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  1. The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design
    ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency
    Published: March 2018
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1024
    Subjects: Mechanisms; Interdependent Types; Ex Post Incentive Compatibility; Strategy Proofness; Pareto Efficiency; Preference Functions; Jury Decisions; Allocation Problems; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Monetary mechanisms
    Published: February 18, 2016
    Publisher:  [Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia], [Columbia, MO]

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Working paper series / Department of Economics ; 16-01]
    Subjects: Money; Mechanisms; Bargaining; Liquidity; Credit
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen