Narrow Search
Search narrowed by
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 7 of 7.

  1. Strategic immunization and group structure
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Univ. of Essex, Dep. of Economics, Colchester

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Keine Speicherung
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (Gültige URL nicht zu ermitteln)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / University of Essex, Department of Economics ; 707
    Subjects: Soziale Gruppe; Soziale Beziehungen; Soziales Netzwerk; Impfung; Gesundheitsvorsorge; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 42 S., 733,78 KB), graph. Darst.
  2. The marginal willingness-to-pay for attributes of a hypothetical HIV vaccine
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Waikato, Hamilton

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Keine Speicherung
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper in economics ; 12,11
    Subjects: AIDS; Impfung; Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse; Conjoint-Analyse; Diskrete Entscheidung; Bangkok; Thailand
    Scope: Online-Ressource (12 S.)
  3. Strategic immunization and group structure
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Univ. of Essex, Dep. of Economics, Colchester

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Keine Speicherung
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / University of Essex, Department of Economics ; 716
    Subjects: Soziale Gruppe; Soziale Beziehungen; Soziales Netzwerk; Impfung; Gesundheitsvorsorge; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 39 S.)
  4. Strategic immunization and group structure
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston

    We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides... more

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 94 (1552)
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between ex-ante identical groups. When groups have an underlying difference, even a small amount of inter-group contacts generates large asymmetries.

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/97249
    Series: Discussion paper / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science ; 1552
    Subjects: Soziale Gruppe; Soziale Beziehungen; Soziales Netzwerk; Impfung; Gesundheitsvorsorge; Theorie
    Scope: Online Ressource (PDF-Datei: 39 S., 768,25 KB), graph. Darst.
  5. Strategic immunization and group structure
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  ISER, [Colchester]

    We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides... more

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 169 (2012,16)
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between ex-ante identical groups. When groups have an underlying difference, even a small amount of inter-group contacts generates large asymmetries. We study the diffusion of a harmful state through a population. Immunity is available, but is costly. The state is meant to capture various kinds of choices or risky behaviors such as, for example, tobacco use, in which case immunity is interpreted as a commitment to avoid the temptation of smoking. The state can also capture the presence of an electronic virus on a computer network; in this case immunity represents the purchase of anti-virus software, or other costly measures taken to avoid the virus. But perhaps the most conventional interpretation is that the state represents human infection of various communicable diseases that spread through social contacts; in this case immunity captures a decision to vaccinate oneself.

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/65918
    Series: ISER Working Paper Series ; 2012-16
    Subjects: Soziale Gruppe; Soziale Beziehungen; Soziales Netzwerk; Impfung; Gesundheitsvorsorge; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 39 S., 4,59 MB), graph. Darst.
  6. Incentive alignment and information elicitation from manufacturers for public goods procurement
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  INSEAD, Fontainebleau

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2012,9
    Subjects: Öffentlicher Auftrag; Öffentliche Güter; Arzneimittel; Impfung; Gesundheitskosten; Leistungsanreiz; Asymmetrische Information
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 28 S., 460,72 KB)
  7. Vaccine marketing
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  INSEAD, Fontainebleau

    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2012,11
    Subjects: Arzneimittel; Pharmaindustrie; Markteintritt; Konsumentenverhalten; Impfung; Arzneimittelmarkt; USA
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 73 S., 587,42 KB)