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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0902)
    Inter-library loan:
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0902
    Subjects: Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Ungleichheit; Gerechtigkeit; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Unvollständiger Vertrag; Macht; Experiment
    Other subjects: Business enterprises; Partnership; Balance of power; Incomplete contracts
    Scope: 51 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  2. A prize to give for
    an experiment on public good funding mechanism
    Author: Corazzini, Luca; Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca M.
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0714)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0714
    Subjects: Öffentliche Güter; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Fundraising; Auktion; Glücksspiel; Experiment; Theorie; Fund raising; Benefit auctions; Lotteries; Public goods
    Scope: 39 S., graph. Darst.
  3. Single versus multiple prize contests to finance public goods
    theory and experimental evidence
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca M.
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0715)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0715
    Subjects: Öffentliche Güter; Auktion; Experiment; Theorie; Contests; Public goods; Public-private sector cooperation
    Scope: 33 S., graph. Darst.
  4. Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters
    a theory of large elections
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Walsh, Randall P.
    Published: 2011

    "We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (17397)
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    "We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a "smooth" policy rule under which the degree to which parties favor their own interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other words, mandates matter. We argue that this approach is an improvement over the existing literature as it is consistent with the empirical evidence. Incorporating this policy rule into a costly voting model with paternalistic voters yields a parsimonious model with attractive properties. Specifically, the model predicts that when the size of the electorate grows without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive both in terms of numbers and proportions. Further, the model preserves the typical comparative statics predictions that have been identified in the extant costly voting models such as the underdog effect and the competition effect. Finally, under the case of selfish agents, we are able to extend Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules. Thus, this new approach reconciles the predictions of standard costly voting, both in terms of positive turnout and comparative statics predictions with the assumption of a large electorate environment"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 17397
    Subjects: Politische Partei; Politiker; Wahlkampf; Wahlverhalten; Spieltheorie
    Scope: 42 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  5. The important thing is not (Always) winning but taking part
    funding public goods with contests
    Author: Faravelli, Marco
    Published: 2008
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0802)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0802
    Subjects: Öffentliche Güter; Experiment; Spieltheorie; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Asymmetrische Information; Theorie; Public goods; Finance, Public; Contests
    Scope: 20 S., graph. Darst.