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  1. Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games
    = Magstabilitás és mag-jellegű megoldások háromoldalú hozzárendelési játékokra
    Published: March 2018
    Publisher:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

    In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we first focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable... more

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    In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we first focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case where each sector of the market has two agents. Furthermore, for any three-sided assignment market, we prove that the union of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those allocations that are compatible with that matching, and this union is always non-empty.

     

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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222019
    Series: Discussion papers / Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; MT-DP - 2018, 6
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)