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Displaying results 1 to 16 of 16.

  1. The way people lie in markets: detectable vs. deniable lies
    Author: Tergiman, Chloe; Villeval, Marie-Claire
    Published: December 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation-building. While some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others... more

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    In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation-building. While some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others remain deniable. We find that traditional market mechanisms such as reputation generate strong changes in the way people lie and lead to strategies in which individuals can maintain plausible deniability: people simply hide their lies better by substituting deniable lies for detectable lies. Our results highlight the limitations of reputation to root out fraud when a Deniable Lie strategy is available.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250592
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14931
    Subjects: ying; deniability; reputation; financial markets; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation - direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment - emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/240446
    Edition: This version: 10 June 2021
    Series: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 18
    Subjects: Cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 95 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236687
    Edition: This version: 10 June 2021
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9145 (2021)
    Subjects: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 91 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Melons as lemons
    asymmetric information, consumer learning and seller reputation
    Author: Bai, Jie
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  Center for International Development at Harvard University, [Cambridge, MA]

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: CID faculty working paper ; no. 396
    Subjects: information frictions; quality; learning; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 91 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Profit sharing as a bargaining weapon against unions
    Author: Pecheu, Vladimir
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Aix-Marseille School of Economics, [Aix-en-Provence

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    Series: Working papers / AMSE, Aix-Marseille School of Economics ; WP 2021, nr 35
    Subjects: profit sharing; unions; bargaining; strikes; reputation; labor income inequality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation - direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237342
    Edition: This version: 10 June 2021
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 097
    Subjects: Cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 89 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236498
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14467
    Subjects: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 90 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Observability of partners' past play and cooperation
    experimental evidence
    Author: Kamei, Kenju; Kobayashi, Hajime; Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan
    Published: October 2021
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information... more

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    The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information per se may not improve cooperation. A structural estimation suggests that a certain percentage of players act according to the "Always Defect" strategy, whether or not the reputational information is available. The remaining players adopt available cooperative strategies: specifically, the tit-for-tat strategy when reputational information is not available, and a strategy that conditions on the matched partner's past play when reputational information is available.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248604
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1145
    Subjects: experiment; cooperation; infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: November 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and... more

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    We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest as a means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment doubles cooperation rates in comparison to a control condition. Children also reciprocate others' behavior, yet direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase overall cooperation rates. We also examine the influence of children's cognitive skills and parents' socioeconomic background on cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248949
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9404 (2021)
    Subjects: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 93 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Essays in applied microeconomics
    Author: Ananyev, Mikhail
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, Bonn

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 20.500.11811/9224
    Subjects: public goods; institutions; social dilemma; deferred compensations; wage arrears; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 184 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, 2021
  11. Under-promise and over-deliver?
    online product reviews and firm pricing
    Author: Shelegia, Sandro; Martin, Simon
    Published: 02 September 2021
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP16508
    Subjects: quality signaling; consumer reviews; reputation; loss leadership
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  12. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation − direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment - emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0008-AD80-4
    hdl: 10419/245977
    Edition: This version: 10 June 2021
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2021, 14
    Subjects: Cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 90 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Essays on trust and reputation portability in digital platform ecosystems
    Author: Hesse, Maik
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Contributor: Teubner, Timm (AkademischeR BetreuerIn); Zarnekow, Rüdiger (AkademischeR BetreuerIn); Lachmann, Maik (AkademischeR BetreuerIn)
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 11303/12879
    Subjects: reputation; trust; digital platforms; data portability; digital identity; Reputation; Vertrauen; digitale Plattformen; Datenportabilität; digitale Identität
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 170 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Dissertation, Technische Universität Berlin, 2021
  14. Information payoffs
    an interim perspective
    Author: Doval, Laura; Smolin, Alex
    Published: 13 September 2021
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP16543
    Subjects: Bayesian persuasion; information design; interim payoffs; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets
    Author: Bolton, Gary E.; Breuer, Kevin; Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback... more

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    Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237315
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 070
    Subjects: dispute resolution system; market design; reputation; trust
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Credibility dynamics and inflation expectations
    Author: Kostadinov, Rumen; Roldán, Francisco
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario

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    Format: Online
    Series: Department of Economics working paper series / McMaster University, Department of Economics ; 2021, 06
    Subjects: Imperfect credibility; reputation; optimal monetary policy; time inconsistency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen