/268491
    Series: Ruhr economic papers ; #990
    Subjects: Coalitional game; cooperation; F&S preferences; public good; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten)
  16. Who benefits from corporate social responsibility?
    reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection
    Author: Briscese, Guglielmo; Feltovich, Nick; Slonim, Robert
    Published: January 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Firms can donate a share of profits to charity as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent experiments have found that such initiatives can induce higher effort by workers, generating benefits for both sides of the labour market. We... more

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    Firms can donate a share of profits to charity as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent experiments have found that such initiatives can induce higher effort by workers, generating benefits for both sides of the labour market. We design a novel version of the gift-exchange game to account for self-selection, and find that wages remain the most effective incentive to attract and motivate workers, with corporate donations playing a smaller role than previously suggested. We also show that firms substitute donations to charity with lower wage offers, keeping their profits constant but reducing workers' earnings. Initiatives of corporate philanthropy can thus be marginally beneficial for firms, but considerably costly for workers.

     
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    hdl: 10419/232819
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14067
    Subjects: gift exchange; reciprocity; corporate philanthropy; self-selection
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Worker reciprocity and the returns to training
    evidence from a field experiment
    Author: Sauermann, Jan
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, [Stockholm]

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    Series: Working paper / Swedish Institute for Social Research ; 2020, 6
    Subjects: on-the-job training; reciprocity; worker performance; field experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
    Author: Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Oexl, Regine
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on effort provision in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate... more

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    Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on effort provision in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principalagent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on the agent's effort provision than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeatedgame effect and a noise-canceling effect is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on effort provision.

     
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    hdl: 10419/250149
    Series: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 27
    Subjects: Gift exchange; principal agent model; incomplete contracts; random shocks; reciprocity; laboratory experiments; long-term contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Des parasites au paradis ?
    revenu universel, minima sociaux et réciprocité
    Author: Allègre, Guillaume
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  OFCE, Paris, France

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    Language: French
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    Series: Sciences Po OFCE working paper ; no 2021, 25
    Subjects: Basic income; minimum income schemes; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten)
  20. Tax compliance in post-transition: you and your friends matter, not the government
    Author: Levenko, Natalia; Stæhr, Karsten
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Eesti Pank, Tallinn

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    ISBN: 9789949606894
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    Series: Working paper series / Eesti Pank ; 2021, 7
    Subjects: tax evasion; monetary and non-monetary motives; auditing; behavioural choice; norms and customs; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Kind or contented?
    an investigation of the gift exchange hypothesis in a natural field experiment in Colombia
    Author: Bogliacino, Francesco; Grimalda, Gianluca; Pipke, David
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel

    The gift exchange hypothesis postulates that workers reciprocate above market-clearing wages with above-minimum effort. This hypothesis has received mixed support in dyadic employer-worker relationships. We present a field-experimental test to assess... more

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    The gift exchange hypothesis postulates that workers reciprocate above market-clearing wages with above-minimum effort. This hypothesis has received mixed support in dyadic employer-worker relationships. We present a field-experimental test to assess this hypothesis in the context of a triadic relationship in which only one out of two workers receives a pay increase. We conjecture that inequality aversion motivations may thwart positive reciprocity motivations and analyze the interaction between such motivations theoretically. Across three treatments, the pay increase is justified to workers based on either relative merit or relative need or was arbitrary as no justification was offered. Two conditions in which either none or both workers receive a bonus serve as the reference. In contrast to the gift exchange hypothesis, we find that pay increases lead to a decrease in productivity. Such a decrease is most sizable in the condition where both workers receive the bonus. A post-diction of this result is that workers interpret the monetary bonus as a signal of the employer’s contentment with their effort, which makes them feel entitled to reduce their effort. In other treatments, receiving the pay increase while the coworker does not has a positive effect on productivity, especially when the pay increase is based on merit. This result is consistent with statusseeking preferences rather than aversion against advantageous inequality. Conversely, not receiving the pay increase while the coworker does, leads to lower productivity, especially when the pay increase is assigned based on relative needs.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/246590
    Series: Kiel working paper ; no. 2199 (November 2021)
    Subjects: Gift exchange; employer-worker relationship; pay inequality; field experiment; reciprocity; labor market; effort provision; fairness; wage inequality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Does reducing inequality increase cooperation?
    Author: Ramalingam, Abhijit; Stoddard, Brock V.
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  City University of Hong Kong, College of Business, Department of Economics & Finance, Hong Kong

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Global Research Unit working paper ; # 2021, 022
    Subjects: reciprocity; inequality reduction; income transfers; cooperation; public goods; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Making markets just
    reciprocity violations as key intervention points
    Author: Richters, Oliver; Siemoneit, Andreas
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  ZOE, Institut für zukunftsfähige Ökonomien e.V., Bonn

    Worldwide, politics are challenged to achieve economic stability, socialjustice, and ecological sustainability. These goals are often played offagainst each other,and some suspect that market economies (aka capitalism) are basically unable to... more

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    Worldwide, politics are challenged to achieve economic stability, socialjustice, and ecological sustainability. These goals are often played offagainst each other,and some suspect that market economies (aka capitalism) are basically unable to solvethese dilemmas. This article explores the normative foundations of market economy asa robust, self-regulating system enabling just exchange in large (anonymous) groups.The primary principle of justice for market exchange is reciprocity, i.e., the balanceof costs and benefits from any kind of social exchange. The corresponding socialnorm is calledMeritocratic Principle. It can be implemented and its contestednessavoided by concentrating on "non-merit", i.e., institutionally draining the wellspringsof systematically undeserved incomes (economic rents). Economic rents as violationsof reciprocity can be viewed as a key problem of justice in any economic system. Thispolitical compass can guide consistent policy measures and is applied to two economichot spots: land rents and resource consumption. The measures discussed follow theGerman neo-liberal ideal of an "economic order" by setting only few general caps.This improves stability, justice and sustainability of market economies and makes theliberal vision of self-regulating markets more realistic.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235556
    Edition: Version 2
    Series: ZOE discussion papers ; no. 7 (June 2021)
    Subjects: market economy; justice; reciprocity; economic rents; liberalism; growth imperative
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    hdl: 10419/236498
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14467
    Subjects: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 90 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation - direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237342
    Edition: This version: 10 June 2021
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 097
    Subjects: Cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 89 Seiten), Illustrationen