Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 6 of 6.

  1. Migration and informal insurance
    Author: Meghir, Costas; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq; Mommaerts, Corina; Morten, Melanie
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 29
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Current version: July 10, 2019
    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2185 (July 2019)
    Subjects: Informal Insurance; Migration; Bangladesh; RCT
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 79 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Migration and informal insurance
    Author: Meghir, Costas; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq; Mommaerts, Corina; Morten, Melanie
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Economic Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven, CT

    Do new migration opportunities for rural households change the nature and extent of informal risk sharing? We experimentally document that randomly offering poor rural households subsidies to migrate leads to a 40% improvement in risk sharing in... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 90
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Do new migration opportunities for rural households change the nature and extent of informal risk sharing? We experimentally document that randomly offering poor rural households subsidies to migrate leads to a 40% improvement in risk sharing in their villages. We explain this finding using a model of endogenous migration and risk sharing. When migration is risky, the network can facilitate migration by insuring that risk, which in turn crowds-in risk sharing when new migration opportunities arise. We estimate the model and find that welfare gains from migration subsidies are 42% larger, compared with the welfare gains without spillovers, once we account for the changes in risk sharing. Our analysis illustrates that (a) ignoring the spillover effects on the network gives an incomplete picture of the welfare effects of migration, and (b) informal risk sharing may be an essential determinant of the takeup of new income-generating technologies.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/227646
    Edition: Current version: July 10, 2019
    Series: Economic Growth Center discussion paper ; no. 1064
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 79 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Migration and informal insurance
    Author: Meghir, Costas; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq; Mommaerts, Corina; Morten, Melanie
    Published: July 2019
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (26082)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 26082
    Scope: 77 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  4. Encouragement and distortionary effects of conditional cash transfers
    Author: Bryan, Gharad; Chowdhury, Shyamal K.; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq; Morten, Melanie; Smits, Joeri
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aim to reduce poverty or achieve other social goals by making the transfers conditional upon the receivers' actions. Conditions are designed to encourage some desirable behavior that recipients might otherwise... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aim to reduce poverty or achieve other social goals by making the transfers conditional upon the receivers' actions. Conditions are designed to encourage some desirable behavior that recipients might otherwise under-invest in. An unintended consequence of the conditionality may be to distort recipients' actions in ways that lower their welfare. The transfer size plays an important role in shaping such distortionary effects. In certain circumstances, a larger transfer increases distortion more than that it raises benefits from stronger encouragement, implying that (i) there is an optimal transfer size for CCTs, and (ii) unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) may be better than CCTs when the transfer amount is large. We illustrate a range of distortions arising from CCT programs around the world. We then introduce an experimental design that permits a test of this distortionary effect, and implement it in a cash transfer program conditional on seasonal labor migration in rural Indonesia. We find that when the transfer size exceeds the amount required for travel expenses, distortion increases and CCT program outcomes deteriorate.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236357
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14326
    Subjects: conditional cash transfers; distortion; seasonal migration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Migration and informal insurance
    Author: Meghir, Costas; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq; Mommaerts, Corina; Morten, Melanie
    Published: 8-22-2020
    Publisher:  Yale University, Economic Growth Center, [New Haven, CT]

    Do new migration opportunities for rural households change the nature and extent of informal risk sharing? We experimentally document that randomly offering poor rural households subsidies to migrate leads to a 40% improvement in risk sharing in... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 90
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Do new migration opportunities for rural households change the nature and extent of informal risk sharing? We experimentally document that randomly offering poor rural households subsidies to migrate leads to a 40% improvement in risk sharing in their villages. Our model of endogenous migration and risk sharing shows that risky and temporary migration opportunities can induce an improvement in risk sharing enabling profitable migration. Accounting for improved risk sharing, the migration experiment increased welfare by 12.9%. However, permanent declines in migration costs improve outside options for households and can lead to reductions in risk sharing. The short-run experimental results for migration subsidies can differ from the longer-run impacts of a policy that permanently subsidizes migration.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/243242
    Edition: Current version: August 22, 2020
    Series: Discussion papers / Economic Growth Center ; 1072
    Subjects: Informal Insurance; Migration; Bangladesh; RCT
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 95 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Zählung der Vorauflage: no. 1064
  6. Encouragement and distortionary effects of conditional cash transfers
    Author: Bryan, Gharad; Chowdhury, Shyamal K.; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq; Morten, Melanie; Smits, Joeri
    Published: 4-14-2021
    Publisher:  Yale University, Economic Growth Center, [New Haven, CT]

    Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become increasingly popular as a development strategy. These programs aim to reduce poverty or achieve other social goals by making the transfers conditional upon the receivers' actions. Conditions are... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 90
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become increasingly popular as a development strategy. These programs aim to reduce poverty or achieve other social goals by making the transfers conditional upon the receivers' actions. Conditions are designed to encourage some desirable behavior that recipients might otherwise under-invest in. An unintended consequence of the conditionality may be to distort recipients' actions in ways that lower their welfare. The transfer size plays an important role in shaping such distortionary effects. In certain circumstances, a larger transfer increases distortion more than that it raises benefits from stronger encouragement, implying that (i) there is an optimal transfer size for CCTs, and (ii) unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) may be better than CCTs when the transfer amount is large. We illustrate a range of distortions arising from CCT programs around the world. We then introduce an experimental design that permits a test of this distortionary effect, and implement it in a cash transfer program conditional on seasonal labor migration in rural Indonesia. We find that when the transfer size exceeds the amount required for travel expenses, the distortion created induces additional individuals to migrate who have lower (possibly even negative) migration returns, weakening overall program impacts.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/243244
    Series: Discussion papers / Economic Growth Center ; 1085
    Subjects: Conditional cash transfers; Distortion; Seasonal migration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen