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Displaying results 1 to 2 of 2.

  1. The role of beliefs for the sustainability of the fiscal constitution
    Author: Neumärker, Bernhard; Pech, Gerald
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0213)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper series / University of St. Andrews, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm ; 0213
    Subjects: Finanzverfassung; Steuerpolitik; Steuerstrafrecht; Erwartungsbildung; Spieltheorie; Theorie; State, The; Rule of law; Constitutional law; Tax evasion; Game theory
    Scope: 36 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 34 - 36
  2. Penalties in the theory of equilibrium tax evasion
    solving King John's problem
    Author: Neumärker, Bernhard; Pech, Gerald
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  Albert-Ludwigs-Univ. Freiburg, Freiburg

    We characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 339 (2010,1)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. We identify a unique limit equilibrium where the poorest citizens evade, intermediate citizens are honest and the richest citizens are indifferent between evading and truth-telling. For small tax rates and auditing cost, committing to a discretionary punishment relief scheme increases expected tax revenue. -- Tax evasion ; signaling ; optimal punishment

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/57635
    Series: The constitutional economics network working papers ; 01-2010
    Subjects: Steuerstrafrecht; Steuerstrafrecht; Straffreiheit; Strafe; Steuermoral; Haushaltseinkommen; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S., 547,20 KB), graph. Darst.