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  1. Coordination under the shadow of career concerns
    Author: Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4 (4039)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both be 'good' (enhancing incentives for effort in developing ideas) and 'bad' (preventing voluntary coordination). Our model shows how the firm designs its explicit incentive system and organizes work processes to take these conflicting forces into account. The comparative statics results suggest a link between the increased use of teams and recent changes in labor market returns to skills. -- Career concerns ; group incentives ; knowledge work ; reputation ; teams

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/35744
    Series: IZA discussion papers ; 4039
    Subjects: Innovation; Wissenstransfer; Arbeitsgruppe; Karriereplanung; Reputation; Leistungsanreiz; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 38 S.)
  2. Career concerns incentives
    an experimental test
    Author: Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht; Raab, Philippe
    Published: 08 Jan. 2009
    Publisher:  Univ. of Aarhus, Dep. of Economics, Aarhus

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Speicherung
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics working paper ; 2009,1
    Subjects: Führungskräfte; Anreiz; Karriereplanung; Implizite Kontrakte; Signalling; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 39 S., Text