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Displaying results 1 to 3 of 3.

  1. Smiles in profiles: improving fairness and efficiency using estimates of user preferences in online marketplaces
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford, CA

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) ; no. 22, 22 (Sept, 2022)
    Subjects: Digitale Plattform; Electronic Commerce; Verbraucherkredit; Künstliche Intelligenz; Matching; Konsumentenpräferenzen; Werbepsychologie; Experiment; Discrimination; Computer vision algorithms; Digital platforms; Matching markets; Experimental methods
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Parallel markets in school choice
    Published: June 13, 2021
    Publisher:  Iowa State University, Department of Economics, Ames, Iowa

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Iowa State University, Department of Economics ; number 21007
    Subjects: Matching markets; deferred acceptance; information acquisition; game theory; lab experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Fairness in matching markets
    experimental evidence
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified... more

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    We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures envy-freeness. When priorities are merit-based, many spectators prefer the Boston mechanism, and this preference increases when priorities are determined by luck. At the same time, there is support for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns for envy-freeness rather than strategy-proofness, while support for the Boston mechanism stems from the belief that strategic choices create entitlements.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282133
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 442 (November 01, 2023)
    Subjects: Matching markets; school choice; voting; Boston mechanism; sincereagents; justified envy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen