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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Strategic experimentation
    the case of poisson bandits
    Author: Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Signature:
    bc 1391-737
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Signature:
    1 : Z 104.53 -737-
    Inter-library loan:
    No loan of volumes, only paper copies will be sent

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 624 (737)
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    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

     

    This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies. We characterize the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium of the game, which is in mixed strategies. A variety of asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria is then constructed for the special case where there are two players and the arrival of the first lump-sum fully reveals the quality of the risky arm. Equilibria where players switch finitely often between the roles of experimenter and free-rider all lead to the same pattern of information acquisition; the efficiency of these equilibria depends on the way players share the burden of experimentation among them. We show that at least for relatively pessimistic beliefs, even the worst asymmetric equilibrium is more efficient than the symmetric one. In equilibria where players switch roles infinitely often, they can acquire an approximately efficient amount of information, but the rate at which it is acquired still remains inefficient.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 737
    Subjects: Informationsverhalten; Experiment; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Lernprozess; Theorie; Nichtkooperatives Spiel
    Scope: 35 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 31 - 32

    Internetausg.: ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/737.pdf
  2. Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits
    Author: Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32(3814)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 3814
    Subjects: Informationsverhalten; Experiment; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Lernprozess; Theorie; Nichtkooperatives Spiel
    Scope: 35 S, graph. Darst
  3. Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
    Author: Heidhues, Paul; Rady, Sven; Strack, Philipp
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (387)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider problem is so severe that the equilibrium number of experiments is at most one plus the number of experiments that a single agent would perform. When payoffs are private information and players can communicate via cheap talk, the socially optimal symmetric experimentation profile can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for sufficiently optimistic prior beliefs. These results generalize to more than two players whenever the success probability per period is not too high. In particular, this is the case when successes occur at the jump times of a Poisson process and the period length is sufficiently small.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93893
    Series: Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 387
    Subjects: Entscheidung unter Risiko; Informationsverhalten; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([1], 29 S., 202,03 KB)
  4. Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
    Author: Heidhues, Paul; Rady, Sven; Strack, Philipp
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (10634)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 10634
    Subjects: Entscheidung unter Risiko; Informationsverhalten; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Scope: 24 S.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen