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Displaying results 1 to 3 of 3.

  1. Relational delegation
    Published: Jan. 2005
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an infinitely repeated game a long lived principal faces a series of short lived agents. Every period they play a cheap talk game ala... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an infinitely repeated game a long lived principal faces a series of short lived agents. Every period they play a cheap talk game ala Crawford and Sobel (1982) with constant bias, quadratic loss functions and general distributions of the state of the world. We characterize the optimal delegation schemes for all discount rates and show that they resemble organizational arrangements that are commonly observed, including centralization and threshold delegation. For small biases threshold delegation is optimal for almost all distributions. Outsourcing can only be optimal if the principal is sufficiently impatient.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 1454
    Subjects: Kooperative Führung; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Wiederholte Spiele; Decision making; Agency (Law); Delegation of powers
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 44, [2] p., text, ill
  2. Performance measurement, expectancy and agency theory
    an experimental study
    Published: Sept. 2007
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4 (3064)
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    No inter-library loan

     

    Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels for noisier performance measures. We conduct a real effort laboratory experiment and find that effort levels are invariant to changes in the distribution of the noise term, i.e. to expectancy. This suggests that enriching the economic (linear agency) model commonly applied within this area by including an expectancy parameter is not needed. -- Performance measurement ; expectancy theory ; real effort experiments ; agency theory ; personnel economics

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/34667
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 3064
    Subjects: Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Leistungsanreiz; Leistungsbeurteilung; Performance; Agency (Law)
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 25, [3] S., Text, Ill., graph. Darst.
  3. The Boys from Biloxi
    A Legal Thriller
    Author: Grisham, John
    Published: 2022; ©2022
    Publisher:  Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, New York

    For most of the last hundred years, Biloxi was known for its beaches, resorts, and seafood industry. But it had a darker side. It was also notorious for corruption and vice, everything from gambling, prostitution, bootleg liquor, and drugs to... more

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    Location:
    Hochschulbibliothek Friedensau
    Signature:
    Online-Ressource
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    For most of the last hundred years, Biloxi was known for its beaches, resorts, and seafood industry. But it had a darker side. It was also notorious for corruption and vice, everything from gambling, prostitution, bootleg liquor, and drugs to contract killings. The vice was controlled by small cabal of mobsters, many of them rumored to be members of the Dixie Mafia. Keith Rudy and Hugh Malco grew up in Biloxi in the sixties and were childhood friends, as well as Little League all-stars. But as teenagers, their lives took them in different directions. Keith's father became a legendary prosecutor, determined to "clean up the Coast." Hugh's father became the "Boss" of Biloxi's criminal underground. Keith went to law school and followed in his father's footsteps. Hugh preferred the nightlife and worked in his father's clubs. The two families were headed for a showdown, one that would happen in a courtroom. Life itself hangs in the balance in The Boys from Biloxi, a sweeping saga rich with history and with a large cast of unforgettable characters

     
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