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  1. On the profitability of collusion in location games

    Abstract: "In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of... more

     

    Abstract: "In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable." (author's abstract)

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11316
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-22
    Subjects: Räumliche Konkurrenz; Standorttheorie; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; Koalitionstheorie; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Räumlicher Wettbewerb; (stw)Standorttheorie; (stw)Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; (stw)Koalition; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Hotelling-Modell; (thesoz)Theorie; (thesoz)Marktmechanismus; (thesoz)Standort; (thesoz)Profitprinzip; (thesoz)Modellentwicklung; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 12 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion

  2. On the profitability of collusion in location games