Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Narrow Search
Search narrowed by
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 25 of 36.

  1. A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
    Author: De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the revolving-door channel) than through a hidden payment (i.e., a bribe). This is because the revolving door publicly signals the firm's eagerness and commitment to rewarding lenient regulators, which facilitates collusive equilibria. We find that opening the revolving door conditional on the regulator's report is usually more efficient than a blanket ban on post-agency employment and may increase social welfare. This insight extends to a variety of applications and can also be used to determine the optimal length of cooling-off periods.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235338
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8968 (2021)
    Subjects: collusion; cooling-off periods; corruption; dynamic games; experts; regulation; regulatory capture; revolving door
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. A theory of partitioned pricing
    Author: Chen, Zhiqi
    Published: March 2, 2022
    Publisher:  Carleton University, Department of Economics, Ottawa, Ontario

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 429
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Carleton economics working papers ; CEWP 22, 02
    Subjects: partitioned pricing; surcharges; duopoly; strategic delegation; collusion
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten)
  3. Artificial collusion
    examining supracompetitive pricing by Q-learning algorithms
    Author: Boer, Arnoud V. den; Meylahn, Janusz M.; Schinkel, Maarten-Pieter
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    We examine recent claims that a particular Q-learning algorithm used by competitors 'autonomously' and systematically learns to collude, resulting in supracompetitive prices and extra profits for the firms sustained by collusive equilibria. A... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 432
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We examine recent claims that a particular Q-learning algorithm used by competitors 'autonomously' and systematically learns to collude, resulting in supracompetitive prices and extra profits for the firms sustained by collusive equilibria. A detailed analysis of the inner workings of this algorithm reveals that there is no immediate reason for alarm. We set out what is needed to demonstrate the existence of a colluding price algorithm that does form a threat to competition.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265843
    Series: Array ; TI 2022, 067
    Subjects: collusion; Q-learning; algorithm; pricing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Cartels and bribes
    Author: Burguet, Roberto; Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  GREEN, Centre for Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy and Networks, Milano, Italy

    We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. As in Dixit (2015, 2016), cooperation among honest suppliers... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 752
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. As in Dixit (2015, 2016), cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest bureaucrats, generating a trade-off. When the likelihood of corruption is high and competition is weak, collusion may be a price worth paying to curb corruption.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/269886
    Series: Working paper series / Università Bocconi, GREEN, Centre for Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy and Networks ; number 16 (June 2021)
    Subjects: Bribes; cartels; collusion; corruption; free-riding
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion
    an experiment
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

    Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

     

    Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Edition: This version: August 3, 2020
    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; No. 19
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; experiment; machine learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (55 Seiten, 843 KB), Illustrationen, Diagramme
    Notes:

    Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 26-31
  6. Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion
    an experiment
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

    Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 811
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Edition: This version: August 3, 2020
    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; No. 19
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; experiment; machine learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (55 Seiten, 843 KB), Illustrationen, Diagramme
    Notes:

    Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 26-31
  7. Colluding against environmental regulation
    Author: Alé-Chilet, Jorge; Chen, Cuicui; Li, Jing; Reynaert, Mathias
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    ZSS 39
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research ; 2022, 002 (January 2022)
    Subjects: collusion; regulation; pollution; automobile market; noncompliance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Collusion by algorithm: the role of unobserved actions
    Author: Martin, Simon; Rasch, Alexander
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question. Moreover, our analysis reveals a dual role of improving forecasting ability when actions are not observable. Deviations become more tempting, reducing profits, but also uncertainty concerning deviations is increasingly eliminated. This results in a u-shaped relationship between profits and prediction ability. When prediction ability is perfect, the ‘observable actions’ case emerges.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252146
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9629 (2022)
    Subjects: algorithm; collusion; demand forecasting; unobservable actions; secret price cutting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm
    Author: Madio, Leonardo; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Management "Marco Fanno", University of Padova, Padova

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 653
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: December, 2022
    Series: Marco Fanno working papers ; 295 (December 2022)
    Subjects: antitrust; capacity constraints; collusion; partial cartel
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm
    Author: Madio, Leonardo; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: December 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We study an infinitely repeated oligopoly game in which firms compete on quantity and one of them is capacity constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little incentive... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study an infinitely repeated oligopoly game in which firms compete on quantity and one of them is capacity constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little incentive to deviate from a cartel. We also present conditions for the emergence of a partial cartel, with the capacity constrained firm being excluded by the large firms or self-excluded. In the latter case, we show under which circumstances the small firm induces a partial conspiracy that is Pareto-dominant. Implications for cartel identification and enforcement are finally discussed.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/271814
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10170 (2022)
    Subjects: antitrust; capacity constraints; collusion; partial cartel
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Coordination in the fight against collusion
    Author: Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M.; Rey, Patrick
    Published: June 2023
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 330
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1441
    Subjects: collusion; cartel; auction; procurement; reserves; sustainability and initiation of collusion; coordinated effects
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Corporate leniency in a dynamic context
    the preemptive push of an uncertain future
    Author: Gärtner, Dennis
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, St. Gallen

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 466
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / University of St.Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics ; no. 2021, 07 (June 2021)
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; leniency program; preemption; dynamics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash
    a discontinuity in behavior infinitely repeated duopoly games
    Author: Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 15 February 2022
    Publisher:  CentER, Tilburg University, [Tilburg]

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 37
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Discussion paper / CentER ; no. 2022, 003
    Subjects: Cournot; Bayesian game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; repeated games; collusion; cooperation; experimental economics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash
    a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
    Author: Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 553
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as any level of cost asymmetry or incomplete information is introduced, observed average individual quantities are remarkably close to the static Bayes-Nash equilibrium predictions.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282151
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 460 (November 21, 2023)
    Subjects: Cournot; Bayesian game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; repeated games; collusion; cooperation; experimental economics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Gender and collusion
    Author: Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A.
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms, they largely ignore individual heterogeneity, such as gender differences. We experimentally analyze gender differences in prisoner's dilemmas, where collusive behavior harms a passive third party. In a control treatment, no externality exists. To study the influence of social distance, we compare subjects' collusive behaviour in a within-subjects setting. In the first game, subjects have no information on other players, whereas they are informed about personal characteristics in the second game. Results show that guilt-averse women are significantly less inclined to collude than men when collusion harms a third party. No gender difference can be found in the absence of a negative externality. Interestingly, we find that women are not sensitive to the decision context, i.e., even when social distance is small they hardly behave collusively when collusion harms a third party.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252131
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9614 (2022)
    Subjects: collusion; cartels; competition policy; antitrust; gender differences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Health care insurance payment policy when the physician and patient may collude
    Author: Wu, Yaping; Bardey, David; Li, Sanxi
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  TSE, Toulouse

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 330 (572)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; 572
    Subjects: collusion; falsification; health care insurance; physician payment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (29 S.), graph. Darst.
  17. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
    Author: Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Andres, Maximillian; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 53 (October 2022)
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; experiment; machine learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten; 1115 KB), Tabellen, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices
  18. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
    a machine learning approach
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  DIW Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 14
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/251797
    Series: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 2000
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; machine learning; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
    Author: Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Andres, Maximillian; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 811
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 53 (October 2022)
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; experiment; machine learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten; 1115 KB), Tabellen, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices
  20. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
    a machine learning approach
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: October 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/267257
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10024 (2022)
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; machine learning; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. How costly are cartels?
    Author: Moreau, Flavien; Panon, Ludovic
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Banca d'Italia Eurosistema, [Rom]

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 450
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Temi di discussione / Banca d'Italia ; number 1413 (June 2023)
    Subjects: competition; cartels; collusion; productivity; welfare; misallocation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 85 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. How do sanctions work?
    the choice between cartel formation and tacit collusion
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: January 22, 2021
    Publisher:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    This paper analyzes the inner workings of cartels. To understand how sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation we study their effect on firms' communication in a laboratory experiment. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DSM 13
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper analyzes the inner workings of cartels. To understand how sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation we study their effect on firms' communication in a laboratory experiment. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242372
    Series: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 66
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; machine learning; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. How should we think about employers' associations?
    Author: Bryson, Alex; Willman, Paul
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We maintain that employer associations are a specific form of employer collusion that is overt, formal and labour market focused which encompasses but is by no means confined to collective bargaining. We consider the conditions under which this form... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We maintain that employer associations are a specific form of employer collusion that is overt, formal and labour market focused which encompasses but is by no means confined to collective bargaining. We consider the conditions under which this form of collusion might emerge, and how it might develop. Since the context is the decline of employers' associations in collective bargaining, we look at how collective bargaining involvement (and its disappearance) might relate to the growth or decline of other forms of collusion in areas such as product and financial markets, and political influence. Our central contention is that employers' associations continue to perform an important role in helping employers set the terms of trade, albeit one that has adapted to the demise of sectoral bargaining.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265688
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15467
    Subjects: employers' associations; collusion; collective bargaining
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)
  24. Human-algorithm interaction
    algorithmic pricing in hybrid laboratory markets
    Author: Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin
    Published: October 2022
    Publisher:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    This paper investigates pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of competition when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm delegating its decisions to an algorithm, an n-player... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 256
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper investigates pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of competition when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm delegating its decisions to an algorithm, an n-player generalization of tit-for-tat. We further vary whether participants know about the presence of the algorithm. When one of three firms in a market is an algorithm, we observe significantly higher prices compared to human-only markets. Firms employing an algorithm earn significantly less profit than their rivals. (Un)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion, although humans do seem to perceive algorithms as more disruptive.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783863043919
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265530
    Series: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 392
    Subjects: algorithms; collusion; human-computer interaction; labora-tory experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Hybrid collusion
    algorithmic pricing in human-computer laboratory markets
    Author: Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin
    Published: May 2021
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    We investigate collusive pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions to an... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 62
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We investigate collusive pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions to an algorithm. We further vary whether participants know about the presence of the algorithm. We find that threefirm markets involving an algorithmic player are significantly more collusive than human-only markets. Firms employing an algorithm earn significantly less profit than their rivals. For four-firm markets, we find no significant differences. (Un)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0008-7A8C-2
    hdl: 10419/245974
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2021, 11
    Subjects: algorithms; collusion; human-computer interaction; laboratory experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten)