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  1. Human-algorithm interaction
    algorithmic pricing in hybrid laboratory markets
    Author: Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin
    Published: October 2022
    Publisher:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    This paper investigates pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of competition when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm delegating its decisions to an algorithm, an n-player... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 256
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper investigates pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of competition when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm delegating its decisions to an algorithm, an n-player generalization of tit-for-tat. We further vary whether participants know about the presence of the algorithm. When one of three firms in a market is an algorithm, we observe significantly higher prices compared to human-only markets. Firms employing an algorithm earn significantly less profit than their rivals. (Un)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion, although humans do seem to perceive algorithms as more disruptive.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783863043919
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265530
    Series: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 392
    Subjects: algorithms; collusion; human-computer interaction; labora-tory experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Hybrid collusion
    algorithmic pricing in human-computer laboratory markets
    Author: Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin
    Published: May 2021
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    We investigate collusive pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions to an... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 62
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We investigate collusive pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions to an algorithm. We further vary whether participants know about the presence of the algorithm. We find that threefirm markets involving an algorithmic player are significantly more collusive than human-only markets. Firms employing an algorithm earn significantly less profit than their rivals. For four-firm markets, we find no significant differences. (Un)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0008-7A8C-2
    hdl: 10419/245974
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2021, 11
    Subjects: algorithms; collusion; human-computer interaction; laboratory experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten)