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  1. The costs and benefits of rules of origin
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John
    Published: 29 January 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation... more

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    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Location:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

     

    Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation is justifiable. The rule does not bind for all supply chains, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers do not comply. For those suppliers it affects, the rule both increases investments and induces excessive sourcing within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, the best rule binds for relatively high-productivity suppliers, because the marginal net welfare gain from tightening it increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a $strict$ rule is socially desirable. In contrast, a lenient rule binds for relatively low-productivity suppliers and is more likely to be harmful. For output tariffs that are not too high, a sufficiently strict rule ensures welfare gains.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18789
    Subjects: Hold-up problem; Sourcing; Incomplete contracts; Regionalism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Information frictions and the two margins of trade
    evidence from Slovenian manufacturing
    Author: Zaurino, Elena; Polanec, Sašo
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  European Commission, Ispra

    We empirically investigate whether firms lower information frictions in foreign sourcing through prior exporting. Using a panel of Slovenian manufacturing firms in the period 1996-2011, we estimate the probability of import entry in a new market when... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 628
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We empirically investigate whether firms lower information frictions in foreign sourcing through prior exporting. Using a panel of Slovenian manufacturing firms in the period 1996-2011, we estimate the probability of import entry in a new market when the firm is already exporting to the same country and we find a positive and significant relation. To control for the endogeneity of the export decision, we implement an instrumental variable approach exploiting the notion of sequential exporting. Moreover, we rule out productivity growth as being the only predictor of entry in a foreign market through several falsification tests. These findings suggest information frictions play an important role for firms trading in international markets.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283096
    Series: JRC working papers in economics and finance ; 2023, 7
    Subjects: Sourcing; Import entry; Information Frictions; Sunk costs
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The costs and benefits of rules of origin
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John
    Published: 29 January 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation... more

    Access:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Location:
    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    LZ 161
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation is justifiable. The rule does not bind for all supply chains, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers do not comply. For those suppliers it affects, the rule both increases investments and induces excessive sourcing within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, the best rule binds for relatively high-productivity suppliers, because the marginal net welfare gain from tightening it increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a $strict$ rule is socially desirable. In contrast, a lenient rule binds for relatively low-productivity suppliers and is more likely to be harmful. For output tariffs that are not too high, a sufficiently strict rule ensures welfare gains.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18789
    Subjects: Hold-up problem; Sourcing; Incomplete contracts; Regionalism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen