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Displaying results 1 to 2 of 2.

  1. Costly voting in weighted committees
    the case of moral costs
    Author: Maaser, Nicola; Stratmann, Thomas
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Aarhus BSS, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Aarhus

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 485
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics working papers ; 2021, 11
    Subjects: moral decision-making; committees; decision rules; deception; institutions; threshold public good games; laboratory experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Communication and social preferences
    an experimental analysis
    Author: Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
    Published: January 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and receivers’ interests are not in conflict. We obtain this even though, as in previous literature, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. We argue our findings could be attributed to distributional preferences of senders who lie to avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than herself.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/232447
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8850 (2021)
    Subjects: experiments; cheap talk; deception; conflicts of interest; social preferences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen