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  1. Lost horizons
    the noncooperative management of an evolutionary biological system
    Author: Goeschl, Timo; Swanson, Timothy M.
    Published: 2002

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 723 (2002.89)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 2002,89
    Subjects: Bioökonomik; Arzneimittel; Immaterialgüterrechte; Theorie; Pharmakologie
    Scope: 31 S
    Notes:
  2. Lost horizons
    the noncooperative management of an evolutionary biological system
    Author: Goeschl, Timo; Swanson, Timothy M.
    Published: October 2002
    Publisher:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano

    This paper studies the interaction between two dynamic domains, (1) an evolutionary biological system ('the environment') whose behaviour determines the availability of a resource stock, and (2) an industry where access to the resource stock is... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 125 (2002,89)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper studies the interaction between two dynamic domains, (1) an evolutionary biological system ('the environment') whose behaviour determines the availability of a resource stock, and (2) an industry where access to the resource stock is determined by the outcome of a patent race. The specific setting of the model is that of managing microbial resistance to antibiotics. Here, resistance develops in response to the use of antibiotics above a threshold level. We show that the optimal policy from society's point of view is to generate through R&D a diversified portfolio of antibiotics that maintains a steady-state of resistance. In practice, however, the management of the resistance stock is left to an industry operating under a system of intellectual property rights (IPR). There, firms are involved in a sequence of patent races to supply the antibiotic with the best cost-effectiveness ratio. The paper studies the structure of the patent race within the industry against the background of pathogen evolution. We show that a multi-firm industry operating under an IPR-based incentive mechanism is unlikely to generate the socially optimal number of antibiotics because IPR systems (1) create incentives for sequential rather than simultaneous innovation; (2) generate incentives that decline with the number of previous (shelved) discoveries; and (3) generate incentives that respond perversely to increases in biological system velocity. These results highlight the importance of well-designed dynamic incentives for managing resource stock dynamics.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/119688
    Series: Array ; 2002, 89
    Subjects: Bioökonomik; Arzneimittel; Immaterialgüterrechte; Theorie; Pharmakologie
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)