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  1. EU trade policy reform
    towards reciprocal concessions with developing countries
    Author: Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik; Volmer, Maximilian
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover, [Hannover]

    The European Union (EU) supports developing countries with a unilateral trade preference scheme. The scheme underwent a major reform in 2014, in which many countries lost access to reduced tariff rates. We analyse how this radical step that removed... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 8
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    The European Union (EU) supports developing countries with a unilateral trade preference scheme. The scheme underwent a major reform in 2014, in which many countries lost access to reduced tariff rates. We analyse how this radical step that removed preferences from 103 countries by 2018 fits into the EU's strategy to promote bilateral agreements and how it affected imports from the removed beneficiaries. Using the gravity model of trade with high-dimensional fixed effects, we show that the removal results in a significant decline in exports of affected developing countries. Some countries formed a bilateral free trade agreement with the EU, in which case the negative effect of removal of unilateral trade preferences is compensated but we do not find significant and consistent additional benefits. Thus, the threat of removal can be seen as a lever for beneficiaries that are about to become ineligible to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the EU.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/268220
    Series: Hannover economic papers (HEP) / Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover ; Nummer: 697 (Mar 2022)
    Subjects: trade preferences; reciprocity; GSP; FTA; gravity model
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. May the forcing be with you
    experimental evidence on mandatory contributions to public goods
    Author: Battiston, Pietro; Chollete, Lorán; Harrison, Sharon G.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  [Università die Parma, Dipartimento di scienze economiche e aziendali], [Parma, Italia]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: May 7, 2022
    Series: [Working paper / $hUniversità di Parma, Dipartimento di scienze economiche e aziendali] ; 2022, EP 01
    Subjects: unintended consequences; public good game; laboratory experiment; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Super-additive cooperation
    Author: Efferson, Charles; Bernhard, Helen; Fischbacher, Urs; Fehr, Ernst
    Published: December 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions. Intergroup competitions provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism... more

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    Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions. Intergroup competitions provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism reliably supports the evolution of cooperation when actions vary continuously. Ambiguous reciprocity, a strategy generally ruled out in models of reciprocal altruism, completely undermines cooperation under repeated interactions, which challenges repeated interactions as a stand-alone explanation for cooperation in both repeated and one-shot settings. Intergroup competitions do not reliably support cooperation because groups tend to be similar under relevant conditions. Moreover, even if groups vary, cooperative groups may lose competitions for several reasons. Although repeated interactions and group competitions do not support cooperation by themselves, combining them often triggers powerful synergies because group competitions can stabilise cooperative strategies against the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a one-shot behavioural experiment in Papua New Guinea fit exactly this pattern. They thus indicate neither an evolutionary history of repeated interactions without group competition nor a history of group competition without repeated interactions. Our results are only consistent with social motives that evolved under the joint influence of both mechanisms together.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/271777
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10133 (2022)
    Subjects: evolution of cooperation; reciprocity; intergroup competition; social dilemma
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes
    Author: Friedrichsen, Jana; Momsen, Katharina; Piasenti, Stefano
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    In sequential interactions, both the agent’s intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the... more

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    In sequential interactions, both the agent’s intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the principal when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment to investigate how intentions and outcome affect the principal’s actions and whether principals use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly. We find that principals react mainly to the intention of the agent. When intentions are not revealed by default, principals tend to select into information based on their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282022
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 330 (June 21, 2022)
    Subjects: information avoidance; dictator game; moral wiggle room; intentions; reciprocity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen