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  1. Politicians and their promises in an uncertain world
    evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India
    Author: Banerjee, Prasenjit; Iversen, Vegard; Mitra, Sandip; Nicolò, Antonio; Sen, Kunal
    Published: April 2018
    Publisher:  Economics School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester, Manchester

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics discussion paper series ; EDP-18, 06
    Subjects: politicians; experiments; intrinsic motivation; promise; reputation; India
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Belief-dependent preferences and reputation
    experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena; Nagel, Rosemarie
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  IGIER, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: April, 2018
    Series: Working paper series / IGIER ; n. 622
    Subjects: Repeated psychological game; reputation; guilt; almost complete information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The New Paradigms in Individual Personality Ramifications
    A South Asian Perspective
    Author: Karunaratne, Vidanage P.
    Published: 2016
    Publisher:  LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783659649073; 3659649074
    Other identifier:
    9783659649073
    Edition: 1. Auflage, neue Ausgabe
    Other subjects: (Produktform)Electronic book text; acceptability; Charisma; Ethics; morality; paradigm shifts; reputation; Individual Personality; Attributes/Criteria; Persona-grata status; (VLB-WN)1720: Soziologie
    Scope: Online-Ressource
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    Lizenzpflichtig. - Vom Verlag als Druckwerk on demand und/oder als E-Book angeboten
  4. Special issue, Volume 2 (2016): The making of reputations: honour – glory – celebrity
    Contributor: Korte, Barbara (Herausgeber); Davis, Virginia (Herausgeber)

    Zusammenfassung: Reputation is central to ideas of the heroic. This E-Journal is therefore a suitable place for a record of the 2015 colloquium for doctoral students of Queen Mary University of London and the Humanities Graduate School of the... more

     

    Zusammenfassung: Reputation is central to ideas of the heroic. This E-Journal is therefore a suitable place for a record of the 2015 colloquium for doctoral students of Queen Mary University of London and the Humanities Graduate School of the University of Freiburg that was held in cooperation with the SFB 948 and discussed a range of historically and culturally variable concepts connected with reputation(s) and the processes through which reputations are made, remade and sometimes unmade

     
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    Contributor: Korte, Barbara (Herausgeber); Davis, Virginia (Herausgeber)
    Language: English
    Media type: Article (journal)
    Format: Online
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    Parent title:
    In:: Helden; Freiburg : Universität : SFB 948, 2013-; Heft Volume 2 (2016) Special Issue; Online-Ressource
    Subjects: Ehre; Berühmte Persönlichkeit <Motiv>; Berühmte Persönlichkeit; Ruhm; Ruhm <Motiv>
    Other subjects: reputation; honour; glory; celebrity; (local)Other
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  5. Buffoonery in Irish Drama
    Staging Twentieth-Century Post-Colonial Stereotypes
    Author: Heininge, Kathleen
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Peter Lang Inc., International Academic Publishers, New York

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  6. Reputation and multilateral punishment under uncertainty
    Author: Hajikhameneh, Aidin; Rubin, Jared
    Published: August 4, 2017
    Publisher:  [Chapman University, Economic Science Institute], [Orange, CA]

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Working papers / Chapman University, Economic Science Institute ; 17, 14]
    Subjects: multilateral punishment; reputation; uncertainty; exchange; lab experiment; trust game
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Reputation of quality in international trade
    evidence from consumer product recalls
    Author: Zhong, Jiatong
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics, [Edmonton, Alberta]

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    Series: Working paper / University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics ; no. 2022, 08
    Subjects: International trade; reputation; Bayesian learning; quality uncertainty; product recalls
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten)
  8. Culture clash
    incompatible reputation mechanisms and intergroup conflict
    Author: Fouka, Vasiliki; Schläpfer, Alain
    Published: 23 September 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17534
    Subjects: Soziale Beziehungen; Konflikt; Kooperation; Reputation; Kulturökonomik; Austauschtheorie; cooperation; reputation; indirect reciprocity; discrimination; con-flict
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 81 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. It hurts to ask
    Author: Bénabou, Roland; Jaroszewicz, Ania; Loewenstein, George
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful:... more

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    We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be an excuse, a refusal reveals that the person in need, or the relationship, is not valued very much. We show that a failure to ask can occur even when most helpers would help if told about the need, and that even though a greater need makes help both more valuable and more likely to be granted, it can reduce the propensity to ask. When potential helpers concerned about the recipient's ask-shyness can make spontaneous offers, this can be a double-edged sword: offering reveals a more caring type and helps solve the failure-to-ask problem, but not offering reveals a not-socaring one, and this itself deters asking. This discouragement effect can also generate a trap where those in need hope for an offer while willing helpers hope for an ask, resulting in significant inefficiencies.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265797
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15576
    Subjects: Altruismus; Asymmetrische Information; Soziales Verhalten; Spieltheorie; helping; asking; rejection; respect; shyness; altruism; cooperation; prosocial; image; reputation; information aversion
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Trust and reputation under asymmetric information
    Author: Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if... more

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    We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the multiplier, both the expected frequency of investments and repayments as well as the expected payoffs of both players are higher compared to a situation where the multiplier is public knowledge. We test this result in a laboratory experiment. The data cannot confirm the predicted welfare dominance of private information about the multiplier. We discuss potential reasons for the deviation between theory and experimental data.

     
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    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/224518
    Edition: Version: September 10, 2020
    Series: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 27
    Subjects: reputation; trust; incomplete information; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. The way people lie in markets: detectable vs. deniable lies
    Author: Tergiman, Chloe; Villeval, Marie-Claire
    Published: December 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation-building. While some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others... more

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    In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation-building. While some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others remain deniable. We find that traditional market mechanisms such as reputation generate strong changes in the way people lie and lead to strategies in which individuals can maintain plausible deniability: people simply hide their lies better by substituting deniable lies for detectable lies. Our results highlight the limitations of reputation to root out fraud when a Deniable Lie strategy is available.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250592
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14931
    Subjects: ying; deniability; reputation; financial markets; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Modelling the diffusion of the deterrent effects of competition policy
    Author: Dierx, Adriaan H.; Ilzkovitz, Fabienne; Pataracchia, Beatrice; Pericoli, Filippo
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  European Commission, Ispra

    Through its competition policy interventions the European Commission not only addresses infringements of EU competition law by the firms directly involved, but it also deters possible future anticompetitive behaviour by these firms and other market... more

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    Through its competition policy interventions the European Commission not only addresses infringements of EU competition law by the firms directly involved, but it also deters possible future anticompetitive behaviour by these firms and other market players. The present paper represents the diffusion amongst market players of such deterrent effects by a mixed-influence diffusion model, which includes both an external triggering factor and an internal propagation mechanism. Within the present context, interventions by the European Commission serve as the trigger and interactions between market players, in particular via legal counsels and law firms, stimulate the propagation of the interventions' deterrent effects. The parameters of the mixed-influence diffusion model are calibrated using surveybased information on average deterrence multipliers and an assessment of the reputation of the European Commission as an enforcer of EU competition rules. On this basis, estimates of the deterrent effect of each individual intervention by the European Commission can be obtained. A sensitivity analysis shows that small interventions by a competition authority having a good reputation have larger deterrent effects than the same interventions by competition authorities with a worse reputation. However, this difference is less pronounced for interventions affecting large markets. Similarly, an increase in interactions between legal counsels and law firms has important positive effects on deterrence, in particular for smaller interventions. Finally, the sensitivity of the deterrent effects to changes in interactions is rather similar to the sensitivity to changes in reputation, with the exception for cartel enforcement, where the interactions between legal counsels and law firms have a much greater impact.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283075
    Series: JRC working papers in economics and finance ; 2022, 16
    Subjects: diffusion; deterrent effect; competition policy; European Commission; mixed-influence model; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Collective brand reputation
    Author: Nocke, Volker; Strausz, Roland
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality... more

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    We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/256791
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 324 (April 19, 2022)
    Subjects: Collective branding; reputation; free-riding; repeated games; imperfect monitoring
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation - direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment - emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/240446
    Edition: This version: 10 June 2021
    Series: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 18
    Subjects: Cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 95 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    hdl: 10419/236687
    Edition: This version: 10 June 2021
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9145 (2021)
    Subjects: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 91 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Melons as lemons
    asymmetric information, consumer learning and seller reputation
    Author: Bai, Jie
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  Center for International Development at Harvard University, [Cambridge, MA]

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    Series: CID faculty working paper ; no. 396
    Subjects: information frictions; quality; learning; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 91 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Profit sharing as a bargaining weapon against unions
    Author: Pecheu, Vladimir
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Aix-Marseille School of Economics, [Aix-en-Provence

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    Series: Working papers / AMSE, Aix-Marseille School of Economics ; WP 2021, nr 35
    Subjects: profit sharing; unions; bargaining; strikes; reputation; labor income inequality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation - direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237342
    Edition: This version: 10 June 2021
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 097
    Subjects: Cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 89 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a... more

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    Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236498
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14467
    Subjects: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 90 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Observability of partners' past play and cooperation
    experimental evidence
    Author: Kamei, Kenju; Kobayashi, Hajime; Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan
    Published: October 2021
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information... more

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    The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information per se may not improve cooperation. A structural estimation suggests that a certain percentage of players act according to the "Always Defect" strategy, whether or not the reputational information is available. The remaining players adopt available cooperative strategies: specifically, the tit-for-tat strategy when reputational information is not available, and a strategy that conditions on the matched partner's past play when reputational information is available.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248604
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1145
    Subjects: experiment; cooperation; infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. The roots of cooperation
    Author: Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Romano, Angelo; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
    Published: November 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest as a means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment doubles cooperation rates in comparison to a control condition. Children also reciprocate others' behavior, yet direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase overall cooperation rates. We also examine the influence of children's cognitive skills and parents' socioeconomic background on cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248949
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9404 (2021)
    Subjects: cooperation; reciprocity; third-party punishment; reputation; children; parents; cognitive abilities; socioeconomic status; prisoner's dilemma game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 93 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. When and why do buyers rate in online markets?
    Author: Hui, Xiang; Klein, Tobias J.; Stahl, Konrad
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Online ratings play an important role in many markets. We study the often disputed information content of these ratings, by proposing a reduced-form Bayesian model of the typical buyer's rating decision. Our empirical evidence based on eBay raw data... more

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    Online ratings play an important role in many markets. We study the often disputed information content of these ratings, by proposing a reduced-form Bayesian model of the typical buyer's rating decision. Our empirical evidence based on eBay raw data is in line with even intricate predictions from it. We thus have good reasons to calibrate the model to moments of the data. Our simulations suggest that the rating record reveals the seller’s type after about 100 transactions, or 65-70 ratings.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252079
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9562 (2022)
    Subjects: online markets; rating; reputation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Independent versus collective expertise
    Author: Catonini, Emiliano; Kurbatov, Andrey; Stepanov, Sergey
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  Higher School of Economics Publ. House, Moscow

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; WP9/2023, 01
    Subjects: information aggregation; reputation; cheap talk
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten)
  24. Building reputation
    proxy wars and transnational identities
    Author: Mercier, Marion; Silve, Arthur; Tremblay-Auger, Benjamin
    Published: July 2023
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    In the context of a global security framework that mitigates interstate conflicts, nation-states establish a reputation for resolve by supporting foreign insurrections. Our theoretical predictions indicate that states with a greater number of... more

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    In the context of a global security framework that mitigates interstate conflicts, nation-states establish a reputation for resolve by supporting foreign insurrections. Our theoretical predictions indicate that states with a greater number of co-ethnic groups abroad are more inclined to endorse foreign uprisings, resulting in higher political inclusion for such groups. With a dataset comprising over 280,000 ethnic group × sponsor state × target state × year observations, our analysis corroborates the role of reputation-building through co-ethnicity narratives as a determinant of sponsor state engagement. We argue that this mechanism engenders political concessions within target states, ultimately benefiting groups associated with reputed potential sponsors.

     
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    Language: English
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/279038
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16340
    Subjects: reputation; proxy war
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Learning from online ratings
    Author: Hui, Xiang; Klein, Tobias J.; Stahl, Konrad
    Published: June 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Online ratings play an important role in many markets. However, how fast they can reveal seller types remains unclear. To study this question, we propose a new model in which a buyer learns about the seller’s type from previous ratings and her own... more

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    Online ratings play an important role in many markets. However, how fast they can reveal seller types remains unclear. To study this question, we propose a new model in which a buyer learns about the seller’s type from previous ratings and her own experience and rates the seller if she learns enough. We derive two testable implications and verify them using administrative data from eBay. We also show that alternative explanations are unlikely to explain the observed patterns. After having validated the model in that way, we calibrate it to eBay data to quantify the speed of learning. We find that ratings can be very informative. After 25 transactions, the likelihood of correctly predicting the seller type is above 95 percent.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/301297
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11171 (2024)
    Subjects: online markets; rating; reputation; Bayesian learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 83 Seiten), Illustrationen