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Displaying results 1 to 6 of 6.

  1. When and why do buyers rate in online markets?
    Author: Hui, Xiang; Klein, Tobias J.; Stahl, Konrad
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Online ratings play an important role in many markets. We study the often disputed information content of these ratings, by proposing a reduced-form Bayesian model of the typical buyer's rating decision. Our empirical evidence based on eBay raw data... more

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    DS 63
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    Online ratings play an important role in many markets. We study the often disputed information content of these ratings, by proposing a reduced-form Bayesian model of the typical buyer's rating decision. Our empirical evidence based on eBay raw data is in line with even intricate predictions from it. We thus have good reasons to calibrate the model to moments of the data. Our simulations suggest that the rating record reveals the seller’s type after about 100 transactions, or 65-70 ratings.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252079
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9562 (2022)
    Subjects: online markets; rating; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Reputation of quality in international trade
    evidence from consumer product recalls
    Author: Zhong, Jiatong
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics, [Edmonton, Alberta]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics ; no. 2022, 08
    Subjects: International trade; reputation; Bayesian learning; quality uncertainty; product recalls
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten)
  3. Collective brand reputation
    Author: Nocke, Volker; Strausz, Roland
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality... more

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    We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/256791
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 324 (April 19, 2022)
    Subjects: Collective branding; reputation; free-riding; repeated games; imperfect monitoring
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Culture clash
    incompatible reputation mechanisms and intergroup conflict
    Author: Fouka, Vasiliki; Schläpfer, Alain
    Published: 23 September 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17534
    Subjects: Soziale Beziehungen; Konflikt; Kooperation; Reputation; Kulturökonomik; Austauschtheorie; cooperation; reputation; indirect reciprocity; discrimination; con-flict
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 81 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. It hurts to ask
    Author: Bénabou, Roland; Jaroszewicz, Ania; Loewenstein, George
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful:... more

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    We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be an excuse, a refusal reveals that the person in need, or the relationship, is not valued very much. We show that a failure to ask can occur even when most helpers would help if told about the need, and that even though a greater need makes help both more valuable and more likely to be granted, it can reduce the propensity to ask. When potential helpers concerned about the recipient's ask-shyness can make spontaneous offers, this can be a double-edged sword: offering reveals a more caring type and helps solve the failure-to-ask problem, but not offering reveals a not-socaring one, and this itself deters asking. This discouragement effect can also generate a trap where those in need hope for an offer while willing helpers hope for an ask, resulting in significant inefficiencies.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265797
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15576
    Subjects: Altruismus; Asymmetrische Information; Soziales Verhalten; Spieltheorie; helping; asking; rejection; respect; shyness; altruism; cooperation; prosocial; image; reputation; information aversion
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Modelling the diffusion of the deterrent effects of competition policy
    Author: Dierx, Adriaan H.; Ilzkovitz, Fabienne; Pataracchia, Beatrice; Pericoli, Filippo
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  European Commission, Ispra

    Through its competition policy interventions the European Commission not only addresses infringements of EU competition law by the firms directly involved, but it also deters possible future anticompetitive behaviour by these firms and other market... more

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    Through its competition policy interventions the European Commission not only addresses infringements of EU competition law by the firms directly involved, but it also deters possible future anticompetitive behaviour by these firms and other market players. The present paper represents the diffusion amongst market players of such deterrent effects by a mixed-influence diffusion model, which includes both an external triggering factor and an internal propagation mechanism. Within the present context, interventions by the European Commission serve as the trigger and interactions between market players, in particular via legal counsels and law firms, stimulate the propagation of the interventions' deterrent effects. The parameters of the mixed-influence diffusion model are calibrated using surveybased information on average deterrence multipliers and an assessment of the reputation of the European Commission as an enforcer of EU competition rules. On this basis, estimates of the deterrent effect of each individual intervention by the European Commission can be obtained. A sensitivity analysis shows that small interventions by a competition authority having a good reputation have larger deterrent effects than the same interventions by competition authorities with a worse reputation. However, this difference is less pronounced for interventions affecting large markets. Similarly, an increase in interactions between legal counsels and law firms has important positive effects on deterrence, in particular for smaller interventions. Finally, the sensitivity of the deterrent effects to changes in interactions is rather similar to the sensitivity to changes in reputation, with the exception for cartel enforcement, where the interactions between legal counsels and law firms have a much greater impact.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283075
    Series: JRC working papers in economics and finance ; 2022, 16
    Subjects: diffusion; deterrent effect; competition policy; European Commission; mixed-influence model; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen