Taxation and education investment in the tertiary sector
Abstract: "In this paper we briefly report some key data on educational expenditure and output in OECD countries and then turn to the motivations for public education. Public education can be important for equal opportunities and has a number of...
more
|
Abstract: "In this paper we briefly report some key data on educational expenditure and output in OECD countries and then turn to the motivations for public education. Public education can be important for equal opportunities and has a number of redistributional aspects within and between generations. We further discuss possible externalities of education, the issue of intersectoral investment neutrality and a fundamental time consistency problem of optimal taxation that may make public expenditure on tertiary education desirable from an efficiency point of view. Further we discuss whether and how globalization changes the picture. Mobility changes the analysis of optimal taxation and may make public expenditure less important. We also emphasize insurance aspects and the role of mobility differences." (author's abstract)
|
Physician reimbursement, time-consistency and the quality of care
Abstract: "We use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians' incentives to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation. If the price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner...
more
|
Abstract: "We use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians' incentives to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation. If the price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner cannot implement the first-best policy. Moreover, the second-best policy is time inconsistent. Excess entry and firstbest efficient total quality provision is observed in the game without commitment. Allowing physicians to compete in prices does not solve the commitment problem since the competitive solution coincides with the time consistent outcome. In the median voter equilibrium the time consistency problem is more severe." (author's abstract)
|
