Narrow Search
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 2 of 2.

  1. Optimal state contingent sovereign debt instruments
    Published: September 2021
    Publisher:  International Monetary Fund, [Washington, D.C.]

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9781513595917
    Other identifier:
    Series: IMF working paper ; WP/21, 230
    Subjects: sovereign default; natural disasters; state-contingent debt
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Optimal state contingent sovereign debt instruments
    Published: September 2021
    Publisher:  International Monetary Fund, [Washington, D.C.]

    This paper shows that the optimal sovereign lending contract is state-contingent when a government can default. It provides a theoretical basis for the specification of optimal state-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) in countries subject to large... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
    No inter-library loan
    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
    No inter-library loan
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    No inter-library loan
    Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt / Forschungsbibliothek Gotha, Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt
    No inter-library loan
    Bibliothek der Pädagogischen Hochschule Freiburg/Breisgau
    No inter-library loan
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    No inter-library loan
    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt / Zentrale
    No inter-library loan
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    Technische Universität Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg Heidenheim, Bibliothek
    e-Book Nationallizenz
    No inter-library loan
    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    Fachhochschule Kiel, Zentralbibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 301
    No inter-library loan
    Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig
    No inter-library loan
    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg Mosbach, Bibliothek
    E-Book Nationallizenz IMF
    No inter-library loan
    Hochschule Offenburg, University of Applied Sciences, Bibliothek Campus Offenburg
    E-Book International Monetary Fund
    No inter-library loan
    Hochschulbibliothek Pforzheim, Bereichsbibliothek Technik und Wirtschaft
    e-Book International Monetary Fund eLibrary
    No loan of volumes, only paper copies will be sent
    Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg Ravensburg, Bibliothek
    E-Book IMF
    No inter-library loan
    Hochschule Albstadt-Sigmaringen, Bibliothek Sigmaringen
    No loan of volumes, only paper copies will be sent
    Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg Villingen-Schwenningen, Bibliothek
    E_Book IMF
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper shows that the optimal sovereign lending contract is state-contingent when a government can default. It provides a theoretical basis for the specification of optimal state-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) in countries subject to large shocks that can be observed and verified by all parties involved, such as natural disasters or global pandemics. The result is obtained as the endogenous solution to a contracting problem under time-inconsistency when a government cannot credibly commit to honor debt service obligations in all possible states of nature. It is shown that rational investors optimally offer SCDIs that include additional financing when the default constraint is binding, keeping the debtor engaged in the contractual relationship and avoiding asset loss. The debtor benefits because the contract implies net-positive financing when facing a large shock, increasing concurrent welfare, while maintaining access to financing in the future for consumption smoothing at the same terms as with precommitment. SCDIs require maintaining debt at a low level compared to the precommitment case, and also a fiscal consolidation when triggered to contain the increase in debt. Extension of the time inconsistency problem to add the taxation of capital returns shows that the optimal physical capital investment is also state-contingent

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file