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  1. Bargaining, mergers, and technology: choice in bilaterally oligopolistic industries
    Published: 2001

    Abstract: "This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market structure for the distribution of industry profits. We find that retailer mergers are more likely (less likely) if suppliers have increasing (decreasing) unit costs, while supplier mergers are more likely (less likely) if goods are substitutes (complements). In a second step we explore how market structure affects suppliers' technology choice, which reflects a trade-off between inframarginal and marginal production costs. We find that suppliers focus more on marginal cost reduction if (1) retailers are integrated and (2) suppliers are non-integrated. In a final step we consider the whole picture where both market structure and (subsequent) technology choice are endogenous. Analyzing the equilibrium market structure, we find cases

     

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  2. Bargaining, mergers, and technology choice in bilaterally oligopolistic industries