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Displaying results 1 to 8 of 8.

  1. Citizen's sovereignty and constitutional commitments
    original VS. continuing agreement
    Author: Vanberg, Viktor
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Inst. für Allg. Wirtschaftsforschung, Abt. für Wirtschaftspolitik, Freiburg im Breisgau

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  2. Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
    Author: Gersbach, Hans
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  CES, Munich ; Ifo

  3. Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
    Author: Gersbach, Hans
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    bc 1391-406
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    1 : Z 104.53 -406-
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 624 (406)
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    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
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    When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians' time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CESifo working paper series ; 406
    Subjects: Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Asymmetrische Information; Glaubwürdigkeit; Leistungsanreiz; Wahlverhalten; Spieltheorie; Theorie; Politische Entscheidung; Commitment
    Scope: 20 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 19 - 20

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/406.pdf verfügbar
  4. Citizens' sovereignty and constitutional commitments
    original vs. continuing agreement ; paper presented at Public Choice Meetings 2001, San Antonio, Texas, March 9 - 11
    Author: Vanberg, Viktor
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Inst. für Allg. Wirtschaftsforschung, Abt. für Wirtschaftspolitik, Freiburg im Breisgau

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    B/69716
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1229 (01.6)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Freiburg discussion papers on constitutional economics ; 01,6
    Subjects: Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Verfassungsökonomik; Verhandlungstheorie; Mittelschicht; Konsumentenverhalten; Theorie; Politische Entscheidung; Commitment; Selbstbindung
    Scope: 24 Bl
    Notes:
  5. Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
    Author: Gersbach, Hans
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    bc 1391-406
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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg, Bibliothek 'Georgius Agricola'
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    HeiBIB - Die Heidelberger Universitätsbibliographie
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    W 624 (406)
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    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
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    wrc 10.06:i/m93-406
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    When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians' time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QC 000
    Series: Working paper series / CESifo ; 406
    Subjects: Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Asymmetrische Information; Glaubwürdigkeit; Leistungsanreiz; Wahlverhalten; Spieltheorie; Theorie; Politische Entscheidung; Commitment
    Scope: 20 S.
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 19 - 20

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/406.pdf verfügbar
  6. Citizens' sovereignty and constitutional commitments
    original vs. continuing agreement; paper presented at Public Choice Meetings 2001, San Antonio, Texas, March 9 - 11
    Author: Vanberg, Viktor
    Published: [2001]
    Publisher:  Albert-Ludwigs-Univ. Freiburg im Breisgau, Inst. für Allg. Wirtschaftsforschung, Abt. für Wirtschaftspolitik, Freiburg i. Br.

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    KA 2002/18
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    Bibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
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    Frei 10: F2/2689
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    B/69716
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    Badische Landesbibliothek
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    102 K 37
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1229 (01.6)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik ; 01,6
    Subjects: Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Verfassungsökonomik; Verhandlungstheorie; Mittelschicht; Konsumentenverhalten; Theorie; Politische Entscheidung; Commitment; Selbstbindung
    Scope: 24 Bl.
    Notes:
  7. Fluktuationsneigung und Commitment
    eine empirische Betrachtung bei F-&-E-Mitarbeitern
    Author: Weller, Ingo
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Werkstatt für Organisations- und Personalforschung, Berlin

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    9/55196
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    C 227118
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    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
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    03-5108
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Berichte der Werkstatt für Organisations- und Personalforschung e.V. ; 6
    Subjects: Wissenschaftler; Arbeitsmobilität; Industrieforschung; Arbeitszufriedenheit; Arbeitspsychologie; Kooperative Führung; Theorie; Deutschland; Commitment
    Scope: 27 Bl, 30 cm
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in engl. Sprache

    Literaturverz. Bl. 16 - 18
  8. Why have some monetary reforms succeeded and others not?
    An empirical assessment
    Published: Apr. 2001
    Publisher:  Inst. für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Univ. Köln, Köln

    Monetary history is characterised by crisis and reform. The paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful. A cross-sectional econometric analysis is chosen to deal with this problem. It is based on a standard... more

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    Monetary history is characterised by crisis and reform. The paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful. A cross-sectional econometric analysis is chosen to deal with this problem. It is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and credibility. As the dependent variable, we calculate a post-reform inflation rate. The exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment and the constraining influence of institutions. The paper allows for the conclusion that monetary commitment, the consideration of institutional constraints and abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary reform. -- Monetary Reforms ; Credibility ; Commitment ; Institutions

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/39257
    Series: IWP discussion paper ; 2001,4
    Subjects: Währungsreform; Inflationsbekämpfung; Glaubwürdigkeit; Institutionenökonomik; Schätzung; Erfolgsfaktor; Welt; Commitment
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 32 p., text, ill