Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Narrow Search
Search narrowed by
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm
    Author: Madio, Leonardo; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Management "Marco Fanno", University of Padova, Padova

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 653
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: December, 2022
    Series: Marco Fanno working papers ; 295 (December 2022)
    Subjects: antitrust; capacity constraints; collusion; partial cartel
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm
    Author: Madio, Leonardo; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: December 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We study an infinitely repeated oligopoly game in which firms compete on quantity and one of them is capacity constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little incentive... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study an infinitely repeated oligopoly game in which firms compete on quantity and one of them is capacity constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little incentive to deviate from a cartel. We also present conditions for the emergence of a partial cartel, with the capacity constrained firm being excluded by the large firms or self-excluded. In the latter case, we show under which circumstances the small firm induces a partial conspiracy that is Pareto-dominant. Implications for cartel identification and enforcement are finally discussed.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/271814
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10170 (2022)
    Subjects: antitrust; capacity constraints; collusion; partial cartel
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. History-based price discrimination with imperfect information accuracy and asymmetric market shares
    Author: Colombo, Stefano; Graziano, Clara; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The paper considers a duopoly model in which firms inherited asymmetric market shares and history-based price discrimination is viable. However, firms can identify only a share of their own consumers depending to the degree of information accuracy.... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    The paper considers a duopoly model in which firms inherited asymmetric market shares and history-based price discrimination is viable. However, firms can identify only a share of their own consumers depending to the degree of information accuracy. We derive the pricing strategies and we analyze the relationship between information accuracy and asymmetric market shares, showing under which circumstances there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies. We show that history-based price discrimination makes the dominant firm’s profits always lower than those of the rival, with an ambiguous effect of the information accuracy on industry profits. Moreover, we prove that the level of information accuracy has a decreasing effect on social welfare, while it affects consumer surplus non-monotonically, according to the size of asymmetry in the inherited market shares.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235419
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9049 (2021)
    Subjects: history-based price discrimination; information accuracy; asymmetric market shares
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Personalized pricing with imperfect customer recognition
    Author: Colombo, Stefano; Graziano, Clara; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: May 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We consider a duopoly model where firms can identify only a share of consumers, which is positively correlated with the consumer' preferences. Firms charge personalized prices to the consumers they can recognize and a uniform price to the rest of... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider a duopoly model where firms can identify only a share of consumers, which is positively correlated with the consumer' preferences. Firms charge personalized prices to the consumers they can recognize and a uniform price to the rest of consumers. The firms' available information is given by the combination of two factors: the intensive margin, which determines the share of consumers the firms can recognize in each single location, and the extensive margin, which determines how many locations the firms can identify. Different market configurations emerge according to the size of these margins. We characterize the values of the intensive and extensive margins that maximize firms' profits, and we show that profits are non-monotonic. We also show that the composition, in addition to the size, of the available information - i.e., the mix of these margins - affects firms' profits significantly. Implications for regulatory policies concerning the protection of consumers' information are finally discussed.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/279204
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10455 (2023)
    Subjects: personalized pricing; price discrimination; privacy; margins of information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen