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  1. Strategic anonymity and behavior-based pricing
    Author: Colombo, Stefano; Garella, Paolo G.; Matsushima, Noriaki
    Published: November 2023
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    In a model of behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD), we argue that sellers may have discretionary power to let buyers decide whether to be identified (e.g., creating an account) or remain anonymous (no account creation). The price equilibria... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 198
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    In a model of behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD), we argue that sellers may have discretionary power to let buyers decide whether to be identified (e.g., creating an account) or remain anonymous (no account creation). The price equilibria generate a more fragmented market segmentation than under the standard BBPD. Firms might prefer a policy where they leave buyers the decision to remain or not be anonymous, breaking the standard BBPD result. Furthermore, firms can realize higher profits than under uniform pricing, contrary to the standard BBPD. Also, firms may adopt asymmetric policies concerning the account creation requirement.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1219
    Subjects: strategic anonymity; behavior-based pricing; privacy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Personalized pricing with imperfect customer recognition
    Author: Colombo, Stefano; Graziano, Clara; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: May 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We consider a duopoly model where firms can identify only a share of consumers, which is positively correlated with the consumer' preferences. Firms charge personalized prices to the consumers they can recognize and a uniform price to the rest of... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider a duopoly model where firms can identify only a share of consumers, which is positively correlated with the consumer' preferences. Firms charge personalized prices to the consumers they can recognize and a uniform price to the rest of consumers. The firms' available information is given by the combination of two factors: the intensive margin, which determines the share of consumers the firms can recognize in each single location, and the extensive margin, which determines how many locations the firms can identify. Different market configurations emerge according to the size of these margins. We characterize the values of the intensive and extensive margins that maximize firms' profits, and we show that profits are non-monotonic. We also show that the composition, in addition to the size, of the available information - i.e., the mix of these margins - affects firms' profits significantly. Implications for regulatory policies concerning the protection of consumers' information are finally discussed.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/279204
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10455 (2023)
    Subjects: personalized pricing; price discrimination; privacy; margins of information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen