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Displaying results 1 to 3 of 3.

  1. Free riding, democracy and sacrifice in the workplace
    evidence from a real effort experiment
    Author: Kamei, Kenju; Tabero, Katy
    Published: 27 April, 2023
    Publisher:  Institute for Economic Studies, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 627
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: KEIO-IES discussion paper series ; DP2023, 011 (27 April, 2023)
    Subjects: workplace democracy; moral hazard; experiment; free riding; teamwork
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The individual-team discontinuity effect on institutional choices
    experimental evidence in voluntary public goods provision
    Author: Kamei, Kenju; Tabero, Katy
    Published: 10 November, 2022
    Publisher:  Institute for Economic Studies, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 627
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: KEIO-IES discussion paper series ; DP2022, 015 (10 November, 2022)
    Subjects: institution; public goods; experiment; punishment; discontinuity effect
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Observability of partners' past play and cooperation
    experimental evidence
    Author: Kamei, Kenju; Kobayashi, Hajime; Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan
    Published: October 2021
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 198
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information per se may not improve cooperation. A structural estimation suggests that a certain percentage of players act according to the "Always Defect" strategy, whether or not the reputational information is available. The remaining players adopt available cooperative strategies: specifically, the tit-for-tat strategy when reputational information is not available, and a strategy that conditions on the matched partner's past play when reputational information is available.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248604
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1145
    Subjects: experiment; cooperation; infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen