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  1. Can leaders persuade?
    examining movement in immigration beliefs
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Can political leaders change constituents' beliefs? If so, is it rhetoric, identity, or the interaction of the two that matters? We construct a large-scale experiment where participants are exposed to anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant speeches from... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63
    No inter-library loan

     

    Can political leaders change constituents' beliefs? If so, is it rhetoric, identity, or the interaction of the two that matters? We construct a large-scale experiment where participants are exposed to anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant speeches from both Presidents Obama and Trump. We benchmark these treatments to versions recorded by an actor to control for speech messages. Our findings show that both leader messages and sources matter. Holding messages fixed, leaders persuade when participants hear unanticipated messages from sources perceived as reliable, consistent with a Bayesian framework. This evidence supports the hypothesis that individuals will "follow their leader" to new policy positions.

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252110
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9593 (2022)
    Subjects: leaders; political beliefs; partisan identity; polarization; immigration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 83 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    In this paper we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto dominant and risk... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63
    No inter-library loan

     

    In this paper we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto dominant and risk dominant actions in the population. The existence of leaders and their followers, plus the local interaction, which leads to clustering, is crucial for the survival of the Pareto dominant actions. The evolution of leader and crowd followership shows that leader followership can also be locally stable around Pareto dominant leaders. The paper answers the questions (i) which Leader should be removed and (ii) how to optimally place leaders in the network to enhance payoff dominant play.

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/263775
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9845 (2022)
    Subjects: coordination games; leaders; followers; evolution
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten)