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Displaying results 1 to 12 of 12.

  1. ESBies
    safety in the tranches
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  European Systemic Risk Board, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these... more

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 611
    No inter-library loan

     

    The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies - diversification and seniority - can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789295081512
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/193528
    Edition: This draft: September, 2016
    Series: Working paper series / ESRB, European Systemic Risk Board, European System of Financial Supervision ; no 21 (September 2016)
    Subjects: Eurobond; Öffentliche Anleihe; Eurozone; Bank; Portfolio-Management; Bankenregulierung; EU-Staaten
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The sovereign default problem in the Eurozone
    why limited liability resulted in excessive debt accumulation and how insurance can counteract
    Published: [2016]; © 2016
    Publisher:  ifo Institut, Leibnitz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, München

    This thesis was written by Nadjeschda Katharina Arnold while having been a research assistant at the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the University of Munich. It was completed in December 2014 and accepted as a doctoral thesis by the Department... more

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

     

    This thesis was written by Nadjeschda Katharina Arnold while having been a research assistant at the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the University of Munich. It was completed in December 2014 and accepted as a doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics at the University of Munich in May 2015. The thesis analyses the sovereign default problem in the Eurozone in two parts. Part I explains why limited liability may have resulted in excessive debt accumulation: A commitment problem of the European Monetary Union to no bailouts may have banished interest rate risk premiums inducing its member states to ignore a part of their original repayment obligation in their debt decision. Part II shows how insurance can restore optimal incentives of debt accumulation by replacing the interest rate risk premiums with insurance premiums.

     

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Print
    ISBN: 3959420102; 9783959420105
    Other identifier:
    9783959420105
    RVK Categories: QM 333 ; QL 218 ; QL 700
    Series: ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung ; 66
    Subjects: Staatsbankrott; Schuldenkrise; Schuldenübernahme; Beschränkte Haftung; Versicherungsschutz; Eurobond; Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus; Eurozone; EU-Staaten; European Default Risk Pool; Default (Finance); Insurance; Debts, Public
    Scope: xii, 169 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Literaturverzeichnis Seite 165-169

    Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2015

  3. The sovereign default problem in the eurozone
    why limited liability resulted in excessive debt accumulation and how insurance can counteract
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  ifo Institute, Munich

    This thesis was written by Nadjeschda Katharina Arnold while having been a research assistant at the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the University of Munich. It was completed in December 2014 and accepted as a doctoral thesis by the Department... more

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 583 (66)
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    This thesis was written by Nadjeschda Katharina Arnold while having been a research assistant at the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the University of Munich. It was completed in December 2014 and accepted as a doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics at the University of Munich in May 2015. The thesis analyses the sovereign default problem in the Eurozone in two parts. Part I explains why limited liability may have resulted in excessive debt accumulation: A commitment problem of the European Monetary Union to no bailouts may have banished interest rate risk premiums inducing its member states to ignore a part of their original repayment obligation in their debt decision. Part II shows how insurance can restore optimal incentives of debt accumulation by replacing the interest rate risk premiums with insurance premiums. Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde von Nadjeschda Katharina Arnold während ihrer Tätigkeit als Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Center for Economic Studies (CES) an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) München erstellt. Sie wurde im Dezember 2014 abgeschlossen und im Mai 2015 von der volkswirtschaftlichen Fakultät der LMU München als Dissertation angenommen. Die Arbeit analysiert das Staatsschuldenproblem in der Eurozone in zwei Teilen. Teil I erläutert, warum ein Problem der beschränkten Haftung zu exzessiver Staatsverschuldung geführt haben dürfte: Ein Selbstbindungsproblem der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion zum Nichtbeistand im Zahlungsausfall dürfte Zinsaufschläge verbannt und damit ihre Mitgliedstaaten dazu verleitet haben, einen Teil der ursprünglichen Zahlungsverpflichtung in ihrer Entscheidung außer Acht zu lassen. Teil 2 zeigt, wie eine Versicherung die optimalen Anreize zur Staatsverschuldung wiederherstellen kann, indem Zinsaufschläge durch Prämien ersetzt werden.

     

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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/167363
    RVK Categories: QM 333 ; QL 700 ; QL 218
    Series: ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung ; 66
    Subjects: Staatsbankrott; Schuldenkrise; Schuldenübernahme; Beschränkte Haftung; Versicherungsschutz; Eurobond; Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus; Eurozone; EU-Staaten
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa XII, 169 Seiten), Diagramme
    Notes:

    Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2015

  4. The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies
    Published: February 2016
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    W 1 (21993)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 21993
    Subjects: Bankenkrise; Kreditrisiko; Schuldenkrise; Eurozone; Eurobond; Portfoliodiversifikation; Theorie; EU-Staaten
    Scope: 14 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe

    ESB = European Safe Bonds

  5. A model of safe asset determination
    Published: May 2016
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    W 1 (22271)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 22271
    Subjects: Öffentliche Anleihe; Kreditrisiko; Öffentliche Schulden; Refinanzierung; Marktliquidität; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Theorie; Eurobond; Eurozone
    Scope: 54, 15 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe

  6. The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and esbies

    We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks' domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    No inter-library loan

     

    We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks' domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio – known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: HEC Paris Research Paper ; no. FIN-2016-1133
    Subjects: Bankenkrise; Kreditrisiko; Schuldenkrise; Eurozone; Eurobond; Portfoliodiversifikation; Theorie; EU-Staaten
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. ESBies
    safety in the tranches
    Published: 2016
    Publisher:  Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 108 (537)
    No inter-library loan

     

    The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies - diversification and seniority - can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/146918
    Edition: This draft: September 18, 2016
    Series: CFS working paper series ; no. 537
    CFS Working Paper ; No. 537
    Subjects: Eurobond; Öffentliche Anleihe; Eurozone; Bank; Portfolio-Management; Bankenregulierung; EU-Staaten
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Keine Speicherung
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: CEP discussion paper ; no. 1414
    Subjects: Bankenkrise; Kreditrisiko; Schuldenkrise; Eurozone; Eurobond; Portfoliodiversifikation; Theorie; EU-Staaten
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 17 Seiten)
    Notes:

    ESB = European Safe Bonds

  9. The sovereign default problem in the Eurozone
    why limited liability resulted in excessive debt accumulation and how insurance can counteract
    Published: [2016]; © 2016
    Publisher:  ifo Institut, Leibnitz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, München

    This thesis was written by Nadjeschda Katharina Arnold while having been a research assistant at the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the University of Munich. It was completed in December 2014 and accepted as a doctoral thesis by the Department... more

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
    1 A 959993
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    SW 2016/1023
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    2016 A 27789
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    A 271262
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    A16-2160
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    300 QL 218 A757
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    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
    S33-66 a
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    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
    S33-66 b
    No inter-library loan
    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
    S33-66 c
    No inter-library loan

     

    This thesis was written by Nadjeschda Katharina Arnold while having been a research assistant at the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the University of Munich. It was completed in December 2014 and accepted as a doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics at the University of Munich in May 2015. The thesis analyses the sovereign default problem in the Eurozone in two parts. Part I explains why limited liability may have resulted in excessive debt accumulation: A commitment problem of the European Monetary Union to no bailouts may have banished interest rate risk premiums inducing its member states to ignore a part of their original repayment obligation in their debt decision. Part II shows how insurance can restore optimal incentives of debt accumulation by replacing the interest rate risk premiums with insurance premiums.

     

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Print
    ISBN: 3959420102; 9783959420105
    Other identifier:
    9783959420105
    RVK Categories: QM 333 ; QL 218 ; QL 700
    Series: ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung ; 66
    Subjects: Staatsbankrott; Schuldenkrise; Schuldenübernahme; Beschränkte Haftung; Versicherungsschutz; Eurobond; Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus; Eurozone; EU-Staaten; European Default Risk Pool; Default (Finance); Insurance; Debts, Public
    Scope: xii, 169 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Literaturverzeichnis Seite 165-169

    Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2015

  10. ESBies
    safety in the tranches
    Published: 2016
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    W 32 (11537)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; DP 11537
    Subjects: Eurobond; Öffentliche Anleihe; Eurozone; Bank; Portfolio-Management; Bankenregulierung; EU-Staaten
    Scope: 51 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe

  11. The soverign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    W 32 (11317)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; DP 11317
    Subjects: Bankenkrise; Kreditrisiko; Schuldenkrise; Eurozone; Eurobond; Portfoliodiversifikation; Theorie; EU-Staaten
    Scope: 14 Seiten
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe

    ESB = European Safe Bonds

  12. How firms borrow in international bond markets
    securities regulation and market segmentation
    Published: 2016
    Publisher:  Banco de España, Madrid

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    No inter-library loan
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Documentos de trabajo / Banco de España, Eurosistema ; no. 1603
    Subjects: bond markets; securities regulation; debt choice; Rule 144; Eurobond; Global bond
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen