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  1. Incentives and innovation?
    R&D management in Germany's high-tech industries during the second industrial revolution
    Published: Oct. 2008
    Publisher:  Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    The allocation of intellectual property rights between firms and employed researchers causes a principal-agent problem between the two parties. We investigate the working contracts of inventors employed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and... more

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 62 (2008.38)
    No inter-library loan

     

    The allocation of intellectual property rights between firms and employed researchers causes a principal-agent problem between the two parties. We investigate the working contracts of inventors employed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering firms at the turn of the 20th century and show that some firms were aware of the principal-agent problem and offered performance-related compensation schemes to their scientists. However, neither a higher total compensation nor a higher share of variable compensation in total compensation is correlated with a higher innovative output. Thus, incentives techniques were already used during the early history of industrial research laboratories, but their impact on innovative output was unsystematic. -- Compensation packages ; incentives ; innovation ; economic history ; Germany, pre-1913

     

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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/32247
    Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2008,38
    Subjects: Industrieforschung; Leistungsentgelt; Wissenschaftler; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Innovation; Deutschland (bis 1945)
    Scope: Online-Ressource (25 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. The underpricing of initial public offerings in imperial Germany, 1870-1896
    Published: Dec. 2008
    Publisher:  Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    In this article, we evaluate underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 1870 and 1896. In contrast to modern data, first day returns were extraordinary low and averaged less than five percent, even during the... more

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 62 (2008.46)
    No inter-library loan

     

    In this article, we evaluate underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 1870 and 1896. In contrast to modern data, first day returns were extraordinary low and averaged less than five percent, even during the speculative period of the early 1870s. Moreover, standard underpricing theories based on asymmetric information, signalling mechanisms, or litigation risk cannot explain underpricing. In contrast to modern markets, the past market return had a negative influence on initial returns. Finally, we show that cash-flow relevant information contained in the corporate charter were readily factored in the first market price. Thus, the historical capital market differed from today's market, but seems to have been efficient. -- Initial public offerings ; Financial history ; Germany pre-1913

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/32236
    Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2008,46
    Subjects: Underpricing; Börsengang; Kapitaleinkommen; Börsenkurs; Effizienzmarkthypothese; Deutschland (bis 1945)
    Scope: Online-Ressource (21 S.)